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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study will deal with an i•portant period in the 
development 0£ employment training policy in the United 
States, the transition between the the programs authorized 
by the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 0£ 1973 
<CETA> and the Job Training Partnership Act <JTPA>, passed 
in 1982. 
By employment training policy, I refer to 
Federally-£unded programs to expand training and 
eaployaent opportunities. Until recently, these programs 
were called manpower training programs. 
0£ course, government expenditures and regulations 
· have always had an e££ect on employment. Some measures, 
such as the Morrill Act of 1862, establishing the land 
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grant colleges, or the Worka Progreaa Administration and 
Civilian Construction Corps 0£ the 1930s, directly 
stimulated JOb creation. Macroeconomic policies are meant 
to expand or contract the demand for labor, among other 
!actors 0£ production, and education policies to affect 
the supply and quality of labor. But the idea 0£ managing 
the composition of labor supply and demand, within 
macroeconomic constraints and £or specified social 
purposes, is a relatively recent one, and still not 
universally accepted in American political thought. 
There has never been a consensus as to the 
predominant purpose of employment training programs. 
Def enders of the programs have claiaed that they are 
primarily designed to iaprove the nation's fund 0£ human 
·: ' 
capital by providing new skills and JOb experience. Both 
defenders and critics have said that employment training 
prograas were primarily welfare programs, cushioning the 
shock 0£ recession through make-work Jobs. Critics 0£ 
employaent training policies have called them only another 
pork-barrel payoff to political allies, and a new source 
0£ patronage. 
The development of "active" Federal employment 
training policies is usually dated froa the Kennedy 
Administration <Marshall ~t ~!·, 1976:564>, when skill 
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training programs were begun in the Appalachian states 
Cthe Area Redevelopment Act 0£ 1961>. From modest 
beginnings, Federal employment training programs grew 
steadily to a level 0£ aore than S8.9 billion expended and 
3.6 aillion people served during the fiscal year 1980 
CETRP, 1982:27>. However, employment training prograaa 
tended to be structured aore as a result 0£ political 
considerations than policy analysis or evaluation 
findings; that is, practice has usually preceded theory. 
Federal employment training programs have been variously 
intended as skill training prograas, retraining programs 
£or displaced workers, countercyclical <anti-recessionary> 
public employment, and, primarily, Job experience and 
training programs £or the disadvantaged unemployed. 
•' 
Accounts 0£ policy development during the 1960s and early 
1970s stress the largely ~g bgg, atheoretical nature 0£ 
employaent training policy, along with the frequent 
political compromises required to pass legislation 
<Mangua, 1969; Mangum and Walsh, 1973; Davidson, 1972; 
Kolberg, 1978). 
After a considerable period 0£ bipartisan support, 
employaent training became a divisive political issue 
during the Nixon Administration. In December, 1970, 
President Nixon vetoed a manpower bill, chiefly because of 
its provision £or public service employaent, which Nixon 
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called .. WPA-type Jobs" and "dead-end JObs" <Davidson,, 
1974:103). In 1973,, Congress succeeded in passing the 
Comprehensive Employaent and Training Act CCETA>,, which 
was subsequently amended in 1975 and 1978. While it ~a 
not ay aia to summarize the coaplete development 0£ 
eaployaent training policy, Chapter Three examines in some 
detail the £inal form 0£ CETA and the issues passed on to 
the drafters of the Joint Training Partnership Act 0£ 1982 
<JTPA>. Some aspects 0£ 9ETA, particularly 
countercyclical public employment, became politically 
unpopular,, and by 1981 the new Reagan adainistration 
seemed hostile to Federal employment training e££orts in 
general. 
Following Ronald Reagan's el~ction in 1980, the 
situation was as £ollows: CETA would expire in 1982 and 
there was little, i£ any, support in the Administration 
£or aerely extending the program. A new law must be 
written, encompassing a re£oraulation 0£ the nation's 
employaent training policy. The Administration and 
Congress were forced to consider the issues involved in 
employaent training policy and to chart the direction £or 
eaployaent and training during the Reagan Administration. 
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Four bills were eventually given serious 
consideration by the Congress: one was a bipartisan 
aeasure introduced in the Senate by Senators Dan Quayle 
CR-Ind.> and Edward Kennedy CD-Mass.>, who were, 
respectively, Chairaan and minority leader 0£ the 
Subcoaaittee on Employment and Productivity 0£ the Senate 
Comaittee on Labor and Human Resources. Generally 
considered to be representatives 0£ opposed ends 0£ the 
political spectrua, the two Senators were certainly an odd 
couple on the face of things, and their reasons £or 
working together will be explored below. A second bill, 
embodying the views of Democratic CETA supporters, was 
introduced in the House by Representative Augustus 
Hawkins, <D-CA>, Chairaan of the Subcomaittee on 
Eaployaent Opportunities 0£ the Committee on Education and 
Labor. A third bill was introduced by Representative 
James Jef£ords <R-VT>, minority leader 0£ the Subcommittee 
on Eaployment Opportunities. The Adainistration, hampered 
by a long delay ·in naaing top administrators in the 
Departaent of Labor, as well as a scandal involving the 
Secretary 0£ Labor, Raymond Donovan, delayed £or several 
months before introducing its own bill, which con£licted 
at aany points with the other three. Soon, appeals to 
bipartisanship fell by the way. Battles were fought at 
every step 0£ the legislative process, with the threat of 
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a Preaidential veto hanging over Congress' deliberations. 
The resulting compromise legislation, called the Job 
Training Partnership Act <JTPA>, was passed in September, 
1982. It is this forced reforaulation of Federal 
eaployaent training policy that is the subJect of •Y 
study. 
My purpose in this study aay be considered .to be 
twofold, although I will contend that the two strands are 
inseparably intertwined. First is the consideration of 
the evolving content of e~ployaent training policy. The 
expiration of CETA forced the rethinking of employment 
training policy, during a period of rapid change in the 
nation's political cliaate. 
Second is the consideration of the process of policy 
asking, and the interest groups that coabined to influence 
the developaent of eaployment training policy. The 
growing level of Federal eMployment training expenditures 
during the 1960s and 1970s stiaulated the creation 0£ a 
large network of persons and organizations with a stake in 
policy developments. There were those who received 
services. There were those who provided services, along 
with the organizations who represented them. There were 
the state and local governments, who dispensed most 0£ the 
Federal funds. There were the practitioners 0£ the new 
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aub-apeciality of eaployaent training policy; these 
experts aixed an interdisciplinary brew of sociology, 
social work, economics, industrial psychology, and 
political science, hoping to create a recipe that would 
aatch program means to political ends. Finally, there 
were the members of .Congress and the Administration, 
charged with the development and oversight of Federal 
legislation. In this context, I will examine the policy 
preferences of those who participated in the legislative 
process, as compared to the policies that were actually 
adopted in legislation. In simpler teras, I wish to 
discover who wanted what and who got what. 
Within the aore general context of the process of 
policy asking, I am particularly ~nterested in the 
phenoaenon of subgovernaents. Subgovernments are the 
clusters of individuals who effectively aake aost of the 
decisions in a policy area. Subgovernaents usually 
consist of a few members of Congress and their staf~, a 
few bureaucrats, and representatives of private groups 
interested in the policy area <Cater, 1964; Ripley and 
Franklin, 1984>. The transition fro• CETA to JTPA 
illu•inates both the functioning of a policy subgovernment 
and ita response to a crisis point, when employment 
training policy had to be fundamentally reconsidered. 
Neither the policy that was shaped nor the process that 
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shaped policy can be explained without reference to each 
other. 
In regard to the structure and £unction of the 
employment training policy subgovernment, this study will 
analyze the way in which the subgovernment produced 
legislation. The legislative process will be 
conceptualized as a series 0£ filters, each layer passing 
a smaller number of options downs to the consideration of 
the next. This conceptualization is not original, but 
lies well within the •ainstream traditions 0£ policy 
analysis, as will be further discussed in Chapter Two 
<Cobb and Elder, 1983; Davidson, 1972; 1974). Elements 0£ 
eaployaent training policy will be characterized as 
distributive or redistributive, £o~lowing the .distinctions 
developed by Ripley and Franklin <1984). Congressional 
voting behavior will be examined in light 0£ the work 0£ 
Kingdon <1981>, and aodi£ications in Kingdon's model will 
be suggested in order to incorporate the concept 0£ 
subgovernments. I hope to show that the process 0£ policy 
making inevitably shapes and limits the content 0£ policy. 
In the case 0£ JTPA, the policy process produced some 
ungainly results, with several contradictions between the 
goals of the legislation and the structures mandated to 
carry out those goals. 
8 
Chapter Two deals with theories 0£ the policy 
process. My conceptualization 0£ the legislative process 
is detailed, along with consideration of some alternative 
methods of analysis. 
Chapter Three examines the structure 0£ the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act CCETA> in its 
final form. CETA and the controversies surrounding its 
administration provided the platform from which new policy 
initiatives sprang. 
Chapter Four considers the role of a special 
institution, the National Commission £or Employment Policy 
CNCEP>. The NCEP was established by law in 1973 to give 
the President and Congress advice on employment training 
policy. As an official evaluation and policy 
organization, the NCEP has played an important and unique 
role in the development of employment training policy. 
Chapter Five describes the transition in 
Administration employment and training policy £rom 1978 
until 1981. First, the finai state and direction of the 
Carter Administration's employment training policy is 
examined, along with appraisals 0£ that policy. Then the 
early development of the Reagan Administration's policy is 
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outlined, along with some reactions to that policy. 
Chapter Six analyzes the policy inputs ,of the chief 
interest groups trying to influence CETA~s replacement 
legislation: business, labor, community-based 
organizations, local and state governments. 
Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine describe the 
legislative maneuvering that led to the final pass~ge of 
the Job Training Partnership Act CJTPA>. Both the content 
of the legislation and the roles of the key legislative 
actors are examined. 
Chapter Ten contains the outcome of the debate over 
the shape of JTPA, and the conclusions of the study; in 
brief: 
1. The development of JTPA was a highly partisan 
activity. There were strong cleavages, between the 
Administration and Congress, between Republicans and 
Democrats in the Congress, among the Federal, local, 
and state governments, and among business, labor, and 
community groups. 
2. The outcome of the legislative process exemplifies the 
incremental, pluralist theory of legislation. 
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3. Although it is too soon to be certain, £roa the point 
0£ view 0£ policy e££ectivenesa, the legislative 
process appears to have £ailed. The aix 0£ political 
structure, administrative controls, and £unding passed 
in JTPA appears to ensure continued auddle in 
employment training programs. 
4. While employment training policy pro£essionals were 
£ighting Cand sometimes winning> battles over program 
structure, the Reagan Administration succeeded in 
imposing simpler, more general political attitudes on 
the overall design 0£ the legislation, through a 
process of "issue expansion," (discussed in Chapter 
Two>. One attitude was the Administration's principle 
0£ cutting £unds £or social spending; another was its 
punitive attitude toward the disadvantaged, or 
"blaaing the victim." 
5. The JTPA development process is a good illustration 0£ 
the working 0£ a subgovernment, both when operating in 
its normal mode of incremental, pluralist policy 
making, and when threatened by "issue expansion" froa 
an outside force (in this case, the Reagan 
Administration> with the power to challenge the 
subgovernment. The pivotal role 0£ key sub-committee 
and committee members was especially apparent, and 
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will be examined. 
6. The employment training subgovernment is:shown to be 
effective at compromising and introducing incremental 
policy changes. A fundamental change of direction 
would require issue expansion, or a aaJor realignaent 
of the subgovernment. 
7. The employment training subgovernment proved to be 
responsive to a limited number of well-organized 
interests, but only when they were able to find allies 
within the subgovernaent. 
8. Unfortunately, the compromises produced by political 
needs do not necessarily match program needs; JTPA 
turned out to be a patchwork quil~, with an 
administrative structure apparently mismatched to its 
funding. 
While the interaction of competing interest groups 
accounts £or the main features in the development 0£ JTPA, 
thus supporting pluralist models, the operation of the 
subgovernment illustrates that access to the arena where 
comptetition takes place is severely limited to those 
groups that can organize considerable quantities 0£ 
resources, both political and financial. Critics have 
said that the American polity is organized to provide 
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socialism to the rich and capitalism to the poor; we aay 
assert the parallel analogy that the political process 
provides pluralism for the elites and elitism for the 
rest. 
This is a case study of policy making, with the 
strengths and weaknesses of the case study method; as 
Nelson Polsby said in a siailar context, "so long as our 
stock of ideas about policy initiation is relatively 
primitive, and so long as we are still learning and 
disagreeing about what a policy is and what an initiation 
is, the strategy of laying out case studies and searching 
£or ideas about the experience they embody seems not only 




THEORIES OF POLICY MAKING 
Policy aaking and the legislative process have been 
studied from many perspectives, £ollowing several 
disciplinary approaches. As the influence of the national 
government on all areas of economic' and social life has 
grown greater throughout this century, the process of 
policy making has become both more complicated and •ore 
i•portant. Consequently, the legislative process has come 
under increasing scrutiny, both popular and academic. 
Studying policy making is complicated, not least 
because so many characters and interests are apt to be 
involved in the process. In the case at hand, employaent 
training policy, one must consider the material interests 
0£ bureaucrats in the eaployment training system who want 
to keep their Jobs, a~d others who would like to get them; 
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the claiaa on political resources of local. state and 
Federal governments; the efforts of Congressmen to win 
funds for their districts; the influence of eaployaent 
training policy professionals inside and outside the 
Government. who have both intellectual and material stakes 
in legislative outcomes; the interests of employers, 
unions, and community-baaed organizations; and, not 
least, the ideological bias of the administration in 
power. 
Despite a massive literature dealing with legislative 
policy asking, there is no consensus on the issue of who 
controls the national legislative process. There seeaa to 
be a school for every political taste (e.g., Berman, 1962; 
Bendiner, 1964; Eidenberg and Morey, 1969; Peabody~~~!·• 
1972; Redman, 1973; Orfield, 1974; Reid, 1980;>. At one 
extreme, a tiny "power elite" is alleged to control· 
national policy; at the other extreme, there are those 
who claia no one is in charge, interest groups having the 
power only to veto the preferences of other groups. 
Most (but not all> power elite theorists are leftist 
in ideology. Their spokesmen have asserted that special 
interest groups are taking control of the governaent, 
that, in the words of Elizabeth Drew, political reporter 
of Ih!! H~~ XQ~~!![• 11 the basis on which our syate• of 
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representative government was supposed to work is slipping 
away. ••• What is at stake ia the idea 0£ representative 
government, the soul 0£ this country" <The Washington 
e2!~, 3/27/83:B1>. In academic circles, Drew's allies 
include Marxian scholars, such as Bottomore C1966), 
Braverman <1974>, and Sweezy C1953>; the power elite 
theorists, exempli£ied by Mills C19SS>, Domho££ C1970; 
1972; 1978; 1979; 1980; 1983>, and Sonquist <1976>; and, 
in large part, the network analysts, including Burt 
C1983>, Galaskiewicz C1979>, Laumann (1979>, and Sonquist 
(1976>. 
The opposing viewpoint consists of those views known, 
to a greater or lesser degree, as pluralist. Pluralist 
theorizing has a long history in the United States, dating 
pluralism was noted as an empirical phenomenon, in 
opposition to the development 0£ a class system, by 
Tocqueville, who, with his usual brilliance, anticipated 
Marx's class analysis: 
To tell the truth, though there are rich men, the 
class of rich men does not exist; £or these rich 
individuals have no £eelings or purposes, no 
traditions or hopes, in common; there are 
individuals, there£ore, but no de£inite class • 
••• CTlhe rich Carel not compactly united among 
themselves (1962 C1838J:436>. 
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Pluralist ideaa have considerable currency among 
contemporary political practitioners as well. Simon 
,., 
Lazarus <who oversaw regulatory policy on the White House 
domestic policy sta££ during the Carter Ad•inistration, 
and is currently a Washington lawyer>, contended that in 
the 97th Congress, "PACs [political action col\aitteesl 
could not buy all the votes they wanted, particularly on 
issues where you aight expect their aoney to count the 
aost" <Wash. ~Q~~, 3/27/83:B1>. Lazarus concluded that 
political action committees cannot influence Congressmen 
to take positions contrary to the "underlying commitment" 
0£ the public: to health, sa£ety, and environmental 
protection. 
On the saae page 0£ the ~g~~, Lloyd Cutler, senior 
partner 0£ one 0£ Washington's aost important political 
law £ir•s, took an even aore radically pluralist position: 
America has a £undaaental problea: because power 
in our political system is so di££used, our 
national government is becoming incoherent and 
irresponsible. It has become virtually impossible 
to sustain national leadership; we get new 
administrations, but they cannot build 
Congressional maJorities that will legislate their 
policies.* 
•cutler's solution ia to re£orm - the Presidential 
noainating process. 
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Perhaps the leading light of acade•ic pluralist 
theorists is Nelson Polsby <1980; 1984>. Pluralists are 
'~ by n~ means a politically cohesive group, nor are they 
predominantly rightist in political orientation. An 
outstanding analysis of the historical development of 
pluralist thought is provided by Lowi <1979>, who views 
pluralist politics, embodied in what he calls 
"interest-group liberaliall," as the death of of Alllerican 
system of governaent under the Constitution of 1787; 
since the late 1960s we have been living in a 
Second Republic ••• operating under an unwritten 
constitution Cwhich states thatl actual policy 
aaking will not come from voter preferences or 
congressional enactments but from a process of 
tripartite bargaining between the specialized 
adainistratora, relevant members of Congress, and 
the representatives of self-selected organized 
interests <1979:xi-xii>. 
Nonetheless, elitist and pluralist conceptions of the 
power structure, and the intellectual traditions behind 
thea, provide rival fraaeworks for the study of policy 
llaking. Still, there are aany elements that they share. 
In •Y view, the crux of the elitist-pluralist argument is 
not so auch over the structure of policy making as the 
relat~ve power of the interest groups. The issue is the 
extent to which non-elite or non-capitalist groups are 
powerful enough to influence the course of government. 
This question ia subJect to empirical investigation in 
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apeci£ic instances, and the instance I choose to study ia 
the developaent 0£ eaployaent training policy. 
In this section, I wish to establish the theoretical 
£oundations £or my atudy 0£ employment training policy 
aaking. I will begin at a quite general level of 
analysis, then look in greater detail at elements of the 
policy making aystea. In tracing the development of a 
policy, I will integrate and build on earlier work, 
illustrating how several iaportant theories of policy 
aaking fit together, applying aodela 0£ policy asking 
stages to the data furnished by the case 0£ employaent 
training policy. 
Nearly all contemporary studies treat policy •aking 
aa a system, although a systems approach is not always 
explicitly recognized, especially in studies 0£ liaited 
areas of the policy aaking process. A typical comment is 
the following: 
we can see clearly that the locus of the probleas 
0£ political agenda-building is essentially those 
pro.ceases occurring at the boundaries of the 
system and its subsystems <Cobb and Elder, 
1983:22>. 
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A conception like this leana on the sociological 
tradition of Persona, and within that tradition the 
M 
classic account of a policy making system ia Smelser's 
(1963). While many theorists have explicitly introduced 
systems aodels of social processes (e.g., Buckley, 1967; 
1968>, I will use Smelser's account as an illustrative 
framework within which aore specialized studies can fit. 
First, there is a perception of a aalfunction in the 
system, or some other stimulus that initiates activity. 
Problem recognition "is clearly a subJective conceptual 
process by consequential organizations" and may itself be 
the result of negotiations among domain actors <Smelser, 
1963:261). Problem recognition will not be a subJect of 
interest in this study. The stimulus for action will be 
taken as given: the legally mandated expiration of CETA 
and the necessity for formulating a replacement Ccf. 
Herman, 1980; Lyles and Mitro££, 1980; and Billings, !~ 
~!·· 1980). 
Second, various actors propose alternative 
interpretations 0£ the problem and the need £or collective 
action to deal with it. Option generation is analytically 
separate, but empirically may occur simultaneously with 
issue generation. Options are not necessarily generated 
according to rational procedures. Organizational routines 
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and standard operating procedures dispose actors toward a 
stock set of solutions that can be applied across a wide 
range~o£ problems <Smelser, 1963:262; c£. March and Olsen, 
1976). 
Third, in discussing the problem, policy domain 
actors com•unicate their pre£erred ways £or dealing with 
the problem and the need £or collective action to one 
another, to non-elite audiences, and to governing actors 
with the authority to make binding decisions £or the 
subsystem. This step introduces the important concept 0£ 
agendas, to which we shall presently return. 
Fourth, domain actors or coalitions of actors atte~pt 
to in£luence the authorities to place their policy 
preferences on the governmental agenda £or 'resolution. 
Fi£th, when an issue reaches the £ormal agenda, 
actors mobilize in an ef£ort to influence which 
preferences become law. This takes place within the 
£ormal processes of Congress: mark-up Cthe line-by-line 
revision 0£ a bill by a sub-committee or committee), 
committee votes and reports, £loor action, House-Senate 
conference, final passage. In the real world, the 
previous point blends seamlessly into this one, since the 
actors who were £ormally communicating in the 
agenda-aaking stage do not £a~l silent. 
21 
Sixth, "the policy cycle ia closed when the 
authorities select one option to deal with the 
~ 
precipitating policy proble•" <Smelser, 1963:260>. In 
Smelser's aodel, the policy cycle ia closed with the 
authoritative decision, in this case the passage 0£ a law. 
In American law-making, it ia more common that the 
controversy is further narrowed but not completely 
settled, since many issues are left to the Executive 
branch to resolve through administrative regulation 
<Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Bardach, 1977; Kagan, 1978; 
Heustadt and Fineberg, 1978; Bardach and Kagan, 1982>. In 
the case 0£ JTPA, the battle over administrative 
regulation is still going on, but I will de£ine that 
battle as outside the scope 0£ my study. 
In the elaborations 0£ Smelser's £ramework discussed 
below, the policy making process is conceptualized as a 
series of filters, each one reducing the number 0£ 
initiatives that pass on to the next step. A pre£atory 
note 0£ caution may be appropriate here. As with any 
organizing metaphor, we must remember the dangers 0£ 
oversiapl1£ication £or the sake 0£ clarity. Eyestone 
reminds us that 
Ctlhe issue translation process rarely proceeds 
step by step £rom issue de£inition to the choice 
0£ a public policy solution, even though it is 
convenient to analyze the process in these 
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discrete segments. More coaaonly, the definition 
0£ an issue is in£luenced strongly by the 
available means 0£ response; that is, basically, 
by ~abitual ways 0£ thinking (1978:51>. 
Fro• another perspective, an elite theorist could 
argue that elite groups can gain access to the public 
agenda through their control 0£ the aaaa aedia. 
Alternatively, elites could place their preferred policy 
options on the government agenda through their direct 
influence on legislators, a byproduct of their economic 
power. The elite-controlled public relations industry 
then contributes to the legitimation 0£ elite preferences 
through manipulation 0£ the aaas public. With this 
reminder that there are competing £ormulations, we will 
continue to explore the policy asking process using the 
convenient systems schema. 
For the purposes 0£ this study, our active interest 
in the policy process begins with Smelser's third step, 
the coaaunication of policy preferences and the setting 0£ 
agendas. Agenda-setting is a central preoccupation of 
this study. 
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The iaportanca 0£ atudying agenda-building resta on 
four observations. First, 
the distribution 0£ in£luence and access in any 
systea has inherent biases. Consequently, the 
aystea will operate to the £avor 0£ some and to 
the disadvantage 0£ others <Cobb and Elder, 
1983:10). 
Second, the range 0£ issues and decisional 
alternatives that can be considered by a polity is 
restricted. This restriction arises £roa two sources. 
"The £!rat is a systems imperative and is predicated on 
the £act that the processing and attention capabilities 0£ 
any human organization are necessarily limited" <Cobb and 
Elder, 1983:10>. To the limited attention capabilities 0£ 
government (c£. Etzioni, 1968, on "scanning units") we 
aust add the observation 0£ Eyestone: "the results 0£ 
decades 0£ social science research show that the 
complexity 0£ social issues is usually real, and not Just 
political" (1978:43). 
The second source 0£ restriction arises fro• the fact 
that 
all £orms 0£ political organization have a bias in 
favor:o£ the exploitation 0£ some kinds of 
con£lict and the suppression 0£ others because 
organization ia the •obilization 0£ bias. Some 
issues are organized into politics while others 
are organized out <Schattschneider, 1960:71>. 
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Third, the aystea'a inertia aakea it extremely 
difficult to change the prevailing bias in terms of the 
types 0£ issues and alternatives that are not only 
considered but also viewed as legitimate concerns of the 
polity. These liaitations ailitate against radical policy 
changes. As Eyestone underlines, 
the political acceptability of ambitious 
government is a fragile commodity. Social and 
economic knowledge, tools, and financial support 
are necessary for governments to tackle certain 
kinds 0£ social and economic problems, and without 
these resources politicians will be reluctant to 
admit the existence of difficult issues <1978:30). 
Fourth, 
pre-political, or at least pre-decisional 
processes often play the aost critical role in 
deteraining what issues and alternatives.are t~ be 
considered by the polity and the probable choices 
that will be made. • •• Froa this perspective, the 
critical question becomes, How does an issue or a 
demand becoae or £ail to become the £ocus 0£ 
concern and interest within a polity <Cobb and 
Elder, 1983:10-12>? 
Before policy initiatives can be adopted, they aust 
£ind a place on the national agenda. Cobb and Elder 
distinguish two types of agendas, the aystemic and the 
£ormal. The first and more general is the systemic 
agenda, which 
consists of all issues that are commonly perceived 
by members of the political community as aeriting 
public attention and as involving aatters within 
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the legitiMate 3uriadiction of existing 
governmental authority (Cobb and Elder, 1983:85). 
Cobb and Elder's work deals extensively with the 
problems of how issues reach the systemic agenda. An 
example of such research would be to examine how civil 
rights became perceived as a national issue requiring 
Federal legislation in the 1960s, or how fears of the 
massive unemployment of skilled workers to be caused by 
automation led to eaployment training proposals in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. 
In their analysis 0£ how issues attain systemic 
agenda standing and thus access to a formal ,~agenda, Cobb 
and Elder state the general proposition that the greater 
the size of the audience that supports an issue, the 
greater the likelihood that it will attain the systemic 
and £oraal agendas <1983:110>. Thia iaplies that the best 
aeans of getting an issue on the agenda is to increase the 
audience £or that issue, and it is this strategy 0£ 
audience expansion, called "issue expansion" by Cobb and 
Elder, that occupies a large portion 0£ their work. 
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Cobb and Elder assert that there is a relationship 
between the size of the audience an issue can attract and 
the way the issue is de£ined. To make more speci£ic 
propositions, they must £irst typologize both issue 
characteristics and audiences. 
The problem of defining the relevant audience £or 
policy making has a long history, which need not be 
summarized here <cf. Dewey, 1927>. Cobb and Elder 
distinguish four general types of "publics" that are 
relevant to political policy making <1983:105). The 
public consists 0£ the audience of the activist group that 
actually participates in social conflict or in policy 
aaking activities. The £our publics can be imagined as a 
set of concentric circles, with each larger .circle 
representing a larger and more general public <1983:111). 
The smallest, most specific public is called the 
identification group <cf. Key, 1961:220>. The 
identification group, while its ties with the activist 
group may vary in strength, nevertheless generally 
identifies its interests with that 0£ the activist group, 
and maintains lasting and stable relations with the 
activist group <Cobb and Elder, 1983:106). 
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Attention groupa £or• the next larger circle 0£ 
publics <c£. Rosenau, 1961:37). Persons in attention 
groups are in£ormed about and interested in certain 
apeci£ic issues, and can be mobilized around those issues. 
Like identi£ication groups, they will be aware 0£ 
a dispute long be£ore it becomes visible or at 
least be£ore it concerns the general public. 
However, attention group participation will tend 
to be dependent on the issues involved in a 
con£11ct, whereas identi£ication group involvement 
centers on the group a££iliations 0£ the 
combatants <Cobb and Elder, 1983:106). 
The third ring 0£ publics is termed the "attentive 
public." This is a "generally in£ormed and interested 
stratua 0£ the population." Though not homogeneous, the 
attentive public tends to be relatively stable in 
composition and comes disproportionately £~om the •ore 
educated and higher income groups <Cobb and Elder, 
1983:107, £allowing Rosenau, 1961:39). We might think 0£ 
this group as those who routinely pay attention to 
national politics and policies at a level 0£ intellectual 
engagement greater than television news. 
The £ourth public, by £ar the largest, is termed the 
mass public. "For the general public to be activated, the 
issues aust be highly generalized and symbolic. In £act, 
it is highly unlikely that this portion 0£ the population 
will ever be mobilized by a given conflict" <Cobb and 
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Elder, 1983:107-8>. When the mass public does become 
interested in an issue, its response is apt to be 
disor~~nized and short-lived. The themes of Presidential 
campaigns are geared to arouse the mass public enough to 
vote for one candidate, and are thus good examples of the 
mostly symbolic content of mass public appeals. 
Issues themselves may be classified according to five 
"fundamental definitional dimensions" (Cobb and Elder, 
1983:96>. Cobb and Elder's dimensions are closely related 
to Parson's pattern variables <Parsons and Shila, 
1951:76-91). Each issue dimension is associated with a 
hypothesis relating the issue dimension to issue expansion 
to a larger public: 
1. The degree of specificity, or how abstractly or 
concretely the issue is defined. The related 
hypothesis is "the more ambiguously an issue is 
de£ined, the greater the likelihood that it will reach 
an expanded public." 
2. Social significance relates to whether an issue is 
peculiar to the iamediate participants or has more 
general social significance: "the aore socially 
significant an issue is defined to be, the greater the 
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likelihood that it will be expanded to a larger 
public:." 
3. Temporal relevance denotes whether the issue is 
expected to have an immediate, short range effect, or 
longer-terJR influence: 11 the aore that an issue is 
defined as having extended temporal relevance, the 
greater the chance that it will be exposed to a larger 
audience." 
4. Complexity concerns whether an issue is simple and 
easily understood, or highly technical: "the more 
non-technical an issue is defined to be, the greater 
the likelihood that it will be expanded to a larger 
public. 11 
5. Categorical precedence indicates whether the issue is 
a routine JRatter with clear precedents, or an 
extraordinary issue or innovation: "the more an issue 
is defined as lacking in a clear precedent, the 
greater the chance that it will be expanded to a 
larger population" <Cobb and Elder, 1983:112-122>. 
Cobb and Elder propose one supplemental proposition, 
relevant to issues that reach a mass public: "issues that 
gain the attention of the aass public must be developed 
rapidly" <1983:124>. This is .due to the mass public's 
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short attention span. 
Manipulating the definition of an iaaue is one of the 
~ 
most important activities of a policy aaking group, since 
issue definition is related to the size and coa•itment of 
the issue~s audience. Consequently, coapeting parties 
will often not agree on how issues should be defined. The 
ability to impose a credible definition of an issue on the 
confusion produced by competing groups is an i•portant 
source of clout <Eyestone, 1978:44>. 
While the above propositions all iaply that their 
converse aay be used to limit issue expansion, Cobb and 
Elder £ind it convenient to categorize conflict 
containment strategies according to two general 
dimensions, group-oriented strategies and issue-oriented 
strategies. Group-oriented strategies, which focus on the 
group advocating policies, include discrediting the group, 
discrediting the leaders 0£ the group, appealing over the 
heads 0£ leaders to members 0£ the group, and co-opting 
the leaders of the group. Issue-oriented strategies 
include symbolic rewards or reassurance <such as 
sympathetic statements>, showcasing or tokenism, creating 
new organizational units to deal with a problem, 
anticipation <taking action to forestall an issue before 
public mobilization>, sy•bol co-optation <£or example, 
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President Nixon's use 0£ the V-for-peace sign>, £eigned 
constraint <a £orm 0£ buck-passing>, and postponeaent--£or 
example, appointing commissions to study the problem <Cobb 
and Elder, 1983:124-129). 
The use 0£ symbols in the presentation 0£ issues to 
the public is important, since the type 0£ language used 
aay be crucial in bringing the issue to public attention. 
Symbol utilization is most important in the elevation 0£ a 
social issue to the systemic agenda. Since my interest 
lies chiefly in the process 0£ achieving the formal agenda 
and enactment, I will not take the space here to discuss 
symbol utilization at length, although there will be tiaes 
when I will re£er to the utilization 0£ symbols during the 
policy making process. Similarly, Cobb and ~lder's 
concerns with the mass media <Chapter 9) are largely 
peripheral to my study, since the employment training 
controversy was rarely mentioned in the mass media, and 
employment training issues were not expanded to the mass 
public--in £act, we shall see that only rarely did issues 
reach the attentive public, through mentions in relatively 
serious newspapers or magazines. 
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The second type of agenda, called the institutional, 
governaental, or formal agenda, 
aay be defined as that set 0£ items explicitly up 
£or the active and serious consideration 0£ 
authoritative decison makers <Cobb and Elder, 
1983:86). 
Only a small portion of Cobb and Elder's study is 
devoted to the means by which demands can be promoted to 
the formal agenda. Although they remind us that "access 
to a formal docket is a dynamic process," they base their 
argument on two propositions. First, 
~n! !~~!n~ ~2 ~h!sh !n !!!Y! !! !~e!ng!9 ~!!! 
g!~!£!!n! ~h! !!!n! e2 ~h!Sh !~ !Sh!!Y!! 
~!S29n!~!2n• By specifying the extent to which an 
issue has been enlarged to the four publics 
discussed earlier, we can determine the probable 
route by which an issue will attain recognition 
fro• governmental o££icials. Second, ~h! !!~g!~ 
~h! eYe!!S t2 ~h!Sh !n !!!Y! h!! e!!Il !~e!n9!9L 
~h! 9~!!t!~ th! !!~~!!h2gg g~ th! sgn~!!s~ e!!ng 
e!!S!9 2Il th! 92SB!~ <1983:152>. 
These propositions lead to £our hypotheses connecting 
the size 0£ the audience to the probability of an issue 
being placed on the £oraal agenda. First, when "conflicts 
are confined to identification groups, formal agenda 
status is most likely to be attained only when disputants 
threaten to disrupt the systea" <Cobb and Elder, 
1983:152-3>. Threats 0£ violence are an example. 
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Second, "con£licta that are con£ined to attention 
groups are most likely to be brought to the agenda by 
threat~~o£ imminent sanctions•• (1983:155>. 
Third, "con£licts that are confined to the attentive 
public are likely to attain the £ormal agenda through a 
brokerage channel" <1983:156>. Political parties and the 
aasa media are examples 0£ brokerage channels. 
Finally, when the mass public becomes involved with 
an issue, "the response £roa the system is almost 
re£lexive; decision-makers automatically place the issue 
on the governmental agenda" (1983:157). However, this 
does not mean that the issue will necessarily be quickly 
resolved. 
Once the issues are placed on the formal agenda, Cobb 
and Elder assert that they have a built-in life that 
assures their existence there £or many years. Even i£ the 
issue is enacted into law, the administration 0£ the law, 
its need for continuing appropriations, and its expiration 
all insure that the issue will remain before Congress. 
This has two iaplications for developing new issues. 
First. since so many old issues are guaranteed a spot on 
the docket, new issues must generate a considerable amount 
0£ attention before they will be considered. Second, one 
of the best ways 0£ gaining a spot on the £ormal agenda is 
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to define the iaaue in teraa of one of the iteas already 
on the agenda <1983:158>. Such a procesa took place in 
the case of employment training programs. The coming 
expiration of CETA forced consideration 0£ policy, and was 
also taken as an opportunity to introduce new policy 
initiatives. 
By granting initiatives space on the formal agenda, 
govern•ent "conveys important messages about who and what 
are socially important, about what is and is not 
problematic, and about what does and does not £all within 
the legitimate purview of governaent" <Cobb and Elder, 
1983:172>. The symbolic weight 0£ such a step may be as 
important as material success in enactment, according to 
theorists such as Murray Edelman, who states.that 
government affects behavior chiefly by shaping the 
cognitions of large numbers 0£ people in ambiguous 
situations. It helps to create their beliefs 
about what is proper; their perceptions of what 
is fact; and their expectation of what is to come 
(1971:7>. 
It is probably iapossible to observe all the ways in 
which policy preferences are placed on the formal agenda. 
Altho~gh aany aethods are public, others are private; for 
example, lobbyists ask Congressmen to add provisions to 
bills before they are introduced. Some aethods are 
illegal, and are kept secret when possible; such methods 
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are occasionally uncovered through investigations such as 
Abacaa, when Congressaen were videotaped while taking 
~ 
bribes to introduce private bills. My research is liaited 
to the use of public communications. A primary goal of ay 
study is to determine which policy preferences survived 
the winnowing of options between the systeaic and foraal 
agendas, and which network actors favored the successful 
preferences. The maJor portion of Cobb and Elder's work 
deals with the systeaic agenda and the way that social 
con£licts become issues on the systemic agenda. In 
contrast, I will be dealing with issues that have already 
been considered part of the systemic agenda, but aust aake 
their way to and through the £ormal agenda to 
authoritative decision. I will call systemic agenda items 
any policy pre£erences that were held by active 
participants in the process 0£ creating JTPA, while foraal 
agenda items will be those policy preferences contained in 
the eaployaent training bills that were introduced in 1981 
and subsequently received serious Congressional attention. 
Formal agendas tend to correspond most closely with 
the views of those who are most politically active <Verba 
and Nie, 1972:299-333>. Thus, the smaller and more 
insulated the group that actively formulates the foraal 
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agenda, the greater the gap between the ayste•ic and 
formal agendas is likely to be. Traditionally, elections 
~ 
are supposed to minimize the gap between the two agendas 
by making politicians accountable to their publics, but 
the connection is imperfect. In fact, in many areas of 
policy aaking, patterns of communication between small, 
cohesive, and well-organized interest groups and 
legislators have been routinized, until the actors 
constitute a relatively closed subsyste•. These 
subsystems have been given many names in the policy making 
literature: issue networks, communities of policy 
professionals, iron triangles, gatekeepers, or the term I 
will adopt here, subgovernments <Heclo, 1978; Wilson, 
1980; Derthick, 1979; Easton, 1965; Cater, 1964; Ripley 
and Franklin, 1984>. In my analysis, the Congressional 
committees charged with creating the employment training 
agenda are the gatekeepers, and I am concerned with which 
policy options pass the gates to consideration by the £ull 
Congress. 
Subgovernments are 
small groups of political actors, both 
governmental and nongovernmental, that specialize 
in speci£ic issue areas. • •• Subgovernments are 
clusters of individuals that effectively make most 
0£ the routine decisions in a given substantive 
area 0£ policy. • •• A typical subgovernment is 
coaposed of members of the House and/or Senate, 
aeabers of Congressional staf£s, a £ew 
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bureaucrats, and repreaentativea 0£ private groups 
and organizations interested in the policy area. 
Usually the members of Congress and staff members 
are from the committees or subcommittees that have 
principal or perhaps exclusive Jurisdiction over 
the policy area dominated by the aubgovernment 
<Ripley and Franklin, 1980:9-10>. 
Subgovernments are a necessary response to the 
tremendous volume of issues facing the government. No 
legislator can be an expert in every area 0£ policy; even 
the most serious aust choose a £ew areas in which to 
specialize. In those areas, usually congruent with the 
committees on which he or she sits, the legislator may 
become a member 0£ the subgovernment. In other areas 0£ 
policy, the legislator must depend on the Judgment 0£ 
politically like-minded colleagues in the relevant 
aubgovernment. 
Subgovernaents are "entrenched bureaucratic 
interests." Their negative capabilities <e~~! Keats> 
should not be underestimated: ''their significance for the 
social issue process is largely potential, resting on 
their ability to de£end established privilege against 
outside efforts to adopt new public-oriented policies, and 
manifesting itself only when the interests of the 
subbgovernment members are challenged" <Eyestone, 
1978:147-148). 
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In their studies of subgovernaents, Ripley and 
Franklin compared the operation 0£ the subgovernaent to 
the type 0£ issue under consideration. Their £ocus was on 
Congressional-bureaucratic relationships, or those between 
the bureaucrats in Executive departments, such as the 
Department 0£ Labor, and the Congress, including 
Congressmen and their pro£essional sta£f. They 
acknowledged the important role 0£ the private sector in 
subgovernaents, but private sector input was not their 
primary interest; rather, they investigated how varying 
types of policy issues affect the 
Congressional-bureaucratic relationship within a 
subgovernment. Accordingly, they have considered the 
policy literature and developed their own typology of 
governmental policy <Ripley and Franklin, 1984:21-28). 
First, policy is divided according to subJect matter: 
domestic policy versus £oreign and de£ense policy. There 
are £our types of domestic policy: distributive, 
coapetitive regulatory, protective regulatory, and 
redistributive. 
The basic notion behind our categorizations is 
that each type of policy generates and is 
therefore surrounded by its own distinctive set 0£ 
political relationships. These relationships in 
turn help to deteraine substantive, concrete 
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outcoaea when policy decisions emerge (Ripley and 
Franklin, 1984:22>. 
Dislributive policies provide subsidies £or ''private 
activities and thus convey tangible governmental benefits 
to the individuals, groups, and corporations subsidized" 
<Ripley and Franklin, 1984:23). The subgovernaenta 
involved in distributive policy are generally stable over 
time, and their actions exhibit low visibility and a high 
degree 0£ logrolling £or mutual bene£it. The 
Congressional subcommittee generally makes final decisions 
after consulting other actors. 
Coapetitive regulatory policy ia a relatively rare 
fora, "aimed at limiting the provision 0£ specific goods 
and services to only one or a few designated deliverers 
who are chosen from a larger number 0£ competing potential 
deliverers" <Ripley and Franklin, 1984:25>. Allocating 
television channels or airport landing slots are examples. 
Most decisions in this area are delegated to bureaus, 
regulatory commissions, or courts. 
Protective regulatory policies are designed to 
protect the public by regulating private activities. 
Federal regulation 0£ pollution, trade, or securities 
aarkets are examples. The actors involved in protective 
regulatory decisions are less stable than in the 
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distributive arena, and ultimate decisions are often •ade 
by the full House or Senate, or in the White House. 
Redistributive policies 
••• are intended to manipulate the allocation 0£ 
wealth, property rights, or soae other value aaong 
social classes or racial groupa in society. The 
redistributive feature enters because a number of 
actora perceive there are "winners" and 11 losers" 
in policies and that policies transfer some value 
to one group !~ ~h~ ~!~~g!~ g~ another group. 
Thus the more well 0££ sometimes perceive 
themselves to be losers in relation to a prograa 
that seeks to confer some benefits on the less 
well 0££ <Ripley and Franklin, 1984:27>. 
In redistributive issues there are generally 
ideological opponents, in favor 0£ or opposed to 
redistribution. Redistributive issues are marked by a 
high degree 0£ visibility and conflict. The outcoae 0£ 
redistributive issues often depends upon strong 
presidential leadership and the willingness 0£ 
participants to retreat from ideological stances and adopt 
coaproaises <Ripley and Franklin, 1984:27>. 
It is perhaps a useful oversimplification to 
characterize distributive issues as those in which 
resources £low from the leas to the aore affluent, while 
in redistributive policy the £low is in the other 
direction. What Ripley and Franklin have shown is that in 
policy aaking the current £lows aore smoothly and awi£tly 
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in the diatributiva direction, while redistributive 
policies must battle upatream. This £oraulation is fully 
consonant with the views of the aore explicitly leftist 
theorists aentioned above. 
To anticipate our narrative somewhat, employaent 
training programs are predominantly distributive in 
character, though with some redistributive elements <and 
with some disagreement among the parties about which is 
which>. Thus, Ripley and Franklin's comments on 
distributive policy making will be of aost interest. 
The interactions 0£ the members of the 
subgovernment that emerge once a subsidy pattern 
has been established are characterized by a low 
level 0£ public visibility and by a high degree of 
autually rewarding cooperation (logrolling> that 
facilitates both perpetuation 0£ the subsidies 
within the subsystea and ita continued low 
visibility. Cooperation and logrolling also mark 
the relationship between legislative members 0£ 
the subgovernment and the rest of the House and 
Senate. Eventually most members of Congress want 
to set up subsidies £or groups they support and 
need cooperation to do so (1984:99>. 
Franklin and Ripley~s propositions concerning the 
expectations about the Congressional-bureaucratic 
relationship during policy £ormation in distributive 
policy aay be concisely summarized. 
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1. The iaportance 0£ the aubgovernaent in the policy area 
is typically high; the subgovernaent ia the aaJor 
loc~s 0£ decision Making. 
2. The range 0£ issues decided by the subgovernaent is 
broad. 
3. The iaportance 0£ the subgovernment in deteraining 
final policy actions is high. 
4. The degree 0£ cooperation between Congress and the 
bureaucracy is high, as both have primary interest in 
pleasing clients. 
5. The normal mode and locus 0£ con£lict resolution is 
£ace to £ace negotiation with the subgovernnent. 
Con£licts are rarely trans£erred to a higher level, 
and visibility (issue expansion) is low. 
6. The usual substance of con£lict resolution is 
incremental compromise between initial.speci£ic 
positions. 
7. When con£lict persists, the dominant institution is 
usually Congress, typically at the subcommittee level. 
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In contrast, expectations about 
Congressional-bureaucratic relationships during 
redistributive policy £oraation are very di£ferent. 
1. The importance 0£ the aubgovernment is usually low, 
with MSJOr decisions aade by the executive branch 
interacting with peak associations. 
2. The range 0£ issues decided by subgovernment is very 
narrow. 
3. The importance 0£ the subgovernment in deteraining 
£inal policy actions is low. 
4. There is potentially high con£lict between Congress 
and bureaucracy, based on partisan and ideological 
di££erences; cooperation is someti•es made possible 
by rede£ining the issue as distributive. We shall see 
in the next chapter that this process took place 
several times during the legislative history 0£ CETA. 
5. Con£licts are normally not resolved within the 
subgovernaent, but resolution is transferred to a 
higher level. 
6. The substance of con£lict resolution is broader 
comproaise at a higher level, rede£inition 0£ issues 
in distributive terms, or nonresolution. 
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7. Which institution is dominant when con£lict persists 
depends on relative partisan and ideological strength 
in Congress <Ripley and Franklin, 1984:100>. 
While formulating an ideal type of aubgovernment 
operation, Ripley and Franklin are quick to point out that 
subgovernaents are rarely completely iamune to scrutiny 
from outsiders. Subgovernment operations can be 
challenged by a number of £actors--disagreement among 
aeabers; the intrusion 0£ outsiders, such as a new 
Administration trying to control policy implementation; 
the introduction 0£ new issues; or the redefinition 0£ 
distributive issues in nondistributive terms 
<1984:104-105). 
Accordingly, there aay be variations in the pattern 
of Congressional-bureaucratic relationships in 
distributive policy asking. The most common pattern is 
expected to be !Ye9Q~!£n!~n~ QQ!!n!nS~· Subgovernment 
doainance describes the typical pattern, in which 
subgovernments decide issues without serious challenge 
fro• those outside the subgovernment. I£ there are 
challenges, they are relatively easily aet by the 
subgovernment. Policy outcomes.favor the interest 0£ 
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those within the aubgovernment. and its policy domain is 
relatively stable. 
A variation on the subgovernment dominance pattern is 
maJor !Y292Y!~nm~n~ !g!E~!~!gn, which ia required when 
challenges to the aubgovernmant becoae powar£ul. The 
subgovernment must then adapt to the challenge to its 
authority, and will either reestablish its dominance, 
though with some accoaodation to new £orces, or will 
disintegrate or be supplanted by a competing set 0£ 
interests represented in another subgovernment. 
92!E!~!ng !Ye92Y!~n!!n~!, a third variation, may 
result when issue Jurisdictions overlap. Finally, 
!Yeggy~~n!!n~ ~!!!n~!9~!~!gn, a rare occurence, may take 
place because the subgovernment loses Jurisdiction over 
its issues, because it collapses in the face 0£ a maJor 
challenge, or because of key personnel changes in the 
critical unita 0£ the subgovernment CRipley and Franklin, 
1984:105-106). 
Ripley and Franklin relate the variations in 
subgovernment types to policy outcomes over tiae, the 
stability 0£ the subgovernment domain, and to the strength 
and £requency of challenges. They view the redistributive 
potential of employment training prograas as modified or 
disguised for the benaf it 
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---~------------------------------~-~~------------------MaJor aubgovernMent aituationa 









------------------------------------------------------~-Short-run Favorable Mixed Mixed 
policy outcoMea 
Long-run policy Favorable Favorable Mixed 
outcoaea 
Stability of High; aay Low Low to 
aubgovt. do1tain expand aoderate 
Strength and Low; Moderate Moderate 
£requency 0£ aporadic to high; to high; 
challenges frequent frequent 
<Ripley and Franklin, 1984:108) 
-~----------------------------~--------------------------
0£ Congreas in the £ora 0£ apecial.revenue sharing 
activitiea, aeans £or passing £ederal £unds to states and 
localities £or a particular use. As we ahall see in aore 
detail in the next chapter, special revenue sharing was a 
concept adopted by the ~ixon Adainiatration and applied to 
eaployaent training prograas during the design 0£ CETA. 
To Ripley and Franklin, 
apecial ~evenue sharing prograaa aeea to be 
replacing progra•s with considerable 
rediatributive potential <which were perceived as 
auch by the participants> with prograaa that 
eaphaaize diatributive potential auch aore <and 
which are generally perceived in teraa 0£ their 
diatributive £eaturea>. Now the client• receiving 
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bene£ita are governmental unita--atates, cities, 
countiea--rather than a class of persons--the 
econoaically disadvantaged. The choices about who 
gets ,~hat at the expense of whoa <the essence 0£ a 
redistributive program> are £uzzed over by the use 
0£ a formula to allocate £unds and by the stress 
on local control <1984:189). 
I£ redistributive issues ere discussed at all, the 
discussion aey take place in the executive departaent <the 
Departaent 0£ Labor in the case of CETA and JTPA> or at 
the local level. 
This view 0£ the policy aaking process, focusing on 
group approaches, can be extended and enriched by 
considering the role 0£ the individual Congressman. The 
dynaaics of Congressmen~s voting decisions have been 
studied by Kingdon (1981>. His work, concerning how 
Congressmen vote on issues on which they are Il9~ experts, 
£its into our conceptual framework and provides .an 
explanation 0£ the individual legislator's behavior that 
is complementary to the analysis 0£ interest-group 
politics and subgovernments. 
King~on adopts a general Model 0£ policy making 
aiailar to that described above, with successively 
narrowing boundaries 0£ alternatives aubJect to 
consideration <Kingdon, 1981:289-91). I£ Kingdon's 
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description of aucceaaively narrowing boundariea is 
aoaewhat lesa detailed than Cobb and Elder'• or Franklin 
~ 
and Ripley's, it ia becauae Kingdon'a focus ia on 
individual voting behavior and the context within which 
Congressmen make their voting decisions. 
The volume 0£ legislation considered by Congress ia 
ao great that no Congressman can hope to study every 
proposal. He must decide, first, in what areas 0£ policy 
be will develop an expertise. These areas are almost 
always related to the committees and subcommittees to 
which he is assigned. Second, he •ust decide how he will 
make up his mind about issues on which he is not a 
specialist. It is this process that aost interests 
Kingdon. 
Kingdon concludes that Congressmen are most 
influenced by like-ainded colleagues. Colleagues on 
different committees are identified aa specialists in 
certain policy areas. They are then Judged according to 
their specialties and by their political orientation, in a 
two-factor summary process <Kingdon, 1981:75-95>. 
Structural characteristics of Congressional 
decision-making are equally important. The influence of 
committees and party leadership, with its control of 
scheduling, parliamentary rules, ·sanctions, and 
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coaaunications, is o£ten decisive <Kingdon, 1981:123-33>. 
The vast maJority 0£ issues are settled in committees and 
subcoamittees. It ia the Job 0£ the committee to generate 
consensus. "Bills about which the rest 0£ the House does 
not care intensely" are completely determined by committee 
action; this includes most appropriations bills <Kingdon, 
1981:139-40>. When it looks as though no consensus is 
possible, the committee's JOb is either to block further 
consideration 0£ the bill, or to generate alternatives £or 
the consideration of the whole House <Kingdon, 
1981:140-42). 
Kingdon £inds that no one set 0£ actors-~the 
Congressman's constituency, House colleagues, interest 
groups, party leadership, the administration, or his/her 
staff--has a pre-eminent influence on decision making, but 
all contribute to a decision process that Kingdon calls 
the consensus mode <Kingdon, 1981:242-3>. Kingdon has 
developed a model of legislative decision-making that 
describes the consensus mode. The Congressman's 
overriding question in beginning the consideration 0£ any 
issue is to decide whether the issue is controversial. To 
aake that decision, the Congressman must be in touch with 
the preferences of colleagues and interest groups. 
so 
I£ there ia little or no controversy, the 
Congressman's voting decision is simple: vote with the 
environment Cthe way everyone else ia planning to vote>. 
The steps in the decision-making model may be £ollowed in 
Figure 1. 
I£ there is con£lict in the environment, the 
Congressman proceeds to Step B, the consideration 0£ 
conflict among the £ield 0£ £orces close to him--his 
trusted associates, his own constituency, or interest 
groups who support him. "I£ he finds his personal £1eld 
0£ £orces £ree 0£ con£lict, then the Congressman votes 
with that £ield" <Kingdon, 1981:245>. 
Only if there is a conflict among his relevant actors 
aust the Congressman consider his goals <Step C>, or what 
he hopes to accomplish by voting one way or the other 
<Kingdon, 1981:245>. Kingdon classi£ies goals into three 
types: 
1. Satisfying constituents. 
2. Intra-Washington 1n£luence. One takes such in£luence 
into account in order to build in£luence within the 
government, a wider group than the House itsel£. 
Considerations include going along with one's party 
leadership, trading £avors with £ellow legislators, 
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and following the lead of the Administration, 
par~icularly i£ the President is 0£ the same party. 
3. Good public policy. Every legislator has a conception 
0£ what aakes good public policy, £ormed by his 
interests and ideology <Kingdon, 1981:246-9>. 
For any particular issue, any, all or none 0£ the 
goals aay pass a critical threshold 0£ iaportance. The 
decision tree in Step C sorts out the considerations £or 
voting according to goal hierarchies. I£ goals are not 
important in the decision, the model predicts that the 
Congressman will vote according to cues from House 
colleagues <Step D>. 
Kingdon's consensus model 0£ Congressional voting 
behavior ties together the structure of the legislative 
process and the individual considerations of the 
Congressman. For us, it helps pinpoint the key figures on 
whoa to focus in the development of legislation, those 
specialists who provide the cues within the Congress: in 
the £irst rank, the committee and subcom•ittee chairmen 
and minority leaders; in the second rank, other 
subcommittee and committee members. We should expect 
these persons to be leaders 0£ the employment training 
subgovernment during the developaent 0£ JTPA. 
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A small, but distinguished group 0£ academic 
researchers has chronicled the development 0£ employment 
training policy. The study 0£ employment training policy 
does not have disciplinary pretensions; its 
practitioners, mostly economists or sociologists, have 
taken an eclectic approach. 
There are several excellent studies 0£ the early 
development and prospects £or employment training policy 
CGinzberg, 1975; Levitan and Zickler, 1974; Mangum, 1978; 
1979; Mangum and Walsh, 1973; Ruttenberg, 1970>. These 
studies, while always descriptive and sometimes 
prescriptive, are explicitly concerned with the developing 
content 0£ employment training policy, and not primarily 
concerned with theorizing about the process 0£ policy 
aaking. Three authors, though, have more explicitly dealt 
with that theae. 
Roger Davidson (1972; 1974> invokes Cater's <1964> 
concept 0£ the subgovernaent in his histories 0£ the 
passage 0£ CETA. His !n! fQ!!~!£! Q! gg!~~~h~n~!Y! 
~!Il~Q~!~ b!9!~!!~!Qn <1972> deals extensively with 
attempts to consolidate coordination and control 0£ 
employment training programs in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Davidson concentrates on· ''the £rustrating history 
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0£ comprehensive manpower legislation between 1969 and 
1971," when Congress passed new legislation, the 
~ 
Employment and Manpower Act, only to have it vetoed by 
Presi9ent Nixon C1972:9>. 
Davidson contends that the development 0£ the 
Employment and Manpower Act "shattered the cozy manpower 
coalition 0£ the 1960s" <Davidson, 1972:71>. Employment 
training programs had been spread around piecemeal during 
the 1960s. The Department 0£ Labor £unded cities and 
counties; the Department 0£ Health, Education, and 
Wel£are £unded vocational educators; state employment 
security agencies had their own programs, as did the 
0££ice of Economic Opportunity, working through Community 
Action Agencies. Although there was a struggle, most 0£ 
these programs were eventually consolidated under the 
Department of Labor. 
President Nixon vetoed the Employment and Manpower 
Act primarily because it contained provisions establishing 
public service employment programs--the Federally-funded 
creation of Jobs in state and local governments. The 
rocks upon .which the Employment and Manpower Act foundered 
were 
ideological divisions which harked back to the 
very beginning 0£ the modern era 0£ governmental 
involvement in the economy, dating from the 
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Depression daya. Public service 
employment--whether one thought 0£ it as new 
opportunity or as "WPA-type JOba"--was a symbol to 
which people reacted quite apart £rom the details 
0£ th~· situation. It was the kind 0£ issue which 
had divided Democrats and Republicans, liberals 
and conseryatives, £or More than a generation; 
and although such issues were thought to be £ading 
£rom the scene, it was revived by a period 0£ high 
unemployment CDavidso~, 1972:71>. 
As we shall see, public service employment was included in 
employment training legislation in 1973, and has remained 
a topic 0£ ideological controversy to this day. In the 
terms 0£ our policy making model, what was seen by the 
Carter Administration as a distributive policy was 
reinterpreted by the Reagon Administration as a 
redistributive one. 
The Nixon Administration also introduced its own 
element 0£ ideological divisiveness into the employment 
training controversy. The Administration had its own 
strategy £or recapturing the political initiative. At 
least since President Johnson's Great Society, it has been 
a strategy 0£ new Administrations to choose a simple theme 
as a catchword, and to translate that theme into policy. 
The Nixon Administration chose the theme New Federalism, a 
symbol int~nded £or the mass public, and it expressed that 
theme through the controversial idea 0£ revenue sharing 
block grants. Thus, the Republican distaste £or public 
service employment opposed the Democratic distaste £or 
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revenue sharing. 
Due ~~ part to concern over rising unemployment, 
employment training legislation was a high priority itea 
in 1971 and 1972. Even while vetoing the 1971 bill, Nixon 
promised to submit new legislation quickly. While 
election year pressure led to the passage 0£ a small 
public service employment bill in 1972 <the Emergency 
Employment Act, with one billion dollars £unding>, 
employment training reorganization and re£orm was put 0££ 
until a£ter the election. Employment sti•ulus had more 
political appeal than the procedural issues 0£ 
reorganization. 
In contrast to procedural issues, the 
bread-and-butter issues 0£ Federal services, and 
the dollars that go with them, are easily 
assimilated and dealt with by elective o££icials. 
Even the potential bene£iciaries 0£ manpower 
reorganization--the mayors, and to a lesser extent 
the governors--showed less enthusiasm £or the 
niceties 0£ procedures than £or the dollars they 
hoped to gain <Davidson, 1972:94). 
Reorganization would have to wait £or the passage 0£ the 
Comprehensive Employaent and Training Act 0£ 1973, 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
In Davidson's 1974 article, "Policy Making in the 
Manpower Subgovernment," he applied Cater~s concept 0£ 
subgovernment to the substance 0£ his 1972 book. The 
manpower subgovernaent comprises the administrators, 
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legislators, and clients 0£ manpower programs. Davidson 
was concerned with the responsiveness 0£ subgovernments to 
public needs. 
Many have become closed systeas, stubbornly 
resistant to the demands 0£ newly sensitized 
groups or even to the routine intrusion 0£ 
concerned citizens. Control 0£ subgovernments 
there£ore £orms a £undamental issue in £uture 
domestic politics <Davidson, 1974:83). 
The struggles over employment training re£ora during 
the 1969-1971 period led Davidson to three conclusions 
about the employment training subgovernment. First, it is 
marked by !~;!~~!! ~~~E!~~!;l• The employment training 
community consists 0£ a variety 0£ agencies and interest 
groups, each competing £or a piece 0£ the action. Once 
initiated, programs generate "virtually irresistible 
pressures £or their perpetuation." The resulting 
structure is programmatically compartmentalized and 
di££icult to modi£y <Davidson, 1974:105>. 
Second, the administrative components 0£ the 
horizontally coordinated. That is, employment training 
programs bind together local, state, and national 
governments. Authority runs vertically between the 
levels; it is not shared between governments at the same 
level. Coordination between programs at any one level is 
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practically nonexistent <Davidson, 1974:105>. 
Final~y, the employment training aubgovernment is 
~Hn£~!9~!!!~ !Y~9n9!~Y!• Those outside the subgovernaent 
have very little in£luence, and even clients 0£ employaent 
training services have had little success in trying to 
participate in the subgovernment. 
As a result of their relative autonomy, 
subgovernaents are highly resistant to change. 
Only a widespread public outcry can penetrate the 
stout de£enses they erect; and for most of the 
time, the operations of the manpower subgovernment 
excite little interest from the general public 
(Davidson, 1974:106). 
One of the aias of this study is to compare Davidson's 
portrait of the subgovernment in 1969-73 to its operation 
in 1981-82. 
Another work that deserves mention, £or its careful 
study of the passage and implementation of CETA, is that 
of Johnston (1979>. In her dissertation concerning the 
Federal role in CETA, Johnston related the development of 
the Federal role in CETA to Grahaa Allison's <1971> three 
models of decision-Making. Allison classified 
decision-making into the Rational Actor model, the 
Organizational Process model, and the Governmental 
<bureaucratic) Politics model. The Rational Actor model 
assumes a unitary focus, a single actor with a rational 
aia, weighing costs and benefits to· aake a 
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value-aaximizing choice. Paul Peterson, expanding on 
Allison's definition, pointed out that the rational actor 
.v 
•ode! can be extended to institutional rationality, which 
.. does not assuJne that the actors have a consistent 
hierarchy of values," but only that they choose the policy 
alternative best suited to their goals <Peterson, 
1976:130). 
The Organizational Process aodel depends on options 
provided by organizations and organizational capabilities, 
with choices aade within those constraints <Allison, 
1971:79). The Governmental Politics model is rooted in 
the pluralist tradition; government actions are the 
"political resultants" of bargaining games <Allison, 
1971:144-147). 
Although Johnston's study provides an extremely 
comprehensive and lucid account of the development of CETA 
and its subsequent regulation, the process did not fit any 
of the three models very well. She concluded that, when 
applied to employaent training policy asking in CETA, 
Allison's models were insufficient. None 
offered a= completely satisfactory explanation by 
itself. Rather, all three models contributed 
aoaething to an understanding of the new 
legislation CCETAl, even though they might appear 
to be contradictory on the surface (Johnston, 
1974:241>. 
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Johnston also used the classification 0£ government 
legislative actions developed by Ripley and Franklin 
(1980). 
Finally, I will £rom time to time re£er to a work 
written £rom the perspective 0£ an important insider in 
the employment training subgovernment. Kolberg~s personal 
view 0£ developing employment training legislation is not 
explicitly theoretical, but is an "insider" account that 
clearly £its into the pluralist school, stressing interest 
group demands and political bargaining between party 
£actions in Congress and the Administration <Kolberg, 
1978). 
Subgovernaent is a concept £rom political science, 
coined by Cater and developed by others, as discussed 
above. The concept 0£ policy network comes £rom Knoke and 
Lauaann (1982>, sociologists allied to that group 
interested in the study 0£ £oraal network analysis. 
Network analysts, working from a systems perspective, 
chart de£ined relationships between actors in a system; 
they then uae various quantitative techniques to summarize 
or classi£y the system~s actors and their relationships 
<Burt and Minor, 1983>. 
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David Knoke and Edward O. Laumann broke new ground 
when they extended the scope 0£ network analysis to the 
~ 
study 0£ national policy domains (1982>.• Knoke and 
Laumann'• interests are quite similar to those 0£ Cobb and 
Elder, although their approach is £rom a soaewhat 
di££erent direction. 
We ask a £undamental question: How does the 
social organization 0£ relations among the elite 
actors constituting a national policy domain 
a££ect the process by which policy proposals are 
generated and put on the national policy agenda? 
<Knoke and Laumann, 1982:255>. 
Despite a siailarity in goals, Knoke and Laumann 
proceed along a di££erent tack, because they de£ine the 
importance 0£ a policy organization according to its 
structural position within a network, rather than by the 
influence 0£ results the organization achieves. Also, 
their interest lies aainly in how groups generate policies 
and place them on the formal agenda. 
To clarify these points, I must examine Knoke and 
Lauaann's reasoning rather closely. They also adopt a 
general model of policy making based on Smelser, and 
reJect Allison's rational actor model of decision •aking 
in £avor of a aore ambiguous organizational aodel siailar 
*They are studying energy and health.policy aaking. 
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to that of March and Olsen C1976>. My study shares these 
choices with theira. 
They consider their work £irmly grounded in the 
tradition 0£ "elite" research, and contend that while 
there are serious limitations inherent in attempts to 
ident1£y a comprehensive national elite, their subsyste•s 
approach, concentrating on delimited policy domains, 
"provides a aore realistic: alternative capable 0£ 
addressing theoretical issues of elite analysis in a 
productive and insight£ul manner" <Knoke and Laumann, 
1'980:3>. 
They de£ine policy domain as: 
A subsystea identi£ied by speci£ying a 
substantively defined criterion of autual 
relevance or common orientation among a set 0£ 
consequential actors concerned with £ormulating, 
advocating, and selecting courses 0£ action <that 
is, policy options) that are intended to resolve 
the delimited substantive problems in question • 
••• The active participants in a policy domain 
include all consequential organizations that have 
responsibility for directing, coordinating, or 
otherwise controlling the creation and 
distribution 0£ domain values <symbolic or 
material> pertaining to the aubsystea'a primary 
function or to externalities that are thereby 
engendered. An organization's consequentiality in 
a particular domain is established by the extent 
to which its actions are taken regularly into 
account in the actions of other domain 
participants. 0£ particular significance is the 
set 0£ organizations that occupies the dominant 
structural positions in the subsystem fro• which 
in£luenc:e over collective decision asking can be 
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exercised. This set coapriaes the elite or core 
organizations 0£ the policy doaain <Knoke and 
Lauaann, 1982:256-257>. 
Fro• these de£initions, it ia not iaaediately obvious 
how the analyst aight identi£y the active and elite 
participants in a real policy domain. However, one 0£ 
Knoke and Laumann 6 s virtues as network analysts is their 
care£ul attention to de£initional issues. The widespread 
interest 0£ network analysts in mathematical techniques 
necessitates a careful attention to the definition of 
network boundaries, and this sharpened perception can 
assist students of policy making, whatever their 
aethodological approach. The issues involved are 
effectively sumaarized in Laumann, Marsden and Prensky 
(1983>, in which the authors construct a typology 0£ 
boundary definition strategies. An imprecise use of 
network inclusion rules can lead to studies that reveal 
little •ore than tautologies. 
In view of the potential consequences of an 
incorrect specif !cation of ~yate• boundaries in 
network analysis, it is somewhat surprising that 
the published literature reporting studies of 
social networks shows little concern £or the 
problem of specifying the inclusion rules used in 
de£ining the membership of actors in particular 
networks and in identifying the types of social 
relationships to be analyzed <Laumann, Marsden and 
Prensky, 1983:19>. 
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Their typology haa two diaensiona: <1> 
aetatheoretical perspective, and (2) definitional focus 
~ 
for delineation. Two •aJor approaches to network closure 
are defined. The first, called the realist approach, 
treats networks as groups that are consciously experienced 
by the actors foraing the groups. "The realist strategy 
of setting network boundaries by definition assumes the 
proposition that a social entity exists as a collectively 
shared subJective awareness of all, or at least aost, of 
the actors who are members" <Lauaann, Marsden and Prensky, 
1983:21>. This definition follows the lead of Weber, and 
the classic example would be Weber~s definition of a 
~!E~~ng as "a social relationship which is either closed 
or liaits the admission of outsiders by rules'' (Weber, 
1947:145>. The realist approach does not require 
relational ties between all aembers of a group. 
The second perspective is the noainaliat: 
here, an analyst self-consciously iaposes a 
conceptual fraaework constructed to serve his own 
analytical purposes. Delineation of network 
boundaries is analytically relative to the 
purposes of the investigator, and thus network 
closure has no ontologically independent status 
<Lauaann, .Marsden and Prensky, 1983:21-2>. 
Parsons' pattern-variable scheae is a classic exaaple of 
noainalist social investigation. 
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Marx illustrates the combined realist and noainalist 
approach. In his conception of social class 
••• one begins with the nominalist concept of 
class-in-itsel£ <K!~!!~ ~n !!~h> and inquires into 
the conditions under which this will or will not 
be trans£oraed into the realist grouping, a 
class-for-itself <Kl!!!~ tY!~ !!~b> <Laumann, 
Marsden and Prensky, 1983:22>. 
The second diaension of Lauaann ~~ ~!-'s typology is 
the definitional £ocus for deliaitation. There are four 
coamonly-used definitional tactics. First is "that of 
using a restriction based on soae attribute or 
characteristic 0£ the actors or nodes in the network" 
<Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 1983:23>. The second 
tactic is "that of speci£ying the network such that it 
includes those actors participating in a social 
relationship of a specified type", the relational 
approach. Third is participation in a defining event or 
activity. Fourth is the multiple foci approach, coabining 
more than one of the £irst three tactics. While the 
Multiple foci tactic 
••• aay lead to theoretically elegant definitions 
0£ aembership, it also has a aa3or weakness, in 
that it reduces the number of problematic features 
to be explained given knowledge of network 
structure <Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 1983:24). 
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by 
Knoke and Lauaann propose to identi£y network actors 
counting the £requency 0£ occurrences in national 
news aedia, appearances at congressional hearings, 
and participation in lobbying and court cases, and 
a £inal scrutiny 0£ the list by a panel 0£ expert 
insiders <1982:258). 
Once the network is aggregated, Knoke and Laumann 
£ocus on the exchange 0£ in£ormation, emphasizing "how the 
social organization 0£ tiaely and trustworthy in£ormation 
£low £rom interested core actors to the proximate 
authorities defines and constrains the nature 0£ the 
policy debate and its outcome" (1982:264). 
Taking the social structure 0£ policy domains as the 
main independent variable in explaining variations in the 
policy process, Knoke and Laumann de£ine "in£ormation 
transmission, or the coaaunication pattern, ••• as the 
priaary relationship among consequential actors in a 
domain's social structure" <1982:264-5). To gather 
primary data on network social structure, they will ask 
actors to identify the usual or typical partners 
to whoa they send and £rom whoa they receive 
various kinds 0£ inforaation about subsystem 
aatters. The researcher then reconstructs the 
coaaunication structure by aggregating these 
routine dyadic exchanges 0£ in£oraation 
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(1982:265). 
The network elite corresponds to those actors best 
£ul£illing mathematical measures 0£ network centrality. 
In the terms 0£ the typology above, Knoke and Laumann's 
method may be classified as nominal and relational. I 
will contrast this with my method shortly; £irst, we will 
examine the range 0£ hypotheses generated by Knoke and 
Laumann's approach. With social structure de£ined as 
patterns 0£ communication, "to hypothesize about the 
ef£ects 0£ domain structure on the policy process, we must 
understand the various ways communication structures can 
di££er £rom each other" (1982:265). 
Knoke and Laumann construct hypotheses concerning 
•: 
£our diaensions 0£ do•ain social organization: 
centralization 0£ the preexisting com•unication structure, 
polarization 0£ event-speci£ic structures, the 
constitutional basis £or making collective decisions, and 
the distribution 0£ resources among the actors. The £irst 
dimension, centralization 0£ the preexisting communication 
structure, is the "degree to which control over 
inforaation transmission is concentrated among positions." 
Hypotheses relating to centralization include <1> "the 
more centralized a domain's communication structure, the 
aaaller the number 0£ policy options generated and the 
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£ewer the positions involved in generating policy options 
for any given issue; and <2> "the lllore centralized the 
communication structure, the aore rapidly are policy 
options winnowed and the shorter the tiae required £or an 
issue to reach the governmental agenda" <Knoke and 
Laumann, 1982:266>. 
Second, polarization on event-speci£ic structures 
measures the extent to which domain actors hold competing 
policy pre£erences. Sample hypotheses are <1> "the less 
centralized a domain's preexisting communication 
structure, the more likely is a polarized structure to 
emerge on a speci£ic event;" and (2) "the more polarized 
the specific event structure, the longer the time required 
for alternatives to be winnowed and for the event to reach 
the government agenda" <Knoke and Laumann, 1982:267>. 
Third, the constitutional basis for making collective 
decisions describes whether the domain actor is a 
governaental organization, a confederated organization, or 
a aonocephalic organization. Selected hypotheses are Cl> 
"monocephalic organizations are the quickest to become 
involved in the recognition 0£ problems and the generation 
of policy options, while confederated organizations are 
the slowest to act;" and <2> "the aore centralized a 
domain's comaunication structure, t~e aore likely that the 
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central positions will be occupied by aonocephalic or 
governmental actors and that the periphery will consist of 
federated actors" <Knoke and Laumann, 1982:269). 
Finally, resource distribution measures the resources 
available to domain actors. Saaple hypotheses are <1> 
"the aore equal the distribution 0£ resources among 
positions in a domain, the larger the number 0£ actors 
involved in problem recognition and in option generation 
£or issues;" and (2) the more equal the distribution 0£ 
resources among positions, the less rapidly will the 
options be winnowed and the less rapidly will the issue 
reach the governmental agenda" <Knoke and Laumann, 
1982:270). 
Knoke and Lauaann's scheme is conceptually elegant, 
rigorously developed, and generates interesting and 
relevant hypotheses. Why not adopt their approach? The 
chief weakness of the approach is the choice, and, 
especially, the operationalization 0£ the independent 
variable. They de£ine the elite actors 0£ the policy 
doaain as those who hold central positions in the domain's 
communication network. Data is gathered by interviewing 
organization representatives in order to reconstruct 
communication patterns. This seeas to ae the potentially 
fatal £law in the aethod. Reconstructing communications 
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patterns £roa interviews is likely to yield data 0£ quite 
suspect robustness and resistance <Mosteller and Tukey, 
,¥ 
1977:Ch. 10>. The method relies too much on £allible 
in£oraants to serve reliably as the basis £or rigorous 
quantitative analysis on such a large scale. Further, the 
calculation 0£ network positions treats all communications 
as 0£ equal sign1£1cance, an assumption certainly not in 
keeping with the views 0£ other elite theorists. That •Y 
call to a Congressaan should be structurally equivalent to 
the chairman 0£ Exxon's call o££ends my sense of the 
policy process. Thus, the aggregation 0£ "routine dyadic 
exchanges 0£ inforaation" does not ensure that true 
Measures 0£ "consequentiality" will be captured. 
Nevertheless, their study contains valuable' 
guidelines £or network definition. In this study, my 
method of identifying network actors is similar to Knoke 
and Lauaann's. I define the network of interest as the 
organizations that were involved in the reauthorization 0£ 
the Coaprehensive Eaployment and Training Act <CETA> as 
the Job Training Partnership Act CJTPA>. Specifically, 
the network 0£ interested organizations includes all those 
mentioned in the following sources: 
71 
1. Organizations repreaented at hearings held by the 
relevant committees. 
2. Organizations mentioned in the ggngr~!!!9n!! B!ggrg 
during debates on JTPA. 
3. Organizations mentioned in the newsletter ~!e!9X!!n~ 
!n9 Ir!!n!ng B!e9rt!r as attempting to in£luence the 
passage of JTPA. 
4. Organizations mentioned in the New York !!!!! or 
Washington fe!~ stories on the development of JTPA. 
5. After a list 0£ organizations was compiled £roa the 
sources above, a small nuaber of expert 11 insiders11 
were consulted to review the list £or other possible 
additions. 
Rather than defining the elite as an artifact of the 
social structure 0£ communications, I wish to ident1£y and 
study the subgovernment, a group defined by its influence 
on the process of policy making. In terms 0£ Laumann !~ 
!!·'•typology, my network is nominal and event-focused. 
As yet, there'.haa been relatively little research using 
this tactic, the aost proainent exaaples being the 
"invisible college" studies 0£ Crane <1972> and Burt 
C1978b>. This network does not define the employment 
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training aubgovern•ent. which ia a smaller group baaed on 
in£luence. However, the subgovernaent can be ident1£ied 
not throug6 measurea of com•unication density but by 
tracing what groups were successful in realizing their 
policy pre£erences. 
To summarize, my study hss a dual £ocus--on the 
content of employment training policy, and on the process 
by which that policy is made. In the realm 0£ content, I 
consider what changes in the coaposition of employment 
training programs were aade in JTPA as compared to CETA, 
what were the sources of new policy initiatives, the 
special role 0£ policy pro£essionals in the design 0£ 
JTPA, which interest groups held which policy preferences, 
and which interest groups were successful in having their 
policy pre£erences adopted ss part 0£ the new law. In the 
real• 0£ process, I will consider to what extent the 
policy aodel above, based primarily on the work 0£ Cobb 
and Elder, Ripley and Franklin, and Kingdon, ia con£1rmed 
in the case 0£ employment training policy making during 
the period 1980-1982; compare the £eatures 0£ the 
employment training subgovernment in 1980-1982 to those 
features described by Davidson in the period 1969-1972; 
and consider to what extent Davidson's hypotheses 
concerning subgovernment characteristics still hold. 
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A chie£ tool in the JOb 0£ tracing sources is the 
~me!2~m!n!: ~ng !~!!n!ng ~!e2r!:!r <£ormerly the ~!ne9~!~ 
B!e9!:!:!!:>, an "insider" newsletter published by the Bureau 
0£ National A££airs, Inc. The insider newsletter is a 
source 0£ data that deserves •ore attention £rom scholars 
0£ contemporary events. A specialized newsletter covers 
alaost any conceivable £ield 0£ Government activity, and 
£or the policy researcher they are invaluable. ~me!2~m!n~ 
~ng !r~!n!ng 8~e9!:!:!!: <~I~> publishes over 1300 pages a 
year solely on employment and training matters. It 
summarizes legislation, regulations, and legislative 
developments, reports on conferences and statements by 
interested groups, reviews books and articles, and 
interviews in£luential persons in the £ield. The current 
C1985) editor Ln chie£ 0£ g!B is a £oraer Assistant 
Secretary 0£ Lapor £or employment training. 
Thia atudy cannot hope to shed light on all 0£ the 
hypotheses presented above. Since it is not a comparative 
study 0£ more than one policy domain, it cannot test 
outcomes that vary according to measures of centrality, 
for example. The following list co~tains questions that 
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will be illuminated to some degree by the case at hand, 
the development 0£ employment training policy in 
1980-1982. 
1. How does the identity 0£ subgovernment actors compare 
to those found by Davidson in 1969-72? 
2. Is the employment training aubgovernment still marked 
by internal complexity, vertical integration, and 
functional autonomy? 
3. To what extent is the situation of the employment 
training subgovernment that of dominance, maJor 
adaptation, or competing with other subgovernments? 
4. Which issues can be classi£ied as distributive or 
redistributive? 
5. Do redistributive issues tend to be rede£ined by the 
subgovernment as distributive issues? 
6. Do Congressional-bureaucratic relationships over 
distributional and redistributional issues correspond 
to Ripley and Franklin's model? 
7. To what extent are the policy preferences of the 
subgovernment placed on the formal agenda, as compared 
to the policy preferences of nonmembers? 
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8. What publics take part in the policy conflict? Is 
issue-expansion used, and 1£ so, by whoa, and with how 
auch success? 
9. Which 0£ Cobb and Elder's hypotheses relating issue 
dimension and issue expansion are supported or 
refuted? 
10. Which groups attempt to manipulate the de£inition 0£ 
issues, £or what purpose, and with what result? 
11. How is issue expansion limited by subgovernment 
members? 
12. What is the use 0£ symbols in the policy process? Are 
they successfully used £or issue expansion? To liait 
issue expansion? Are symbolic means used to ease the 
denial of policy preferences? 
13. Do issue entrepreneurs exist? I£ so, are their 
activities correlated to their positions in the 
subgovernment? 
14. To what extent do political party labels serve to 
distinguish between the policy preferences 0£ 
subgovernment actors? 
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15. Does Congressional voting behavior £it Kingdon's 
consensus model in this case? 
16. To what extent does employment training policy making 
correspond to elitist interpretations 0£ policy 
asking, as opposed to pluralist interpretations? I£ 
access to the £ormal agenda is limited to a small 
group 0£ organized actors <or interests>, yet policy 
making within the subgovernaent is predominantly 
incremental in nature, by what criteria can we label 
the process elitist or pluralist? 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LEGACY OF CETA 
11 As for policy ••• it D\ust be said, as it has been said 
0£ sovereignty, that its real sources are 
undiscoverable. 11 
Before the 1960s, the United States had only a small 
employl\ent training system, consisting 0£ apprenticeship, 
vocational education, and vocational rehabilitation 
programs. These programs had few full-time trainees, were 
narrow in focus, subJect to only miniaal Federal 
standards, and were generally unconcerned with the 
disadvantaged (Marshall, 1976:565). However, Federal 
initiatives deliberately affecting employment training can 
be traced much farther back, at least to the Morrill Act 
of 1862, which established the land grant colleges. 
Vocational education was aandated in the Smith-Hughes Act 
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0£ 1917, and the Federal State Employment Service was 
established by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933. The Federal 
Government moved directly into JOb creations programs £or 
the uneaployed during the New Deal era, through such 
programs as the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Works 
Progress Administration, and the National Youth 
Administration. Even these early programs illustrate the 
tripartite goals of Federal employment training 
legislation: training, Job placement, and Job creation 
<Daniela, 1975:327>. 
The general rationale for Federal involvement in 
employment training programs was summarized in the 
Employaent Act 0£ 1946, which commits the Government to 
pursue policies that would "promote maximum employment and 
purchasing power 11 <Mangum, 1969:12-13>. Despite the fact 
that the Act was honored mainly in the breach, the goals 
of the Employment Act of 1946 were reaffirmed in the Full 
Employaent and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, which called 
upon the Federal government to take whatever actions were 
necessary to achieve full employment, along with many 
other economic goals (92 Stat. 1887, Public Law 95-523>. 
While the employment acts set national goals and 
broad policies, the first specific national employment 
training legislation was adopted during the Kennedy 
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Administration. The rapid growth 0£ research and 
technology during the 1950s spurred £ears that aasaive 
A 
numbers 0£. unskilled workers would be displaced by 
automation, while a lack 0£ skilled workers would create 
bottlenecks in production. These £ears led to the passage 
in 1962 0£ the Manpower Developaent and Training Act 
CMDTA> CGinzberg, 1975:187-88>. MOTA, along with the Area 
Redevelopment Act 0£ 1961, the Vocational Education Act 0£ 
1963, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Economic 
Opportunity Act 0£ 1964, established the basic legislation 
and tools of the employment training policies of the 1960s 
CMangua, 1976:46>. 
KDTA required the President to make an annual report 
on manpower to the Congress. The first B~e2£~, ln 1963, 
expr~ssed the manpower philosophy 0£ the Kennedy 
Ad•inistration. In the message to Congress that 
accompanied the B~eg~~, Kennedy said that unemployment was 
the Nation's number one problem, and he proposed two 
solutions: first, a tax cut package to stimulate demand, 
and second, iaprovement in "the functioning and structure 
0£ our labor markets, and the quality of preparation of 
our •anpower £or the occupational needs 0£ tomorrow" 
<Manpower Report 0£ the President, 1963:xi). 
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Kennedy identified four trends that called for 
action. First, the slow rate of economic growth in recent 
years had diminished the growth in employaent. Second, 
the maJor goods-producing industries (manufacturing, 
agriculture, and mining) were experiencing maJor declines 
in employment. Third, the growth in automation would 
result in a rapidly diminishing need for unskilled 
workers. Fourth, new technology was expanding the need 
for occupations requiring more education ·and training, and 
existing institutions were not keeping pace with the 
demand <Manpower Report of the President, 1963:xiii). 
Kennedy felt that manpower planning and the 
employaent system should be predominantly a £unction of 
the private sector; indeed, ''nothing aore exac~ly 
identifies the totalitarian or closed society than the 
rigid and, more often than not, brutish direction of labor 
at all levels" <Manpower Report of the President, 
1963:xii). Nevertheless, there were "certain parts of the 
evolving manpower prograa that require action that we 
recognize as being necessarily carried out through the 
agencies of government" <Manpower Report of the President, 
1963:xvi>. 
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Ironically, soon a£ter the passage 0£ MOTA and the 
firat H~DeQ~~£ B~eQ~t. it became clear that skilled 
workers were being reabsorbed by a recovering econoay; 
their high unemployment rate had been caused by recession, 
not by automation. 
The delivery system of MOTA was twofold. The Labor 
Departaent gave grants for training and counseling to 
public and private agencies, while the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare operated through agreements 
with state agenciies to train individuals. MOTA included 
no Job creation programs; those were the province of the 
Econoaic Opportunity Act. For example, Operation 
Mainstream created Jobs £or chronically uneaployed adults, 
who worked in community betterment proJects, mostly in 
rural areas <Daniels, 1975:328>. 
As enacted in 1962, MOTA was a program for classrooa 
and on-the-Job occupational and skill training £or the 
unemployed. The Act also initiated a national program 0£ 
eaployaent training research. The first amendments, in 
1963, added a special prograa £or unemployed youth, plus 
authority £or twenty weeks of basic education to prepare 
individuals for skill training. 
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In 1965, amendments authorized deaonstration 
proJects, Job developaent, and labor aobility proJects,; 
liberalized allowance payments, and doubled the 
peraissible training period £rom £1£ty-two to 104 weeks. 
The 1966 amendments added programs for older workers, 
part-tiae skill upgrading programs, an experiaental 
prograa £or prisoners, and prevocational employability 
prograas to introduce trainees to the world 0£ work. The 
1968 amendments boosted £unding to the states and gave 
the• aore authority to approve proJects <Ruttenberg, 
1970:14-16). 
Stanley H. Ruttenberg, who was Manpower Administrator 
and Assistant Secretary 0£ Labor £or Manpower during the 
period 1965-1969, has said that MDTA increasingl1 
concentrated on the "social component of 
aanpower--particularly on the development of manpower 
prograas aimed at the disadvantaged." He named three 
forces •ainly responsible for this focus: first, the 
growing consciousness 0£ the extent 0£ poverty in the the 
United States, and the subsequent commitaent of the 
Johnson Administration to a war on poverty; second, the 
civil rights movement and its pressures to improve the lot 
of ainorities; and third, the urban crisis, which 
received wide attention during the late 1960s <Ruttenberg, 
1970:2>. 
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Throughout the 1960a, eaployaent training legislation 
enJoyed widespread bipartisan support from Congress and 
the Adainistration. By the end of the decade, however, 
the belief grew that it was time for a thorough 
reappraisal of employment training policy. The Select 
Subcoaaittee on Labor held twenty-seven days of hearings 
on employment training reform during 1969 and 1970. They 
£ound that the Secretary of Labor alone had entered into 
over 10,000 contracts £or various employment training 
activities, and the result had been a great deal of 
confusion and duplication of services <Daniels, 1975:328>. 
Since many departments had employment-related 
prograas, it was not at all certain Just how much had been 
spent on employment training prograas during the':1960s. 
However, it was ~lear that expenditures had grown 
steadily; while outlays £or Federal manpower programs 
totaled less than S250 aillion in FY1961, the MDTA budget 
£or FY1973 was $2.7 billion, with about $1.5 billion for 
training and Sl.2 billion £or emergency employment 
<Ginzberg, 1975:172>. 
Suaaarizing the £irst decade 0£ employment training 
prograas, Mangum and Walsh wrote: "the fact is that after 
ten years, there is still no g!!!B!~!Y! evidence one way 
or the other about MOTA outcomes" <1973:47>. 
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Nevertheless, two general conclusions are warranted. 
FirstJ during their £irst decade, the e£fect 0£ 
employment training programs on the economy as a whole was 
not substantial. Enrollments never exceeded one per cent 
0£ the labor £orce, and spending was never as much as two 
per cent of the Federal budget. Second, despite a lack of 
definitive evaluation data, most employment training 
professionals £elt that the programs had a positive 
effect. 
Following his years as staff director of the Senate 
Subcoaaittee on Employment and Manpower and executive 
director of the President's Committee on Manpower during 
the 1960s, Professor Garth Mangua has written ex~ensively 
on employment training policy; while a Professor at the 
University 0£ Utah, he served as a technnical advisor to 
Senator Hatch during the formation and passage 0£ JTPA 
<Mangua, 1983:281). In his book, ~!e!g~~~!!!tlL 
E2!!g~, he wrote: 
In retrospect, the surprising £act is that almost 
everything which was tried worked, aaking at least 
aarginal improveaents at costs JUstif ied by the 
bene£its, a £act that aany seemed anxious to 
£orget a decade later. Even intuitive 
interventions proved better than none, at least at 
those levels 0£ aagnitude (1976:55). 
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In 1970, the House Education and Labor Comaittee 
dra£ted a comprehensive employaent training bill. The 
.. 
Eaployaent and Manpower Act 0£ 1970 passed both Houses 0£ 
Congress but was vetoed by President Nixon on December 16, 
1970. Nixon contended that he vetoed the Act, despite its 
general agreement with his own precepts 0£ administrative 
decentralization and program decategorization,. because it 
contained a large-scale public service employaent 
component that he characterized as o££ering dead-end, 
"WPA-type" Jobs. The next year, however, continuing 
econoaic distress in the aerospace industry led hi• to a 
reluctant acceptance 0£ the Eaergency Employaent Act 0£ 
1971, which authorized a two-year $2.25 billion Public 
Eaployaent Program <NCEP, 1980:69). 
Early evaluations 0£ the Emergency Employment Act 
were £avorable, and it was quickly £ollowed by the passage 
in 1973 0£ the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
<CETA>. CETA was passed as the result 0£ a consensus 
reached between Representative Doainick Daniels <D-NJ>, 
maJority leader 0£ the House Labor Subcommittee, and 
Representative Marvin Esch <R-Mich.>, the Subcommittee~s 
minority leader <Daniela, 1975:329-330). 
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The emphasis 0£ CETA was on decategorization and 
decentralization. Decategorization meant replacing 
apeci£ically mandated training activities <the individual 
contracts between the Secretary 0£ Labor and local 
agencies> with block grants that local governments could 
use for whatever training was deemed most needed in a 
specific area. Decentralization aeant that the locus of 
control of programs was aoved away froa the Labor 
Departaent to the states and local governments. As CETA 
was actually enacted, many qualifications were attached 
that substantially limited both the block grant and 
decentralization concepts; when the Reagan Administration 
sought to replace CETA in 1981, they professed the same 
goals. 
CETA was by no means the only Federal law authorizing 
expenditures for employment training activities, nor was 
the Department 0£ Labor the only agency to administer such 
activities. Besides the Department of Labor, the 
Coaaunity Services Agency, the Equal Eaployment 
Opportunity Coaaission, the Veterans Administration, and 
the Departments 0£ Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, 
Education, HEW <later HHS>, HUD, Interior, and Justice all 
spent £unds on employment training~ In FY1974, total 
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expenditures on employaent training were 84.692 billion, 
0£ which the Labor Departaent's share was 92.835 billion. 
Comparable £igures £or FY1979 were S14.453 billion and 
$10.975 billion CNCEP, 1980:55>. 
It should be remembered that the Federal share 0£ 
e•ployaent training expenditures is only a small £raction 
0£ total expenditures £or such programs. Educational 
institutions and private industry are the priaary 
providers 0£ eaployaent training; Federal e££orts a££ect 
the aargin, helping those not served by the private 
aystea.• The distribution 0£ the employaent training 
training dollar ia illustrated by Figure 2. 
Nevertheless, CETA and its replaceaent, JTPA, have 
been the centerpieces 0£ Federal employment training 
policy, and, except £or an occasional digression, this 
study will £ocus on those prograas. Before examining the 
speci£ics 0£ CETA, I will present an overview 0£ the £our 
maJor categories 0£ employaent assistance strategies 
~The many private and public inputs into the 
eaployaent training system are discussed in exhaustive 
detail in Chapter 4 0£ the 1981 ~nn~!! H!~2£~, "The 
National Employment and Training 'Systea'," by Janet w. 
Johnston <NCEP, 1981:61-102>. 
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FIGURE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRAINING DOLLAR, 1980 
Federal employment training programs account £or 
only 7 cents 0£ an average training dollar. • • • 
Elementary, secondary, and 
post-secondary education 
institutions 
Private business and industry 
Government: civilian and military 
training 






Out 0£ the 7 Cents Ascribed to Federal Employment 
Training Programs, 4 Cents Were Spent £or the 
CETA Program. 
PSE Programs <Titles IID and VI> 
Youth Programs <Titles IV and VIII> 
Training and Upgrading <Title IIBIC> 
National Programs and PICs 
<Titles III and VII> 
1.5 cents <41") 
CNCEP, 1981:83) 
utilized by the Federal Governaent. 
Public works are a traditional Job-creating device, 
dating back at least to the 1930s. 0£ course, Job 
creation is not the only £unction of public works, but JOb 
creation has been an iaportant coaponent of public works 
bills, perhaps aost specifically in the Public Works and 
Employaent Act 0£ 1976 <Public Law 94-369>, which 
specifically aandated the countercyclical funding of 
public works (increasing public spending during an 
econoaic downturn>. The impact 0£ public works can be 
substantial; funding for public works in FY1980 .was $27 
billion COMB, 1980:206-16). 
Although even strong critics of Job-creation 
strategies have soaetiaes supported the value 0£ 
well-planned and efficiently administered public works 
proJects, public service eaployaent <PSE--the direct 
creation 0£ Jobs in government agencies, either local~ 
state, or Federal> has been far aore controversial, 
perhaps due to its focus on Jobs rather than proJects, and 
the mechanism 0£ subsidizing the growth 0£ the public 
sector in states and localities. 
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Fro• 1974 through 1980, PSE absorbed e progressively 
larger share 0£ Federal employment training £unds. In; 
FY1980, 54 per cent, or S5.1 billion of the $9.4 billion 
in CETA program outlays, was spent on PSE. PSE included 
£our aain program strategies: 
1. Countercyclical PSE. 
2. Teaporary PSE £or the disadvantaged, while they 
receive training £or unsubsidized Jobs. 
3. Work experience in low- or unskilled Jobs, which may 
be of help in securing unsubsidized Jobs. 
4. 11Eaployer of last resort" PSE £or those who cannot 
£ind work on their own; popularly known as the 
"workfare" prograas. 
Countercyclical PSE prograas share the philosophy 
that workers who are unemployed because of a continuing 
recession are entitled to maintain a ainiaum standard of 
living through government-subsidized employment. 
Countercyclical prograas have several advantages: 
1. Job skills can be maintained. 
91 
2. PSE is an income transfer without the social stigaa of 
welfare. 
3. At least in theory, countercyclical employment can be 
triggered on and off quickly to respond to changes in 
the economy. 
4. Countercyclical PSE can be targeted to areas of 
greatest need <NCEP, 1980:71>. 
To Congress, the maJor drawback of countercyclical 
PSE Congress is the extent to which Federally-funded 
positions substitute £or those that would otherwise have 
been filled by local £unds. The substitution rate is the 
extent to which local governments, instead 0£ u~ing 
Federal £unds to create new Jobs in addition to their 
existing workforce, merely substitute Federal funds £or 
local £unds, creating no new Jobs and saving local funds 
for expenditures elsewhere Cor lowering the need for new 
tax revenues>. This substitution of Federal £or local 
funds is contrary to Federal intentions. A National 
Commission for Employment Policy study carried out by the 
Brookings Institution found a substitution rate 0£ £ro• 
eight to eighteen percent, but concluded that in general 
"local employing agencies have not used Federal funds to 
displace workers whom they would otherwise have paid £roa 
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their own resources" <Brookings, 1978, Vol. I:vi: Vol. 
II:14-16>. The e££ect 0£ PSE on the rate 0£ in£lation has 
also been debated, but there are no reliable data £roa 
which to draw conclusions CM.N. Bailey, 1978:72>. 
Evaluation studies 0£ PSE have generally shown that 
participants' incomes were raised, with a net e££ect 0£ 
S200 aore income than a control group <Westat, 1980a:6-7>. 
A similar study showed that earnings e££ects were 
especially strong £or participants with very low prior 
earnings, while the program did not significantly help 
those who previously had good Jobs CWestat, 1980b:32-36>. 
Temporary PSE serves disadvantaged persons who are 
expected to gain experience in public employment ~nd then 
to move on to permanent, unsubsidized employment. This 
was the obJective 0£ Title IID 0£ CETA, and the New 
Careers and Public Service Careers programs under the 
Econoaic Opportunity Act <NCEP, 1980:76>. Although 
overshadowed by the countercyclical PSE program, temporary 
PSE nevertheless served considerable nuabers of people Ca 
high of 459,800 enrollments in FY1979> CWestat, 1980b:77>. 
Work experience programs are designed to provide 
employment in unskilled or low-skilled Jobs for persons 
with little or no stable work histories. This experience 
enables participants to earn a wage while establishing a 
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work record and learning to cope with workplace 
discipline. It alao provides an income trans£er under 
more socially acceptable conditions than wel£are <NCEP, 
1980:78>. Clients have been aostly the very old 
<Operation Mainstream> or the very young <CETA Summer 
Youth Program>. Although economic evaluations have shown 
very little evidence 0£ postprogram earnings gains, 
noneconomic gains were o£ten cited: better social 
integration and improved sel£-iaage £or older workers, and 
keeping busy and 0££ the streets in the case 0£ youth 
CNCEP, 1980:79>. On the other hand, work experince £or 
youth without close supervision and a worthwhile product 
may be detrimental, producing a "something £or nothing" 
attitude <NCEP, 1980:81>. 
Work£are prograas are designed to provide Jobs 
instead 0£ wel£are payments. There is some evidence that 
these programs do reduce the wel£are rolls by making the 
wel£are program more burdensome to participants, but the 
work£are programs themselves have been quite expensive, 
and there have been no studies showing a positive 
cost/bene£it ratio CNCEP, 1980:82>. 
To summarize, while PSE was anathema to the Nixon 
administration, accepted only under duress, it became the 
largest element 0£ Carter's employment training policy. 
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As we ahall see, PSE was again the aubJect 0£ political 
contention during the development of 3TPA. 
The second category 0£ eaployment assistance prograaa 
can be called hiring incentives £or the private sector. 
Hiring incentives are "demand-aide" programs intended to 
make hard-to-place individuals more attactive to employers 
through financial incentives. The two maJor programs were 
the Work Incentive <WIN> Program and the Targeted Job Tax 
Credit CTJTC> program. 
WIN was designed to help AFDC welfare recipients aove 
into permanent, unsubsidized employment. Employ~rs were 
o££ered tax credits for hiring WIN participants. T3TC 
offered similar credits, but the list of those eligible 
was broader. The advantage 0£ tax credit prograas is that 
to the extent that program participants £ind Jobs. they 
are gaining a foothold in permanent employment situations 
that aight otherwise be closed to them; they are given an 
opportunity to prove themselves to an employer, partially 
at government expense. The disadvantage of such programs 
is that there is no accurate way to aeasure the extent of 
substitution of subsidized workers for unsubsidized 
workers, and no way to prevent it froa happening <Westat, 
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1980b:88). The only aa3or study 0£ TJTC £ound that "TJTC 
was Cnotl responsible £or the creation of any new Jobs," 
and, in addition, that the Jobs taken under TJTC were 
"mainly low-pay, low-status, no-growth, high turnover 
positions in the secondary labor market" <Mershon Center, 
1980:37). 
The next strategy, employability development 
programs, relies on the supply side to help make persons 
/ 
aore eMployable by increasing their skills <NCEP, 
1980:88). 
Skill training covers a vast range 0£ activities• In 
on-the-Job training <OJT>, trainees are placed on the Job 
and work while receiving training. They receive a wage 
rather than stipends. In theory, government support 
replaces their partial loss 0£ productivity to the 
employer. The disadvantage 0£. OJT is that openings are 
strongly related to the business cycle, so £ew Jobs are 
available when they are most needed. Nevertheless, OJT 
programs have: shown the aost consistently positive results 
among governaent eaployment training programs. Earnings 
gains have been relatively large <although highly variable 
among programs>, with ainorities an~ females tending to 
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have the largest gaina <Borus, 1980:32-35; Blooa, 1980:15; 
Westat, 1980a:7; Westat, 1980b:3:33-35>. Despite its 
positive results, OJT has played a relatively small role 
in Federally-funded training programs--14 per cent of CETA 
enrollaents in FY1979 CNCEP, 1980:93>. 
Institutional, or classroom training was the largest 
component of MDTA and CETA programs, and classroom 
training was often coabined with other £oras <NCEP, 
1980:94). Evaluation studies show that classroom training 
has been econoaically effective,,although low earners 
before training have benefitted much more than high 
earners CBorus, 1980:32; Westat, 1980a:6>. 
Apprenticeship prograaa are among the oldest 
Federally-regulated training programs. They are privately 
funded and regulated only in very general terms by the 
Bureau of Apprenticeship Training in the Departaent 0£ 
Labor. Apprenticeship programs were a££ected in two ways 
by MDTA and CETA: 1) some programs received Federal funds 
to operate pre-apprenticeship training programs £or the 
disadvantaged, to bring them up to entry-level standards; 
2> CETA's Targeted Outreach Program provided counseling, 
tutoring, recruitment, referral, and supportive services 
to ainorities and women who were seeking apprenticeships. 
Federal assistance to apprenticeship programs was 
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virtually eliainatad under JTPA. 
Since the 1930s, JOb search assistance has been the 
responsibility 0£ the U.S. Employment Service. The 
Eaployaent Service has been sharply criticized in recent 
years for its failure to help the disadvantaged, and there 
have been frequent demands that the Employment Service be 
more closely integrated with the employment training 
system, a theme that will be a ainor !~!~m2~!f in the JTPA 
saga. The Employment Service was authorized by the 
Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, and amendments to that act were 
considered along with the reauthorization of CETA <NCEP, 
1980:100-104). 
The Federal government has sponsored several other 
prograas that directly a£fect employment training 
opportunities. Since these programs all had their own 
developaent and policy struggles, I will consider thea 
generally outside the scope of this study but will list 
soae of the most important here. 
1. The Equal Eaployment Opportunity Coamission <EEOC> is 
charged with ensuring the rights of those protected by 
the Civil Rights Act 0£ 1964. EEOC initiatives have 
done a great deal to change employment practices, 
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particularly through litigation against discriminatory 
0 patterns and practices" <EEOC, 1979; 1981; U.S. 
Senate, 1984) • 
2. The 0££ice 0£ Federal Contract Compliance Programs 
(QFCCP> monitors the utilization 0£ minorities and 
woaen in Federally-£unded programs. The OFCCP 
conceived and administers the "a££irmative action 
plan" that every Federal contractor must implement. 
3. The Trade AdJustment Assistance program helps workers 
who lose their Jobs as a result 0£ £oreign import 
coapetition. Between 1975 and 1980, over one million 
workers received S2.4 billion-in assistance <ETRP, 
1979:61). Several other programs have assisted 
workers dislocated £or other reasons, although much 
smaller sums were spent <NCEP, 1980:105-107). As we 
shall see, trade adJustment assistance and dislocated 
workers programs were considered as part 0£ the CETA 
reauthorization process in the earlier stages, but 
these were eventually shunted aside to be considered 
in separate legislation. 
4. In CETA and other acts, the government has encouraged 
experiments with alternative work schedules, such as 
£lexitime and JOb sharing <several programs are 
reviewed in ETRP, 1979:75-92>. A conference sponsored 
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by the NCEP in 1978 concluded that Federal legislation 
aandating alternative work schedules would be 
undesirable, since employee and employer needs are too 
diverse to £it a standard pattern <NCEP, 1980:109>. 
5. Veterans have been the target 0£ several initiatives 
to stimulate their employment, notably the Vietnam Era 
Veterans' ReadJustment Assistance Acts 0£ 1972 and 
1974, and targeting requirements in CETA <NCEP, 
1980:109-110). 
This section reviews the content of CETA in its £inal 
£ora. CETA merits close attention, since JTPA was 
developed largely as a response to the CETA experience. 
CETA began with five sections, called titles in 
legislative and bureaucratic parlance. I will summarize 
the titles briefly here, in order to.give the flavor 0£ 
what the original legislation was like be£ore considering 
CETA's final form in considerably more detail. 
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Title I established a aenpower planning authority in 
each state and each city or county 0£ over 100,000 
population. These agencies were called prime sponsors, 
end they received £unds directly £rom the Departaent of 
Labor. Prime sponsors were responsible £or planning and 
administering training programs, although actual program 
services were usually per£ormed by subcontractors. Prime 
sponsors were under the 2! ~~9~2 control 0£ local 
political executives such es mayors or county 
administrators. Governors had control only in areas not 
part of local political units <or consortia of units> 
totalling 100,000 population or more, the so-called 
"balance of state" areas. 
Title II regulated the types'of training services 
that each prime sponsor could provide, and authorized a 
s•all public service e•ployment program. Title III 
continued several 0£ MDTA's national programs that were 
not appropriate to local initiatives, such as prograas £or 
migrant workers and reservation Indians. Title IV 
preserved the Job Corps as a separate program under the 
Labor Department <it was transferred from the Office of 
Economic Opportunity>. Title V authorized a National 
Coamission on Manpower Policy Clater renamed the National 
Commission for Eaployaent Policy>. Cabinet members and 
public appointees served on the Commission; they 
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per£oraed en overview and evaluation £unction, end were 
charged with recommending policy changes. Later in 1973, 
a large public service employment program was added as 
Title VI. 
By the end 0£ the Carter Administration in 1981, CETA 
had been amended several times, the last time in 1978. 
The amendments had three main e££ects: £irst, £unding was 
continuously increased. Second, the public service 
employment program expanded throughout the Carter years. 
Finally, £unds were increasingly targeted on aore severely 
disadvantaged groups, such as prison inmates and single 
parents, and on youth. As Federal oversight increased and 
new programs were added, CETA became increasingly less 
decentralized and decategorized. 
In its £inal £orm, CETA had eight titles, which 
£oraed the base £rom which changes would be aade in 
designing JTPA. 
Title I, Administrative Provisions, maintained the 
prime sponsor structure £rom the original act. It also 
set the planning, auditing, and administrative standards 
applicable to all prime sponsors. 
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Title II was called Comprehensive Eaployment and 
Training Services. Titles IIB and IIC authorized most 0£ 
the training activities per£ormed by prime sponsors £or 
adults. The Title IID program authorized public service 
Jobs £or persons with persistent labor market problems, 
such as single parents, prison inmates, and the 
handicapped. 
Title III, Special National Programs and Activities, 
authorized special target group programs, somewhat 
expanded in scope £rom the original legislation. The 
national programs served an exremely diverse clientele; 
some 0£ the programs were le£tovers £rom MDTA, national 
contracts that the Congress wished to see continued during 
CETA. 
The Targeted Outreach Program CTOP>, provided 
recruitment and guidance services to minority youth and 
women who wished to gain employment in the skilled trades, 
especially construction apprenticeships. The principal 
sponsors 0£ TOP programs were the construction labor 
unions, along with outreach agencies such as the Urban 
League and RTP, Inc. The outreach agencies, which 
employed and served a predominantly minority population, 
received £unding £rom the Department 0£ labor, and in 
turn~d operated programs that counseled and prepared 
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ainority youth end women £or apprenticeships in Joint 
labor-management programs, thus easing affirmative action 
pressures on unions and unionized employers. Both the 
outreach agencies and the unions were considered linked to 
the Democratic party; £or example, Ernest Green le£t his 
position as President 0£ RTP, Inc., to become Assistant 
Secretary 0£ Labor in charge 0£ the Employment Training 
Administration, which administered CETA. In FY81, seven 
community-based organizations and labor groups had 
contracts. 
National on-the-Job training contracts provided 
private sector on-the-Job training, primarily £or high 
wage and apprenticeable positions, and in occupations. with 
skill shortages. In FY81 many 0£ the contractors were 
labor union training programs. National on-the-Job 
training served 16,000 participants in FY81. 
ProJects £or the handicapped served 12,000 
participants; most contractors were national advocacy 
organizations £or the handicapped. 
The Small Business Workshops funded a very small 
number 0£ proJects to help participants plan management 
careers in small businesses. 
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The Persons with Limited English Speaking Ability 
<PLESA> program was another small program that provided 
Job-related English language skills training to Hispanics, 
primarily Puerto Ricans <NCEP, 1980:28). 
The Partnership Program was a small e£fort to help 
community-based organizations work with the employment 
training system in educational and promotional roles 
<NCEP, 1980:28-9). 
Indian and Native American employment and training 
programs spent S161 million to serve 85,000 participants 
in many categories of employment and training services. 
Services were provided both on reservations and in urban 
areas. 
Programs for migrant and seasonal £armworkers sought 
to alleviate the chronic unemployment and underemployment 
0£ farmworkers or, in the case of youth, have them return 
to school CNCEP, 1980:33>. Those programs spent $62 
•illion on various proJects in FY81 C33>. 
Many Title III programs proved especially repugnant 
to the Reagan: Administration, since they were 1) 
nationally-centralized and administered by the Federal 
government, and 2> funded programs operated by enemies of 
the new Administration, such as labor unions end minority 
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outreach organizations. 
Title IV, Youth Programs, authorized the Job Corps, 
summer youth employment, and other youth programs. In 
recent Presidential administrations, it has been customary 
£or the President's wi£e to "adopt" a £ederal progra• as a 
public relations gesture, in order to give the program 
higher visibility. Mrs. Carter chose to take a personal 
interest in youth employment programs, so Title IV was a 
prime interest 0£ the Carter Adainistration. Title IV 
included several components. 
The Job Corps, with 114,000 participants, spent $465 
million in FY81. A£ter weathering severe legislative 
challenges during the early 1970s, the Job Corps·: developed 
widespread bipartisan support; £or exaaple, it was 
£requently cited as an e££ective investment in training by 
Senator Orrin Hatch <R-UT>, Chairman 0£ the Senate Labor 
Committee during the development 0£ JTPA. 
The Summer Youth Employment Program <SYEP> consisted 
0£ short-tera summer Jobs to keep kids 0££ the streets. 
This program was originally developed during the late 
1960s to counteract the forces that led to urban riots; 
the political sponsorship of mayors and minority 
organizations has ensured the continuation of a similar 
prograa in all subsequent training bills. 
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The Youth Employment and Training Prograa <YETP>, was 
a aini-CETA directed at disadvantaged youth <14-21> who 
were still in school. Most 0£ this money went to local 
school districts for career education or work exploration 
prograas. S719 million served 394,000 participants in 
FY81 <NCEP, 1980:34-5). 
The Youth Community Conservation and Improvement 
ProJects <YCCIP> provided unemployed 16-19-year-old youth 
with short-term employment or training, mostly working £or 
public agencies in neighborhood-improvement of 
weatherization proJects. 38,000 were enrolled in FY81 
<NCEP, 1980:35) 
Title V continued the National Commission £or 
Employment Policy and authorized that body to aake policy 
recommendations to the Administration. 
Title VI, the Public Service Employment <PSE> 
Program, authorized a countercyclical program 0£ 
employaent with government agencies. The Public Service 
Employment Program was greatly expanded by the Carter 
Administration, but later became politically unpopular, as 
we shall see. 
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Title VII, the Private Sector Initiative Prograa 
<PSIP>, authorized greater involvement of the private -
sector through the establishment of Private Industry 
Councils <PICs>. With representatives froa industry, 
organized labor, community-based organizations, and 
educational institutions, PICs were to participate with 
prime sponsors in improving access for all CETA 
particip~nts to private sector Jobs. We will see that the 
PIC, its function and composition, became a maJor issue in 
JTPA. 
Title VIII, Young Adult Conservation Corps <YACC>, 
authorized conservation camp employment for youth on 
public lands <ETRP, 1982:29>. This was a youth version 
ofthe Depression-era Civilian Conservation Camps; 68,000 
youths were served in FY81, at a cost 0£ $174 million 
<ETRP, 1982:35). 
Expenditures for FY81 were $7.7 billion, as follows: 
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FY81 marked a shift away from Public Service 
Employaent and towards skill training in private 
employaent. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act 0£ 1981 <P.L. 
97-35) repealed the authorization for Titles IID, VI, and 
VIII, so those programs were terainated at the end of FY81 
<ETRP, 1982:28). 
The trend in the types of services provided during 
the decade of the 1970s is illustrated in Figure 3, which 
shows the types of program by years of service funded <a 
measure that adJusts for the rapidly inflating dollar 
during the 1970s>. 
Reports fro• the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower 
Survey <CLMS 1981a,b> provide detailed data on the 
characteristics of those who have been enrolled in 
decentralized CETA programs. In FY80, approximately 1.9 
aillion persons were enrolled in training, about 70 per 
cent of them youth aged 16-21. 58 per cent of all 
participants were in youth-oriented activities, and of the 
42 per cent: of all participants in adult-oriented 
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CETA programs focused heavily on ainorities <52 per 
cent>, while women and men participated in roughly equal 
numbers. Median £amily income £or enrollees <excluding 
suaaer programs> was S5,250, less than the SS,500 median 
in FY79. Enrollee's own employaent and earnings records 
<in adult-oriented programs) showed that the average 
participant had been employed 30 per cent, unemployed 39 
per cent, and in school or out 0£ the labor £orce 39 per 
cent 0£ the year preceding training, with median earnings 
0£ Sl,210 <E:TRP, 1982:119-20>. 
The employaent e££ects 0£ CETA were never completely 
clear. While aoat studies showed positive e££ecta 0£ the 
prograaa on income, long-tera eaployment rates were more 
probleaatical. Placement rates varied considerably, and 
were not reported in a uni£ora aanner. Long-term studies 
0£ CETA participants were begun only toward the end 0£ the 
CETA years Cmost studies are suaaarized in Westat, 1980a; 
1980b; NCEP, 1981). When debating the £ora 0£ CETA's 
successor, Congress would £ace aost 0£ the same issues 
they £aced when £oraulating CETA. 
The development 0£ CETA served as an extension 0£ the 
policy asking modes that led to the original law, and were 
described by Davidson (1974>. Alaost all later changes in 
the program were the results 0£ incremental compromise. 
The aubgovernment met challenges to its authority, and 
aanaged to expand its in£luence when concern with 
uneaployaent led to a larger public service employment 
prograa. Redistributive aeasures tended to be rede£ined 
as distributive, as Cobb and Elder predicted. The public 
service eaployaent prograa becaae something 0£ a political 
barometer. When unemployment seeaed a politically 
high-priority issue, expanding public service employment 
provided a "quick :fix." When the issue 0£ unemployment 
was displaced at the level 0£ the aass public by the issue 
0£ in£lation, public service eaployaent became a 
convenient scapegoat. As the 1970s caae to a close, 
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employaent training prograaa acquired aore public 
visibility, mostly in a negative context. As Ripley and 
Franklin theorized, this was to be a threatening oaen for 
the eaployment training subgovernaent. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
"Practical aen, who believe theJl\selves to be quite 
exeapt from any intellectual influences, are usually 
the slaves 0£ some de£unct economist. Madmen in 
authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling 
their £renzy £roa some academic scribbler 0£ a £ew ' 
years back. 11 
--John Maynard Keynes, 
Ib! g!B!£!! !h!2£X 2f &me!2X!!ntL !nt!£!~tL !n9 M2n!~ 
During the development 0£ CETA, some members of 
Congress were concerned with improving the coordination 0£ 
Federal employaent training programs. In order to help 
coordinate policy, as well as to increase the quantity and 
prestige 0£ expert policy advice o££ered to the Congress 
and the Administration, Representative Marvin Esch 
CR-Michigan) led an effort to establish a National 
Coaaisaion for Manpower Policy, supplanting the earlier 
National Manpower Advisory Committee. 
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It ia not aurpriaing that legislators £ound it 
difficult to assemble and integrate expert advice on 
eaployaent training aatters. Although there are still 
relatively £ew employment training policy experts, their 
approaches are as divergent as their backgrounds. 
Employaent training policy suffers an uneasy relationship 
with the social sciences. Hot only ia it a relatively new 
field, but its subJect matter lies within no single 
discipline, incorporating elements 0£ economics, political 
science, sociology, public administration, social and 
industrial psychology, and aocial work. Employment 
training policy experts come to the £ield from their 
various disciplines, necessarily carrying their 
disciplinary baggage with them, and communication is often 
difficult. 
The National Comaission for Manpower Policy, created 
by Congress in Title V of CETA, was unusual in both 
£unction and aembership CGinzberg, 1979:2>. The 
Commission was given the Job of advising the Congress, the 
President, and the Secretary 0£ Labor. Its membership 
would include the heads of six Federal agencies, as well 
as eleven public members chosen from among representatives 
0£ business, labor, education, client groups served, and 
public officials operating manpower programs. Eli 
Ginzberg, a professor at Columbia and Chairman of the 
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National Manpower Advisory Committee, waa chosen as the 
£irst Chairman <Ginzberg, 1979:2>. 
Instead 0£ being appointed to advise either the 
legislative or executive branch, the Commission was in 
ef£ect appointed advisor to the entire employment training 
subgovernment. Ginzberg underscored this role by inviting 
key Congressional committee sta££ members to Commission 
meetings; as he put it, "with Congress controlled by one 
party and the Administration by the other, the Coaaission 
gained by being able to position itself to be responsive 
to both" CGinzberg, 1979:2>. 
The negative side of this arrangement was that the 
Federal agency aembers of the Commission were bound to the 
Adainistration, and thus not always £ree to agree with the 
positions favored by the public members. While the 
Coaaission sought to minimize conflicts, at least once <in 
Report Number 4> Federal members were forced to 
disassociate themselves fro• a Comaission recommendation 
because it varied from Administration budget guidelines. 
Nevertheless, the Commission decided that timidity would 
be self-defeating, and, in Ginzberg's words, it resolved 
to be "responsive, iaaginative, Candl venturesome" 
<Ginzberg, 1979:2>. With a small staff from the 
Department of Labor, the Commission supplemented its 
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resources with sta££ on temporary aaaignaent £rom other 
agencies and through outside consultants hired with £unds 
!roa the Department 0£ Labor and foundations. Besides 
reports prepared by its own sta££, the Commission 
contracted with individual scholars and research 
institutions to perform studies. It has also cosponsored 
con£erences with other organizations <Ginzberg, 1979:3>. 
The Chairman often testi£ies before Congressional 
coa:aittees. 
Congress has been generally supportive of the 
Coaaission. During the CETA reauthorization of 1978, the 
Senate Committee on Human Resources wrote new language 
earaarking appropriations £or the Commission, thus 
enhancing its independence. The Commission's name was 
changed at that tiae to the National Commission £or 
Eaployment Policy <NCEP>, £allowing the trend away £rom 
the term "manpower," with its sexist connotations 
(Ginzberg, 1979:3>. 
While the Coaaissioners themselves represented policy 
makers, clients, and interest groups, Chairman Ginzberg 
envisaged the role 0£ the Commission as a vital link 
between the community 0£ <mostly academic> policy experts 
and the policy making subgovernment. Playing this role 
required a highly developed sense of the political 
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cliaate, the tiaeliness 0£ iaaues, and the range 0£ 
peraisaible policy options. The Commission showed a high 
level 0£ sensitivity to political currents during the 
period £rom the end 0£ the Carter Administration through 
the beginning 0£ the Reagan Administration. The 
Commission's adept per£ormance as translator 0£ research 
resulta into achievable political initiatives is 
illustrated by an examination of its A~~Y~! H~eQ~~~ £or 
1980 and 1981. These reports reveal a Commission whose 
approach to the Carter Administration was based on 
incremental policy steps, while £or the Reagan 
Adainistration it produced a fundamental defense of the 
role 0£ employaent training programs in economic policy. 
In both cases, the Commission's arguments were··couched in 
teras comfortable to the current Administration leaders. 
The NCEP ~BBY!! B!~9£~! £or 1980 and 1981 both dealt 
with the nature 0£ employment training programs in the 
1980s, but they were produced under quite di££erent 
political conditions. Although the overall condition 0£ 
the United States econoay did not change radically between 
the release 0£ these two reports, the 1980 ~!E9r~ was 
written during the Carter Administration, and reflected 
the characteristic aindset and interests of that 
Administration. The 1981 R!E9~~, on the other hand, was 
written £or the Reagan Administration, a group with very 
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different preconceptions about economic policy in general 
and eaployaent training policies in particular. An 
examination of the differences in these two B~~2£~~ 
reveals a great deal about the interaction of policy 
research and politics. 
In May 1980, the Commission published a "Policy 
Stateaent of the NCEP on the Role 0£ Employment and 
Training Policies in the Early 1980s,'' <NCEP, 
1980:213-218). The paper began with a general statement 
on the role of employment training policy in national 
econoaic policy: 
Inflation and unemployment must be £ought 
concurrently. To this end there is no substitute 
£or e££ective monetary and fiscal policies. ·· 
Still, eaployment policy, targeted properly and 
applied e££ectively, can help reduce the burden of 
a recession by providing temporary income support 
and employment training opportunities <NCEP, 
1980:214). 
In other words, Job creation and training prograas 
are appropriate short-term, anti-recessionary measures, 
substituting £or unemployment compensation and welfare. 
For the longer tera, 
employaent policy can make a significant 
contribution in assisting the structurally 
uneaployed to obtain regular Jobs; in restraining 
inflation; and in helping to move the economy 
toward £ull employment, the early achievement 0£ 
which must remain a high priority national goal • 
••• The Commission's obJective is to recommend what 
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it believes to be the moat productive, 
non-in£lationary programs, as well as appropriate 
•onetary and budgetary decisions, to deal with 
present economic conditions and to of£er guidance 
for the longer term <NCEP, 1980:214>. 
These words express the Coaaissions's sense 0£ 
working within a relatively uni£ied subgovernaent, which 
was leading the Administration and Congress toward more 
activist measures in employment training policy. Working 
£roa this general sense 0£ national policy, the Commission 
•ade recommendations concerning the aaJor elements 0£ 
employment training policy: 
1. Monetary and £!seal policies should be consistent with 
steady, non-in£lationary employment growth. Just what 
these policies should be was not made speci£ic. 
2. Unemployment insurance bene£its, which had been 
extended to as much as 65 weeks during the Ford 
Administration, should be limited to 39 weeks, with 
training and public employment opportunities a 
pre£erable alternative £or those who still need 
assistance a£ter 39 weeks. The principle that 
training or subsidized employment was pre£erable to 
unemployment compensation and wel£are was strongly 
held· by Ray Marshall, President Carter's Secretary 0£ 
Labor, although it had never been confirmed as 
national policy by the Congress, nor had sufficient 
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funds been available to undertake such a policy on a 
large scale. 
3. Trade adJustment assistance programs provided 
retraining and £inancial assistance to workers whose 
Jobs are lost due to foreign competition. Spending in 
this category had risen very rapidly during the past 
two years. The Commission found that such programs 
were getting out of control, and recommended a 
"thorough review" of the progral\s, since their 
approach was far too piecemeal to respond e££ectively 
to "the restructuring problems that face parts 0£ our 
maJor industries. • •• Far more comprehensive policies 
and programs ••• will be necessary" <NCEP, 1980:216>• 
Note that once again the Commission~s iapulse was to 
prescribe more comprehensive, not more limited 
measures. 
4. Public service eaployaent, the Federal £unding 0£ JObs 
in state and local governments, should not be viewed 
as a maJor countercyclical device, but should be 
targeted on the "structurally unemployed, those with 
the least attachment to the labor £orce, and those who 
have been unemployed the longest" <NCEP, 1980:216>. 
This is the philosophy 0£ government as the employer 
0£ last resort. 
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5. Public works were £ound to be use£ul as part 0£ a 
long-term strategy to increase employment in 
economically-depressed areas, but they are generally 
not e££ective anti-recessionary measures due to long 
start-up times CNCEP, 1980:217>. 
6. National priority programs, such as energy 
conservation, transportation, comaunity health care 
and other human services, o££ered opportunities to 
attack structural unemployment and in£lationary 
pressures. Government-£unded programs should require 
"the employment 0£ a percentage 0£ disadvantaged youth 
and adults" CNCEP, 1980:217>. This con£irmed the 
principle 0£ targeting resources to the neediest, and 
in £act re£lected the more stringent requirements 0£ 
the latest CETA amendments in 1978. 
7. The Commission £ound that private sector involvement 
could be sustained during periods 0£ recession, 
contrary to the £ears 0£ some members 0£ Congress that 
this would not be the case. The Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit and the Private Sector Initiatives Prograa 
Cwith the Private Industry Councils> should there£ore 
be encouraged. 
122 
8. Training, retraining, pre-apprenticeship training, and 
upgrading "are valuable activities even in a 
recession" CNCEP, 1980:217>. Training can be 
conducted at less social cost when labor markets are 
alack, and economic recovery will be accelerated by 
the increased skills of the workforce. Therefore, 
e££orts to smooth the supply and demand cycle 0£ 
training activites were warranted. 
9. "Effective planning and delivery systems are crucial 
to the short- and long-term success 0£ employment 
policies" <NCEP, 1980:218>. This was a criticism 0£ 
the instability 0£ CETA, with its rapid program and 
funding changes. "There can be no greater obstacle, to 
either an antirecessionary or a long-term policy than 
constantly changing signals and hastily implemented or 
suddenly discontinued programs" <NCEP, 1980:218>. 
Clearly, the Commission was recommending incremental 
rather than radical changes in Federal employment training 
policy, and those changes were predominantly in the 
direction 0£ doing more rather than less. 0£ course, this 
approach was consonant with the o££icial views 0£ the 
Carter Administration, which had supported the CETA 
Amendments 0£ 1978, and was planning to develop a CETA 
reauthorization proposal after a massive outreach effort, 
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including regional public conferences <g!B, 12:6:146-7; 
12:33:969>. At the same time, however, there was conflict 
at higher levels of the Administration over the relative 
priorities of fighting unemployment or inflation. While 
the Department of Labor continued to support a vigorous 
e£fort against unemployment, o££icials at the Department 
0£ the Treasury and the Off ice 0£ Management and Budget 
were pressing for budget cuts and restrictive fiscal 
policies. designed to £ight inflation. Concern with 
inflation was threatening to displace the issue 0£ 
unemployment £rom the top 0£ the Administration's agenda, 
and the NCEP report served to help the employment training 
subgovernment resist the displacement 0£ the unemployment 
issue. 
Immediately a£ter the Reagan victory in November 
1980, the Commission sta£f had several meetings with 
aeabers of the Reagan transition team. As the new 
Administration prepared to take o£f ice, the leader 0£ the 
Department 0£ Labor transition team, Richard Schubert, 
(vice chairman 0£ Bethlehem Steel Corporation> told the 
Commission that "there is no real sense 0£ what to do" in 
employment training policy <g!B, 12:14:382-3>. He asked 
the Commission £or input. 
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Chairman Ginzberg replied in a memorandum to 
Schubert. He summarized the accompliahments 0£ Federal 
employment training programs and repeated the Commission's 
doubts about public service employment and trade 
adJustment assistance. He stressed that 1£ the 
Administration decided to cut back substantially on 
employment training programs, an orderly withdrawal would 
be important <NCEP, 1980:220>. From statements made 
during the campaign (detailed in Chapter Five>, it was 
evident that the new Administration was far more concerned 
with in£lation than with unemployment, and intended to cut 
employment training expenditures. Given the reality of 
cuts, Ginzberg stressed quality over quantity in training: 
The Commission, aware 0£ the pain£ul trade-0££ 
between numbers to be served and available Federal 
resources, has nevertheless repeatedly advised 
that a greater investment be made in serious 
training 0£ a smaller number rather than spreading 
funds among too many <NCEP, 1980:220>. 
In regard to CETA, the Commission rea££irmed its 
support £or the 1978 "Congressional emphasis on targeting 
and greater involvement 0£ Community Based Organizations" 
<NCEP, 1980:221>. In addition, it contended that there 
was a great need £or an 
adequate in£ormation syste• so that the DOL 
(Department 0£ Labor], the Congress and the 
American people have a £ira basis £or assessing 
the e££ectiveness of the total effort and £or 
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holding the primes and contractors accountable 
<NCEP, 1980:221). 
During the Presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan's 
primary proposal for dealing with urban unemployment wes 
the creation of urban enterprise zones <New York !!!~!• 
11121180,1:6>. These officially-designated zones, to be 
located in inner cities, would be allowed to attract new 
businesses <end therefore increased employment> through 
the provision 0£ tax incentives to industry. Chairman 
Ginzberg's response was to support the notion 0£ tax 
incentives, but he warned against any approach "that does 
not recognize the need £or continuing investment in 
improving the employability 0£ persons living in such 
seriously deprived areas" <NCEP, 1980:221>. Reading 
through the diplomatic language 0£ the memo, one can 
discern an at best luke-warm feeling toward the enterprise 
zone idea; enterprise zones should not be substituted £or 
employment training programs. 
Since Schubert's transition team would be in 
existence £or only a short period, Ginzberg was forced to 
aake a rapid response, writing on behalf 0£ the whole 
Commission. He could do little more than reiterate the 
Commission's.earlier conclusions, with only slight 
adJustments in light of the views 0£ the incoming 
policymakers. The Commission then £aced the Job 0£ 
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designing an employment training system to fit the Reagan 
Administration's political philosophy. 
The Commission's task proved difficult. Their 1980 
R!e2~~ had made recommendations in tune with the Carter 
Administration's activist approach to employment training 
issues, an approach with which the Commission clearly was 
in syapathy. However, the new Administration seemed 
hostile to employment training programs in general, and at 
the very least expected new approaches to the old 
problems, preferably requiring £ewer Federal resources. 
In October, 1981, the Commission published its 
§~Y!n~h ~nnY~! ~!E9~~, entitled "The Federal Interest in 
Employaent and Training" <NCEP, 1981>. This document, 
rather than concentrating on incremental changes in 
current policy as did the 1980 B!E2~~, reexamined the 
basic rationale for employment training policy as a 
component of economic policy. It certainly did not take 
an Administration commitment to employment training 
prograaa £or granted. The B!~9~~ attempted to summarize 
the state of current knowledge in several areas of 
employaent training policy, and it made suggestions £or 
employment training policy initiatives that the Commission 
perceived would be congruent with the new Administration's 
overall economic philosophy. During this period the !! 
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2ii!~!9 aembers 0£ the Commission were, 0£ course, Reagan 
appointees, but the other members and the Chairman were 
all Carter holdovers. Due to the timing of appointments 
to the Commission, this B!E9~~ must be considered 
primarily a sta££ document. 
The B!eQr~ was an interesting exercise in compromise 
and persuasion. The Commission and its sta££ outlined a 
<to it> minimalist program, avoiding challenges to 
orthodox Republican belie£s wherever possible. 
Chairman Gin2berg's letter of transmittal to the 
President and Congress summarized the three main 
conclusions 0£ the ~!EQ~~: 
1. There has been a long tradition 0£ Federal involveaent 
in employment training programs, starting with the 
Morrill Act in 1862. 
2. There is still a Federal interest in employment 
training programs, since they can promote economic 
growth, £acilitate adJustments to labor market shocks 
(such as the oil crises>, and contribute to equal 
opportunity. 
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3. There£ore, despite "budgetary stringencies," the 
Coamission recommended that Federal employment 
training programs be continued, in order to "increase 
the human capital 0£ hard-to-employ youth and adults 
so that they will be able to participate actively in 
the world 0£ work and support themselves and their 
dependents rather than to be dependent on income 
trans£ers" <NCEP, 1981:11). Expenditures on training 
would be pre£erable to creating a class 0£ "permanent 
dependents" who rely on public assistance. 
The body 0£ the B~~g~~ began with a policy statement 
by the Commission. The statement stressed that employaent 
training programs have received broad bipartisan support 
in the past. In the 1980s, employment training programs 
could continue to promote economic growth by "increasing 
the productive capacity and £lexibility 0£ the work £orce" 
<NCEP, 1981:4>. Many persons will need training to aake 
them eaployable, but they will not be able to pay £or such 
training themselves, while employers, viewing such workers 
"as poor risks, will not hire and provide them with 
training opportunities" CNCEP, 1981:4). There£ore the 
Federal government must play a significant role in 
cushioning the impact of technological change. 
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Federal policy inevitably haa a aubatantial iapact on 
the labor market. For example, a de£ense buildup wtll 
produce akill shortages to defense contractors, while the 
declining number 0£ young adults in the population will 
aake ailitary recruiting more difficult. Changes in 
immigration or trade policy could have similarly large 
effects on the labor £orce <NCEP, 1981:4-5>. The 
Commission implied that since the Federal government will 
be a aaJor source of labor market shocks, it also has a 
responsibility to cushion those shocks in some way. 
Moreover, Federal employment training programs could 
be a power£ul force to secure equal opportunity. 
Low-income, low-skilled individuals were not being 
adequately served by the private labor market. The 
Federal role should not be to serve everyone or to replace 
current remedial efforts 0£ other groups, but should be 
limited to promoting those activities that 
otherwise would not take place and to activities 
which are less costly or more e££icient to the 
Nation as a whole when undertaken at the Federal 
level CNCEP, 1981:5>. 
The Commission ended its atateaent with a 
3usti£ication of employment training programs as 
profitable social investments. Their conclusion warrants 
reproduction here for its artful combination of simple 
statement and appeal to sound capitalist Judgement. 
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The wealth 0£ a nation is based on the productive 
capacity 0£ its people. People who do not work 
are supported by the taxes that eaployera and 
workers pay. The Federal Government should do all 
it can to help nonproductive and tax-consuming 
persons to become productive taxpayers. This 
cannot be done £or everyone, and it is not cheap 
to do, but where £easible it is pre£erable to 
income trans£er payments. Pro£itable social 
investments in human beings need to be made 1£ we 
are to maintain the basic £abric 0£ our society. 
The Commission is convinced that Americana want to 
work, but to do so they must possess the 
coapetencies, skills, and in£ormation that will 
lead an employer to ~££er them a Job. Government 
must encourage a sound and equitable economy so it 
will be profitable £or employers to make such 
of£ers. It is a good public investment £or the 
Federal Government to provide opportunities for 
those who need them so that they can become 
regular, productive workers CNCEP, 1981:6>. 
The Commission made a powerful case £or employment 
training programs as an investment; we might call this 
the "Republican Justi£ication" for employment training 
prograas, since it is so obviously aimed at Republican 
political themes. The Commission did not speci£1cally 
deal with the question 0£ whether actual Federal 
employaent training programs have succeeded <or can 
succeed> in aaking pro£itable and desirable social 
investaents. In contrast to the 1980 B!E~~~, the 
Commission mentioned £ew speci£ic policy proposals of any 
kind. 
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The Co1unission' a "Sta££ Report on EmployJnent and 
Training," presented as the bulk 0£ the 1981 ~!!!!!:!!!.! 
R!E!9~~, sketched out the "Republican Juati£ication" in 
auch greater detail. It presented an analysis 0£ the past 
and prospective Federal role in eaployaent training. With 
the CETA reauthorization process in view, the Commission 
sought to establish a plat£ora £or a continued national 
employaent training e££ort. The "Sta££ Report" expanded 
and supported the Commission's policy statement. 
The B!Rg!:;'s £irst section, "Employment and Training 
Policy and the National Econoay," by Steven G. Cecchetti, 
Daniel H. Saks, and Ronald S. Warren, Jr., reviewed recent 
aacroeconomic developments and discussed the role 
employaent training programs aight play in improving the 
operation 0£ the economy <NCEP, 1981:21>. The key point 
about the macroeconomic impact 0£ Federal employment 
training programs on the economy was that it could not 
have been very large, however auccess£ul individual 
prograaa might have been: 
CRlelative to the size of the economy, Federal 
expenditures on employment programs have been 
extremely limited, so it is unrealistic to have 
expected measureable improvements in performance 
indicators like the unemployment rate or per 
capita income for these programs. The important 
point is that whenever the Government or private 
sector make investment decisions about anything, 
£roa highways to training, resources should be 
allocated where they make at least as great a 
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contribution to total output as any foregone 
opportunity CNCEP, 1981:30). 
This cost-bene£it approach to government investment 
leads to the question, where do employment training 
prograas £it into the national economy? The B~2g~; 
reminds us that the economy experienced many di££iculties 
during the 1970s. The rate of growth in gross national 
product and personal income fell, as did the growth in 
labor productivity. On the other hand, the economy did 
manage to assimilate the baby boom, and, although 
unemployment rose substantially, 
data suggest that most 0£ the rise in the 
unemployment rate during the 1970s cannot be 
accounted £or by the labor £orce growth 0£ groups 
with characteristically high unemployment rates 
Cthe youngl <NCEP, 1981:24>. 
In other words, although youth unemployment rose, adult 
unemployment rose as well, and the rise in adult 
unemployment could not be attributed to the substitution 
0£ youth £or adults in Jobs. In the 1980s, the economy 
would not have to absorb a large proportion of new 
workers, but high unemployment rates would probably 
persist due to "a restrictive aggregate demand policy" 
<Reagonomics> CNCEP, 1981:26). 
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The small absolute size 0£ Federal programs aade it 
very di££icult to deteraine whether employaent training 
prograas produced more output £rom better trained workers, 
or whether those newly-trained workers had merely 
displaced existing workers <NCEP, 1981:26>. Most prograa 
evaluations have examined post-training earnings gains, 
but those gains are necessary but not sufficient evidence 
to show that the training investment is a net addition to 
national output. Aside £roa earnings gains, output 
produced by the trained worker aust exceed the costs of 
resources (such as equipment, classrooms, and teacher 
time> devoted to the training. Moreover, increased 
productivity without displacement assumes real economic 
growth. ''The question is whether the increased long-tera 
capacity of the economy JUsti£ies the short-tera costs 0£ 
the eaployment and training program" <HCEP, 1918:26>. 
Despite these uncertainties, the preponderance of 
evaluation studies of CETA have suggested that positive 
cost-benefit ratios were achieved. 
I£ employment training programs are beneficial to the 
econoay, and a large training effort is taking place in 
private industry and local governaent, why are Federal 
efforts necessary? Briefly, market barriers aay hinder 
optiaua human capital utilization. 
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Individuala may underinveat in training because 
they do not have aaay access to loana £or this . 
purpose and they cannot use their £uture earnings 
as co"! lateral. 0£ course, these barriers to human 
capital investaent are especially prevalent among 
the poor. Firms may underinvest in their workers' 
training because the workers aight change Jobs. 
In these situations, the Government can encourage 
investment in training by lowering the cost both 
to the worker and the employer <NCEP, 1981:27>. 
That is, investments that may not be possible or desirable 
at the level 0£ the individual or the single £ira are 
desirable £rom the point 0£ view 0£ the entire economy. 
The terms in which the Commission chose to present 
the argument £or employment training programs reveal their 
strategy in dealing with the new Administration. The 
Commission JUsti£ied em~loyment training programs in terms 
0£ human capital, an approach com£ortably within 
neoclassical or "orthodox" economic analysis. This 
treatment would have been unlikely during the Carter 
Adainistration, when the Secretary 0£ Labor, F. Ray 
Marshall, was himsel£ a leading academic proponent 0£ the 
dual aarket hypothesis, a rival conceptualization. The 
background 0£ this shi£t in the terms 0£ 3usti£ication 
deserves ampli£ication, since it illustrates the in£luence 
of politics on the course of policy and even disciplinary 
developaent, as theoretical schools and their adherents, 
once in £avor, are supplanted according to the political 
implications 0£ their analyses. 
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In "orthodox" labor aarket analysis, considered as a 
branch 0£ neoclassical aarket economics, workers are 
assumed to be homogeneous units 0£ labor. On the demand 
side, workers are hired according to their aarginal 
revenue product, or pro£itability to the £ira <Marshall et 
al., 1976:217-219). The supply 0£ workers is £requently 
imagined as a long queue, which is arranged in the order 
0£ workers' desirability to employers. At some point in 
the queue, workers' perceived desirability to employers is 
less than their perceived marginal pro£itability. Workers 
past that point in the queue are not hired. 
Orthodox theory explains the qualitative aspects 0£ 
labor supply through the human capital approach. Put 
simply, the human capital approach stresses the value of 
the worker's education and training in enhancing his 
productivity <Becker, 1964>. 
I£ education and training are the main determinants 
0£ productivity and thus the attractiveness 0£ the worker 
to an eaployer, 
a natural consequence 0£ the acceptance 0£ human 
capital:theory by many labor economists in the 
1960s was to eaphasize education as an iaportant 
policy instrument £or raising the productivity, 
and hence the earnings, 0£ low-income workers. 
Not only was human capital theory used to Justify 
large amounts 0£ spending on educational and 
government sponsored training .programs, but it 
also served to indicate how the results of these 
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programs should be evaluated. Thus £or a time it 
seeaed that the human capital school was defining 
the rules 0£ the game in which it had become the 
doaihant player <Marshall et al., 1976:243>. 
To summarize, orthodox theory posits an efficient 
labor aarket, and "seeks to explain the lower tail 0£ the 
earnings distribution in terms of the same economic 
£actors that operate elsewhere" CNCEP, 1981:127>. Like 
neoclassical analysis, human capital theory is basically 
deductive, worked out from principles of market behavior. 
In contrast, dual labor market theory developed 
inductively, from detailed labor market studies whose 
results did not seem to £it neoclassical models. An 
important series of studies of inner-city labor markets 
found that the posited links between education, 
employaent, and higher earnings did not apply to ghetto 
labor aarkets <Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Harrison, 1971). 
In contrast to the "orthodox" view, the dual market 
hypothesis posits less market e££iciency than the human 
capital hypothesis. There is not one labor market or 
queue, but two. The Jobs people hold are important 
deterainants of their productivity, so that two workers 
with the same human capital could have different levels 0£ 
productivity and wages in di££erent parts of the economy. 
One part 0£ the economy is characterized by internal labor 
markets with opportunities £or specific training, 
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relatively high wages, stable eaployment, due process in 
the settling 0£ grievances, and a high degree of 
unionization. This ia the priaary labor market. Workers 
within the primary labor market are expected to show a 
continuing commitment to the £ira, accept supervision, and 
exhibit stable work habits. 
In contrast, the secondary labor market of£ers Jobs 
with little or no training, low wages and little chance 
£or advancement, intermittent employment opportunities, 
and no union representation. Norms for worker behavior 
are also lower; absenteeism and high turnover are 
commonplace. In the secondary labor market, personal 
attributes such as education and age are relatively modest 
determinants of earnings, so that persons in those sectors 
cannot iaprove their status through better education or 
on-the-Job training. Further, there is only limited 
aobility between the primary and secondary labor markets 
<Marshall et al., 1976:265-295; NCEP, 1981:127>. Those 
who are aired in the secondary labor market and unemployed 
are o£ten called the "structurally unemployed," and the 
term structural unemployment is identified with adherents 
of dual labor market theory. 
138 
How would the support of one of these two rival 
hypotheses about the functioning of the labor market 
a££ect one's approach to employment training policy? To 
an adherent 0£ the human capital approach, there are two 
ways in which disadvantaged workers could improve their 
econoaic status. From the supply side, they could augment 
their skills and thus their human capital. Federal 
employaent training programs could make those towards the 
end 0£ the queue more productive and thus more desirable: 
There may be bene£icial economy-wide consequences 
if employment training programs are designed to 
take people from the pool 0£ disadvantaged, 
low-wage, unskilled workers and move them into the 
high-wage, skilled Job market. Specifically, 1£ 
programs are targeted to relieve pressure in labor 
markets where skill shortages exist, training 
unemployed people may reduce in£lationary ·: 
pressures in the short run and permit lower 
une•ployment rates in the long run <NCEP, 
1981:27). 
From the demand side, efforts could be made to lessen 
preJudice. Federal agencies such as the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and the 0£fice 0£ Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs serve this purpose. 
An adherent 0£ the dual market hypothesis would see 
another solution to the problems of low-income workers: 
their integration into the primary labor market. 
Education and training alone are not sufficient to do 
this. On the supply side, training can be supplemented 
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with such aeasurea as better labor market in£ormation and 
incentives to aove to areas with available employment. On 
the deaand aide, screening criteria, such as standardized 
employaent tests, could be purged 0£ cultural or sexual 
bias; or Job creation strategies could expand the primary 
market and train workers in the skills and habits 
necessary to succeed in the primary aarket. Since the 
labor aarket is considered more segmented, there are more 
points 0£ attack. More generally, £or the dual market 
theorist, the £ocus 0£ policy attention tends to shi£t 
£rom the individual to the system. The primary market 
should be expanded at the expense 0£ the secondary market, 
since the primary market has both the best Jobs and the 
highest productivity <Marshall et al., 1976:278-279>. As 
Doeringer and Piore put it, "the task of public policy is 
to slow the rate at which primary Jobs adJust to secondary 
workers and increase the rate at which secondary workers 
adJust to priaary Jobs" (Doeringer and Piore, 1971:179>. 
In simpler political terms, the dual aarket theorist 
may charge that the orthodox economist blames the victia 
for the faults of the system. The orthodox economist aay 
claia that the dual market theorist would only make things 
worse by impeding the efficient operation of the market. 
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While tha 1980 B!E2~~ had £avored dual market 
hypotheses, most 0£ the analysis 0£ the 1981 R!E2~~ was 
expressed in the £ramework 0£ human capital economics, 
presumably more congenial to the new Administration. The 
Commission was attempting to run be£ore the prevailing 
wind, but without abandoning ship. 
The Commission went to considerable lengths to show 
that Federal support served those who would not otherwise 
be served. In "The National Employment and Training 
'Systea'," by Janet W. Johnston, the Commission dealt with 
the iaplications 0£ less Federal support £or employment 
training programs <NCEP, 1981:61-102). In Johnston's 
words, ''it now appears certain that there will be £ewer 
Federal dollars available £or programs in the £uture, and, 
in addition, the Federal Government will have a 
' diainishing role in program administration" <NCEP, 
1981:98). 
According to Johnston's analysis, Federal employment 
training programs were designed to help people whom the 
private employment training system had £ailed. "The 
question now is whether other institutions will be willing 
and able to take over the responsibility £or training 
disadvantaged people" <NCEP, 1981:98>. 
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Other than the Federal Government, the three aaJor 
providers 0£ employment training services are the schools, 
business, and the military. Johnston did not think any 0£ 
the three would help more disadvantaged persons without 
additional incentives that in some way require Federal 
e££orts, either a££ecting the number of Jobs available, 
through Job creation strategies, or the skills and number 
0£ Jobseekers, through training, income maintenance 
prograa work test requirements, labor market assistance 
efforts, and ad3ustment assistance <NCEP, 1981:100-101>. 
Federal coordination and money would still be needed, and 
developing a rational system £or serving the needs 
0£ disadvantaged, uneaployed, or underemployed 
persons--a system that takes into account the 
resources available from both the public and 
private sectors--remains one 0£ the ma3or 
challenges of the 1980's <NCEP, 1981:102>. 
Who are the people whose needs are unmet by the 
functioning 0£ the private labor market? An employment 
training program cannot be e££ective 1£ its designers do 
not understand the problems and needs of the clientele. 
Our understanding of the characteristics of those at 
the bottom: of the income distribution has improved 
dramatically in recent years. That understanding was 
summarized in the 8!E2~~'s chapter on "Groups in Need of 
Employment and Training Assistance," by Ralph E. Saith 
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CNCEP, 1981:43-60). 
In ~980, out 0£ 118 million in the labor £orce, 21 
million <18~> experienced some unemployment, according to 
the Bureau 0£ Labor Statistics. 0£ that total, what 
groups would warrant special employment training 
assistance? Data and research identi£ied three groups. 
The first group consisted 0£ poor and minority youth. 
"There is no general unemployment problem £or youth but 
rather a concentrated problem among poor and minority 
youth" CNCEP, 1981:14). A large proportion 0£ youth 
unemployment was incurred by a small proportion 0£ the 
long-term unemployed. "They are having trouble £inding 
their way into the labor market and we know that being 
without a JOb £or a long period a£ter leaving school is 
associated with lower earnings later in li£e11 <NCEP, 
1981:14>. While it was natural £or young people to have 
higher unemployment rates, there were dramatic di££erences 
by race and location. For example, in 1980 the 
unemployment rate £or white teenagers was 15.S percent, 
while £or black teenagers living in metropolitan poverty 
areas it was 44.9 percent. This di££erence has persisted, 
and it also persists into adulthood CNCEP, 1981:47>. It 
is not clear that the overall decline 0£ the youth 
population during the next decade will a££ect these 
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differentials. 
Thia ia not to suggest that race can be identified as 
the main cause 0£ youth unemployment. William 3. Wilson 
has made the point that race has become subordinate to 
class as a determinant 0£ poverty: 
The situation 0£ marginality and redundancy 
created by the modern industrial society 
deleteriously a££ects all the poor, regardless 0£ 
race. Underclass whites, Hispanic-Americans, and 
native Americans all are victims, to a greater or 
lesser degree, of class subordinations under 
advanced capitalism <Wilson, 1980:154>. 
Wilson's analysis applies as well to the second needy 
group, which consists of adult workers with persistently 
low incomes. The analysis of this group owes a great ,deal 
to the results of research reported in Appendix A 0£ the 
1981 a!m!H~! B!e2r!:. "Troubled Workers in the Labor 
Market, .. by Richard B. Freeman CNCEP, 1981:103-173>. 
Freeman's paper, which includes an extensive literature 
survey as well as new analysis of longitudinal data, 
introduced some key findings about the disadvantaged 
worker. 
1. Many workers at the bottom of the income distribution 
are E~~m~~~~~!l plagued by problems of low earnings. 
I£ .. permanently disadvantaged" is defined as being in 
the lowest decile of the male earnings distribution 
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for 70 per cent or more of the time over a decade, 
about 5 per cent of working !!n who are heads of 
households are "permanently disadvantaged ... And 60 per 
cent 0£ women household heads who are in the labor 
force in !nf given year are in the lowest earnings 
decile £or men. The existence 0£ this group reflects 
the existence 0£ a permanent subclass in the American 
earnings distribution CNCEP, 1981:106). 
2. Although many workers who lose their Jobs recover 
successfully, workers who drop substantially in the 
earnings distribution tend not to recover their 
previous economic positions. 
3. While both low wages and working only a few weeks a 
year play a part in low income, "surprisingly, 
perhaps, low wages appear to be the more important 
cause 0£ permanent economic disadvantage" CNCEP, 
1981:106). Again, this is evidence for a permanent 
underclass of low-income workers. 
4. For the aost part, low wage workers are black, poorly 
educated, relatively unskilled, female, and in certain 
industries. However, the most important predictor of 
low earnings in any one year is low earnings in a 
previous year. "This fact highlights the importance 
of personal, ~~Q~!!~Y!9 factors in the labor market 
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problems of individuals" CNCEP, 1981:106). It also 
supports Wilson's argument on the primacy of class as 
opposed to race in poverty. 
5. The classic labor market adJustments to economic 
problems--mobility 0£ supply, growth 0£ demand in 
response to labor supply, and changes in wages--appear 
to work £or displaced workers, older workers, and 
depressed communities, but "the situation £or women 
heads of households ••• shows little evidence of 
change, and sluggish economic growth has meant that 
persons at the bottom have hardly improved their 
absolute earnings" CNCEP, 1981:107>. Working women 
who are heads of households are the group with the 
most serious labor aarket problem. 
6. Economic growth raises the earnings of all groups, but 
it does little to improve the relative position of the 
lowest group. 
7. The distribution of black earnings is widening. Some 
black men have made considerable economic advances, 
but the labor participation rate of black men has 
fallen, creating a disparity between those in and out 
of the economic mainstream CNCEP, 1981:107>. 
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The third maJor group 0£ concern to Federal 
policymakers consists of experienced but "displaced" 
workers. The identity and need of this group is much more 
controversial than £or the £irst two. The NCEP sponsored 
a considerable amount of research on displaced workers, 
including a summary paper reprinted in the ~!E9~t, 
"Workers Dislocated by Economic Change: Do They Need 
Federal Employment and Training Assistance?" by Marc 
Bendick, Jr., and Judith Radlinski Devine CNCEP, 
1981:175-226). 
The tone of the E~E2~~ was generally dubious 
concerning the e£f icacy of assistance to displaced 
workers. Bendick and Devine examined workers who had been 
unemployed £or at least eight weeks and were also 
associated with one 0£ three types of structural economic 
change: 
!ngy~~~!!! experiencing nationwide long-term 
employment decline, 9EEYE~~!2n! experiencing 
nationwide long-term employment decline, and 
~!9!2n~ experiencing either very high unemployment 
or long-term population loss <NCEP, 1981:177>. 
Association with a declining industry did not appear 
to be a maJor indicator that a worker will experience 
particularly long unemployment. Such workers accounted 
£or 20 per cent of those unemployed over eight weeks and 
13 per cent of those unemployed over twenty-six weeks, but 
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the 13 per cent figure represents only 90,000 persons, 
compared to an employed labor force 0£ over 100 miliion. 
Occupational decline showed similar e££ects to 
industry decline. "Neither industrial decline nor 
occupational decline increased a worker's predicted 
duration of unemployment more than a few days, in a 
population where the duration 0£ unemployment averaged 11 
weeks" CNCEP, 1981:178>. 
Being unemployed in a declining region had a much 
greater negative impact. Those regions accounted for 43 
per cent 0£ eight-week unemployment and over 55 per cent 
of twenty-six-week unemployment --895,000 and 269,000 
persona, respectively, in March 1980 <NCEP, 1981:177-8). 
Thia finding should not surprise us; it is hard to 
find Jobs in an area where few are available. 
Nevertheless, dislocated workers and their problems were 
quite different from the other two target groups of 
employment training policy. Dislocated workers were much 
better off than the other two groups: they had reasons to 
resist mobility Ca high percentage of home ownership) and 
the resources (from savings and other wage earners in the 
family> to wait out a long spell of unemployment without 
seeking extremely low-paying work. Accordingly, Bendick 
and Devine concluded that there was "little support for 
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the notion that dislocated workers per se should receive 
high priority in the use of scarce Federal employment and 
training resources" CNCEP, 1981:180). 
Nevertheless, the Commission included dislocated 
workers as fit targets for employment training programs. 
Once again, they were trimming their sails to the 
political winds, but this time the winds were blowing from 
the direction of Congress. Dislocated workers were 
concentrated in a number of Frost Belt cities, and for 
Congressmen from those areas the problems of unemployaent 
were certainly severe enough to merit Federal action. 
Accordingly, Bendick and Devine eventually qualified their 
earlier Judgments about relative claims to assistance: 
Such negative conclusions, however, leave 
unaddressed three dislocated-worker proble~s which 
our empirical data suggested were possibly serious 
enough to require a Federal response: economic 
dislocation defined in terms 0£ regional economic 
decline; the uniquely massive unemployment 
problems 0£ the motor vehicle manufacturing 
industry; and the high levels 0£ unemployment in 
a local area immediately following a mass layoff. 
They recognized that the first problem was not an 
employment training problem but one that would require 
.. locationally focused economic development efforts" <NCEP, 
1981:218>. For the second and third problems they could 
only suggest an ~9 he9 approach. 
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To summarize, three groups were identified as top 
priority £or employment training services at the Federal 
level: poor and minority youths, severely disadvantaged 
adult workers, and dislocated workers. Once the groups to 
be served were chosen, speci£ic criteria £or program 
eligibility needed to be developed. Smith addressed the 
problem 0£ de£ining eligibility criteria £or the 
disadvantaged; he did not deal with dislocated workers. 
The issues in defining criteria £or program 
eligibility are complex. Who should decide among the aany 
possible claimants £or Federal services? Since 1966, when 
MDTA became part of the war on poverty, the trend in 
Federal legislation has been clear: there was a 
continuing emphasis on ever-tighter targeting <NCEP, 
1981:55>. Targeting was a maJor issue in the 1978 CETA 
reauthorization. 11Crea1ting, 11 or taking those who are 
eligible but need the smallest amount of services and have 
the greatest chances of finding Jobs without assistance, 
was widely deplored. In fact, in 1978 there were 70 
million persons technically eligible for CETA services, as 
compared to three million program positions. This was 
considered too wide a choice for the prime sponsors, and 
the 1978 A•endments cut the number of eligible persons to 
about 32 million, still a huge nuaber coapared to program 
positions CNCEP, 1979b). The Comaission endorsed this 
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tightening of eligibility, and also recommended that a 
single set of eligibility criteria be used throughout CETA 
(NCEP, 1978). 
The revision of eligibility criteria is a technical 
issue that surfaced repeatedly throughout the JTPA 
enactment process. What is interesting to point out here 
is that this is an area in which the Reagan 
Administration, despite its emphasis on moving 
decision-making powers out of the Federal sphere, 
consistently supported tighter Federal targeting and 
therefore more constricted choices for program operators. 
Later, we will consider charges that the Reagan 
Administration, while claiming credit for serving the aost 
needy, in fact advocated tight targeting requirements in 
order to make the eligible labor pool less attractive to 
states and cities, and thus lessen their support for the 
legislation. 
The differences between the 1980 and 1981 policy 
statements of the Commission show a lively regard for new 
political realities and a consequent shift in advisory 
strategy. : Missing from the 1981 statement was almost 
every •aJor theme mentioned in the 1980 statement: 
fighting inflation and unemployment concurrently, moving 
the economy toward full employment through the use of 
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effective fiscal and monetary policies, providing 
temporary income support as a goal of employment training 
policy, focusing on the structurally unemployed <NCEP, 
1980:214). 
In 1981, fiscal and monetary policies were not 
mentioned in connection with fighting unemployment, since 
it was generally acknowledged that Administration policies 
would in fact worsen unemployment, and moving the economy 
toward full employment was not a high Administration 
obJective. Employment training programs as temporary 
income support were anathema to the new Administration, 
and the concept of structural unemployment was displaced 
by huaan capital analysis. 
The 1980 policy statement aade a number of specific 
recomaendations, generally incremental in nature, covering 
such areas as unemployment insurance, trade adJustment 
assistance, public service employaent, public works, 
national priority programs, private sector involvement, 
and planning structures. The 1981 statement made a 
general case £or the existence of employment training 
programs;: specific recommendations were conspicuous by 
their absence. Even in the staff reports section of the 
~nnY~! B~~9~t, there were no recommendations covering the 
entire area of program content •. While the 1980 B~~g~~ 
152 
suggested slight aodi£icationa in the course of eaployaent 
training policy, the 1981 B~Ee£~ was a salvage operation. 
The 1980 B!Ee£~ was a aodel 0£ incremental policy 
analysis, suggesting new developaents and re£ineaents to a 
policy whose basic outlines were taken as £ixed. Such an 
approach can be called typical of an organization that is 
operating comfortably within a relatively stable 
subgovernment. In 1981, the Comaission was forced to 
return to first principles and Justify the very existence 
of employment training programs; the eaployment training 
policy subgovernment was threatened with radical changes 
by an outside force, the newly-elected Reagan 
Administration. Thus the advent of a new Administration 
can be <depending on whether one supports the.broad 
outlines of current policy> a setback, forcing the 
reinvention of the wheel in policy terms, or a rare 
opportunity to break the constraints of incremental policy 
development and take fundamentally new directions. 
The Commission clearly anticipated a battle over CETA 
reauthorization that would question the need for any 
employment training programs. Although they realized that 
aany changes were inevitable, they established a 
foundation for the defense of an active Federal role in 
employment training. 
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One clue to the attitude of the Reagan Administration 
towards employment training policy lay in their 
appointae~ta to the Commission. Under the terms 0£ Title 
V of CETA, the President is required to appoint to the 
Commission nine public members, who must be "broadly 
representative 0£ labor, industry, commerce, education 
(including vocational and technical education>, veterans, 
state and local elected o££icials currently serving in 
o££ice, community based organizations, individuals served 
by employment and training programs, and of the general 
public." The President also appoints the Commission's 
Chairperson. 
During the period 1979 through May, 1981, the aeabers 
0£ the Commission, appointed by the Carter Administration, 
were Austin Sullivan, Jr., a vice president 0£ General 
Mills and chairman 0£ the Minnesota Governor's Council on 
Employaent and Training; Pedro Garza, national director 
0£ SER-Jobs £or Progress, a Hispanic outreach and training 
prograa; Leon Sullivan, £ounder 0£ OIC 0£ America, Inc., 
a national inner-city outreach· and training prograa; Ruth 
Love, Chicago Superintendent of Schools; George Jenkins, 
an attorney; Sam Lena, a businessman and chairman 0£ the 
Pima County, Arizona Board 0£ Supervisors; Patsy Friaan, 
assistant to the president 0£ the Communications Workers 
0£ America; and Julius Thrower, administrative director 
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0£ Bishop State Junior College <South Dakota) and vice 
chairman of the American Association of Minority Veterans 
Program Administrators <~IB, 13:316). Every member 0£ the 
Coamission had extensive experience in employment training 
prograa operation or policy making. 
Three members' terms expired in May, 1981, £our were 
removed in November, and the other two were replaced in 
April, 1982. Chairman Ginzburg was replaced in November, 
1981, by Kenneth Smith. Smith, who was 32 when he was 
appointed Chairman, was president of International 
Management and Development Group, Ltd., a Washington 
aanageaent consulting firm. He was also president of Jobs 
for America's Graduates, Inc., a national corporation 
designed to replicate in five states the youth employaent 
progra• developed in Delaware by Smith. Formerly, Smith 
was founder of 70001, Ltd., a program that trained high 
school dropouts for entry-level Jobs, and ataff assistant 
to Patrick Buchanan, special assistant to President Nixon. 
He holds a B.S. degree from American University. While 
Smith had experience as an operator of employment training 
programs, he did not have a background of working with 
policy experts, particularly from the academic community. 
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In November, 1981, the Reagan Administration named 
six new members 0£ the Commission. They were: 
--Roberto Cambo, owner of the Rocam Produce Company 
0£ Miaai. Mr. Cambo came to the United States fro• Cuba 
in 1960 and founded a £ruit and vegetable business: in 
1981, he owned two warehouses and employed fourteen 
people. He was active in the Reagan campaign in the Kiaai 
area. 
--Michael Gaver, an associate· with an international 
executive search consulting £ira located in Chicago. 
--Jack Gertz, public a££airs and aedia relations 
manager with AT&T in Washington, D.C. 
--Paul Locigno, research director 0£ the Ohio 
Conference 0£ Teamsters. Mr. Locigno was active in 
employaent training organizations in Ohio. 
--Roderick Paige, pro£essor 0£ health and physical 
education at Texas Southern University, where he was 
previously head football coach and athletic director. 
--Kenneth Stout, a retired ailitary officer and 
self-eaployed real estate investor in Anchorage, Alaska. 
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In April, 1982, President Reagan naaed to the 
Coaaisaion Noraa Pace, senior vice-president of the 
Aaerican Paper Institute in New York City, and Daniel 
Quinn Kills, professor of business administration at the 
Harvard Graduate School of Business Adainistration. Milla 
had done a study £or the Coaaiasion in 1977, and was 
well-known £or his expertise on labor relations and 
employaent probleas in the construction industry <~IB, 
13:315-16;793). Except for Mills and Locigno, the Reagan 
Adainistration's appointees did not have extensive 
experience in eaployaent training matters; while I do not 
suggest that political loyalty or activisa should play no 
part in deteraining who receives political appointaents 
<and Carter's nominees were equally well-con~ected­
politically>, the Reagan Adainistration's appointments 
suggest to ae that the Administration placed a low 
priority on the work of the Commission and on the 
iaportance 0£ employaent training policy. 
To anticipate the course of our narrative somewhat, 
the NCEP proved to have considerable credibility within 
Congress, which not only reauthorized the Commission as 
part 0£ 3TPA but increased its independence £roa the 
Adainistration. The Commission was reorganized under 3TPA 
to exclude the heads of Federal agencies; the new 
Commission would consist of fifteen "public" •embers. 
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As a key participant in the eaployment policy 
subgovernment, the NCEP provided policy options and 
theoretical JUsti£ications to members 0£ both political 
parties who wanted to continue Federal employment training 
programs. Taken as a whole, the Commission has been a 
success£ul innovation in the areas 0£ data-gathering, 
prograa evaluation, and policy advice. At least as long 
as academic policy professionals were strongly represented 
on the Commission, it served as a vital link between the 
theory and practice 0£ employment training. The 
Coamission made an iaportant contribution to the survival 
0£ the employment training subgovernment during the rocky 
transition between Administrations, which is described in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TRANSITION IN ADMINISTRATION POLICY, 1979-81 
"Politics ain"t bean bag. 0 
--"Mr. Dooley" 
This chapter chronicles developments in employment 
training policy during the period 1979-1981. Six maJor 
topics will be examined: the controversy over public 
service employment; the e££orts 0£ the Carter 
Administration to pass youth employment training 
legislation £ollowing the passage 0£ the CETA Aaendments 
0£ 1978; policy research on the relationship between CETA 
and private industry; employment training issues as they 
were treated during the 1980 Presidential campaign; early 
developments in the Reagan Administration"s approach to 
employaent training policy; and, £inally, the aost 
important contributions 0£ employment training policy 
researchers will be considered, as they related to the 
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other eleaents 0£ the narrative. The role 0£ Congress in 
formulating legislation is omitted £rom this chapter; it 
will be considered in Chapter Seven. 
In 1979 and 1980, employment training policy was 
considered within the economic context 0£ simultaneous 
recession and high in£lation. The Carter Administration 
was split between those who thought recession or in£lation 
should have higher priority. Secretary 0£ Labor Marshall 
continued to £avor employment training programs, including 
public service employment, as a countercyclical strategy 
to £ight recession, while many in the White House and the 
Off ice 0£ Management and Budget opposed higher Federal 
spending until in£lation eased <ETR, 11:2:30>. Aside £roa 
" this aore general question--could one £ight recession and 
inflation at the saae time, or, if not, which was more 
important--both Congress and the Administration were split 
as to whether employment training programs should play a 
maJor role in a countercyclical strategy against the 
recession. 
The uncertainty over aacroeconomic strategy had dire 
consequences for employment training policy. It lurched 
like a car driven by a learner; the Administration 
alternately punched the accelerator and Jammed on the 
brakes. 
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An active employaent training policy was a potential 
tool £or £ighting recession. The problem was to choose 
the best way 0£ combating the recession, or at least to 
cushion its e££ects. Laying aside £or the moment the 
question 0£ the effectiveness 0£ the training offered in· 
training programs, was it better £or an unemployed person 
to be in a training program receiving training and a 
stipend rather than unemployment insurance or wel£are? 
The training strategy has been pursued elsewhere with some 
success, perhaps most notably in Sweden <Rehn, 1980). 
An anti-recessionary employment training policy could 
take two directions. One direction was tow~rd Job 
creation, with little attention to skill training. This 
path had some strong points in its favor, making it seea 
the path 0£ less resistance. Job creation in the £orm 0£ 
a public service employment program could be done 
relatively quickly; local governments had hiring 
mechanisms in place and could easily identi£y Jobs that 
could be done. In economic terms, speed 0£ action is a 
de£inite:virtue in countercyclical action, and this 
approach had been success£ul in 1971, under the Emergency 
Employment Act. In addition, a public service employment 
prograa that passed Federal mo~ey along to cities held 
161 
considerable political attraction: aost maJor cities were 
hard-pressed, and most were Democratic. 
The skill training direction had its own adherents. 
One example typifies their position. A report by the 
National Manpower Institute <Barton, 1980) charged that 
policymakers "are almost like a doctor, who, having £ailed 
to keep a person healthy, abandons the sick patient with a 
bottle 0£ aspirin at the bedside." Instead 0£ layo££s and 
unemployment insurance during recessions, there should be 
an education and training alternative to provide skill 
upgrading £or workers who would otherwise be laid 0££. 
Remuneration would be made on a stipend basis, perhaps 
lower than regular wages, but higher than unemployment 
insurance. In this way, the employer would maintain an 
experienced workforce, enlarge the productive capabilities 
of the workforce, and increase the loyalty 0£ employees. 
There would be additional government spending to cover a 
portion of the stipend, but reductions in spending for 
unemployment insurance, welfare, and aedicaid costs. 
The United States experiment in countercyclical 
eaployaent training policy emphasized public service 
employment, without a significant expansion in training 
programs. The 1978 CETA amendments and supplementary 
appropriations devoted the lion's share of new funding to 
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public service employment. Unfortunately, the Carter 
Administration's political Judgment proved faulty in this 
choice. 
Congress was divided in its feelings about employment 
training policy. The subgovernment, led by the National 
Com~ission for Employment Policy, was moving in an 
increasingly activist direction, but many other 
Congressmen took a generally skeptical view of the role of 
employment training programs against recession. Opponents 
focused the attention of Congress on the public service 
employment program, which proved to be a disadvantageous 
battleground for proponents of an active employment 
training policy. The public service employment debate 
tended to accentuate the problems of employment training 
programs as anti-recessionary tools, rather than their 
potential. 
Congressional opinion was turning against public 
service employment as early as 1979. At a research 
conference sponsored by the Employment Training 
Administration of the Department of Labor <ETA>, several 
Congressional staffers reported that Congress was more 
likely to fight the worsening recession with a tax cut 
than with increased employment training programs, 
particularly public service employment <ETR, 11:2:31>. 
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Robert Guttman of the Congressional Research Service said 
that the question in Congress' minds was how much to cut 
CETA, not how much to spend. Public service employment 
was unpopular in Congress because members perceived that 
local programs were marred by patronage, make-work Jobs, 
and substitution of effort <ETR, 11:2:31>. Richard 
Nathan, a Princeton University labor economist, agreed 
that CETA was now a "four letter word" in Congress CETR, 
11:2:31>. 
Carol Cox, a Republican staff member of the Senate 
Budget Committee, agreed that CETA would probably be cut, 
and particularly, "there is a negative bias on our 
Committee toward the Title VI public service employment 
Jobs program." The only hope would be to cut the program 
less rapidly than planned; "to us, it is an expansion if 
you keep any Jobs at all in FY 1982" <ETR, 11:14:401>. 
The major substantive criticisms were first, that 
public service employment Jobs were make-work, raking 
leaves and such~ and second, that localities were siaply 
substituting Federal funds £or local taxes, and not 
creating new Jobs at all. Examples of both criticisms 
were found and presented to Congress. Changes were 
subsequently made in the public service employment 
regulations, but the controversy continued. 
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A maJor research study, directed by Willia• 
Mirengof£, evaluated the effects 0£ the 1978 CETA 
Amendments <Mirengoff, 1981>. Mirengoff critically and 
sagaciously examined the record of the public service 
employment program, throughout its several twists and 
changes 0£ policy. Unfortunately, Congress didn't wait 
for professional analysis; the study was published in 
1981 when public service employment's £ate had already 
been sealed. The most apt summary 0£ the study's findings 
was that of the ~IB editorial sta££: "it reiterates 
earlier findings that the public service employment 
program's most chronic and intractable problems had been 
largely corrected JUSt as the program was being 
dismantled" CETR, 13:19:460). 
After the 1978 CETA Amendments were passed, the chief 
task of the Carter Administration concerning employment 
training policy was to devise a new program addressing the 
employment problems 0£ youth. This proJect had a high 
public relations profile, and was considered Vice 
President Mondale's showcase proJect, tangible proof that 
his role in the Administration included more than the 
traditional symbolic duties 0£ the Vice President. Mrs. 
Carter also took a personal interest in the problems 0£ 
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youth. The Administration convened a Vice President's 
Task Force on Youth Employment and held an elaborate 
aeries 0£ regional con£erences to discuss and develop 
proposals £or action. 
The NCEP played a role in the process by submitting a 
set of goals and rec·ommendations on youth employment 
<NCEP, 1979c>. At this point, the NCEP and the 
Administration were working as one, and the NCEP report 
was aimed at Congress, where legislation was expected. 
Thus, the NCEP report summarized the Administration's 
position as well as its own. 
Most important to the NCEP, the Congress and 
Administration should 
identi£y the employability and employment probleas 
0£ disadvantaged youth as a domestic issue of 
critical importance to the £uture well-being and 
security 0£ the nation and pledge that the Federal 
government and the nation will devote the 
resources and efforts necessary to its 
amelioration <NCEP, 1979c:S15788>. 
The NCEP stressed both the structural aspect of youth 
unemployment and the macroeconomic aspect: 
Youth unemployment should be viewed principally as 
a structural problem and long-term solutions 
sought. Nevertheless, there is no question that 
sustained high levels of employment are an 
important precondition £or substantially iaproving 
the labor market prospects of.disadvantaged youth 
<NCEP, 1979c:S15788). 
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Aside £roa its macroeconomic responsibilities, the 
Federal government should play a very active, i£ rather 
vaguely expressed, role: 
The aa3or obJective of Federal education, 
training, and employment programs £or youth should 
be to improve the long-term employability 0£ 
Clow-income] youth; that is, their basic 
education, work habits, ability to absorb new 
skills on the Job, and other competencies which 
will permit successful integration into the 
regular work £orce <NCEP, 1979c:S15788>. 
To £ul£ill their goals, the NCEP made twenty-two 
speci£ic policy recommendations. Most significant to our 
interests, they reversed their previous opposition to 
categorical programs in CETA and recommended a separate 
title £or youth programs, because, they said, of the 
seriousness 0£ the youth unemployment problea and the need 
to coordinate employment training activities with the 
school systems. Several of the recommendations concerned 
linking CETA activities to school-based activities, and 
funding compensatory education programs in the schools. 
The report also recommended that the Job Corps be expanded 
<NCEP, 1979c:S15790). 
In £act, no youth legislation was passed before the 
1980 election. The Administration never managed to 
present a united £ront and push its program through 
Congress. The conflict between .the Labor Departaent, the 
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Off ice 0£ Management and Budget and the Treasury 
Department was a st~ndo££, and the President £ailed to 
resolve the con£lict between his agencies. 
The whole story 0£ youth eaployment training 
legislation deserves a study 0£ its own; its importance 
to this work lies in the way the development 0£ youth 
policy illustrates the Administration's attitudes towards 
CETA. Aside £rom £ailing to resolve its ambivalence 
towards the role 0£ employment training programs in the 
broader economic context, Carter's policy makers were also 
ambivalent about the use£ulness 0£ the CETA administrative 
structure. At one point they were willing to consider 
greatly expanded responsibilities £or the CETA systea, 
even to the extent 0£ giving it some leverage <through 
£unding> over the much larger, more powerful, and more 
locally-controlled public education establishment. At 
another point they considered shrinking the CETA 
administrative establishment and giving most 0£ the 
funding to the school systems <this when Carter was 
soliciting election support £roa the teachers unions CNew 
York!!!~!, 2112180, 23:1J). 
A youth employaent training bill eventually passed 
the House in 1980, but at a tiae when it was clear there 
would be no Senate action before the election recess. The 
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large aaJority that voted £or the bill could go hoae and 
say they had voted to do something about the problems of 
youth unemployment. Opposition to the bill united the £ar 
left and right. Conservatives opposed any Federal aoney 
for JOb training. Liberals opposed the bill as a "shell 
game," in the words 0£ Representative George Miller 0£ 
Cali£ornia, a Democratic member 0£ the House Education and 
Labor Committee. Miller blasted the bill as Just an 
election year maneuver that would create a new level 0£ 
bureaucracy and not much else <New York !!!~!, 8/27/80, 
1:1>. 
Finally, then, the Carter Administration was unable 
to pass a youth employment training bill. Its last 
tangible success in the employment policy arena was the 
passage 0£ the 1978 CETA Amendments. During its last two 
years, the Carter Administration £ailed to take 
coordinated and decisive action in the realm 0£ employment 
training policy. The chie£ reasons £or the 
Administration's £ailure were its apparent inability to 
decide whether to support a more restrictive £iscal and 
monetary aacroeconomic policy or a more expansive full 
employment-oriented macroeconomic policy, and its failure 
to coordinate the legislative consideration of the youth 
employment training bill before the 1980 campaign season, 
when Congress was reluctant to pass new social spending 
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measures. 
The main theme in policy research regarding CETA 
during the 1979-1980 period was the examination 0£ the 
relationship between CETA and private industry. Four 
research reports sponsored by the Department 0£ Labor 
stressed the importance 0£ increasing private sector 
involvement in CETA. A study per£ormed by the Con£erence 
Board, a private, non-pro£it economic research £irm, 
concluded that aore private sector involvement in CETA 
would be essential, as Federal employment training 
programs will continue to be a vital part 0£ the United 
States economic and social policy throughout the next 
decade. The study pointed out that aost private £irma 
were still not aware 0£ CETA. Furthermore, it was 
essential to tailor training and placement programs to the 
actual JOb needs 0£ employers, in order to reduce 
recordkeeping and red tape, and to improve communications 
with private sector £irms. In order to do this, the role 
0£ Private Industry Councils <PICs> would need to be 
considerably strengthened CETR, 11:8:196-7). 
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Another study con£irmed the importance 0£ close links 
between training programs and eaployera. The authors, 
Marcia Freedman and Anna Dutka of the Columbia University 
Conservation 0£ Human Resources ProJect, concluded that 
the ideal "skill acquisition scheae" is a mixture 0£ 
classroom and on-the-3ob training similar to that £ound in 
apprenticeship programs <1980>. 
Two reports £ocusing apeci£ically on private 
involveaent in public training were released somewhat 
later, toward the end 0£ 1981. The £irst, by Randall 
Ripley and Grace Franklin, surveyed twenty years 0£ 
private sector involvement in government employment 
training e££orts. They £ound that volunteerism, economic 
development pro3ects, and tax credit incentives have 
accomplished relatively little compared to training 
prograas. "Reliance on volunteerisa on the part 0£ 
eaployers has not generated auch in the way 0£ concrete 
benefits £or the economically disadvantaged in the past" 
<ETR, 13:19:453>. 
Private sector involvement should nevertheless be 
encouraged, and the authors concluded the following: 
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1. Initiative aust coae froa the governaent; the private 
sector will not become su££iciently involved without 
Government-furnished incentives. 
2. Experimentation with different program £ormats should 
be encouraged. 
3. Efforts should be directed at small local firms rather 
than national companies, since the vast maJority of 
new Jobs in the economy will be created by small 
firas. 
4. National level policy makers should not overmanage 
local programs. 
5. Private industry councils should not be funded 
directly or given priae sponsor status, but 
incremental changes should be made in the existing 
CETA structure. 
6. National mediating groups <such as the National 
Alliance of Business> "have at best liaited utility" 
in encouraging private sector partnerships. CBoth the 
National Alliance of Business, on the management side, 
and the .Human Resources Development Institute, a 
creation 0£ the AFL-CIO, enJoyed a 
legislatively-mandated coordinating and mediating role 
under CETA.) 
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7. Programs that rely on pledges of future hires will 
prove disappointing. This waa the experience of 
several earlier programs. 
8. Too auch reliance on volunteer staff is a aistake; 
pro£essionals are "cruc:ial. 11 
9. On-the-Job-training is not always the most appropriate 
way to increase private sector participation. 
10. Small categorical add-ons to the CETA budget can have 
only limited results <ETR, 13:19:453-5). 
11. Most important, any attempt to increase the private 
sector role in employment training programs should 
focus on structure and design rather than on increased 
spending. The structure aust be iaproved be£ore it 
can competently handle more resources. Prime sponsors 
should be given more £lexibility in program design 
<ETR, 13:19:455>. 
Another maJor study, sponsored by the Employment and 
Training Adainistration and performed by the staff of Ohio 
State University's Mershon Center, evaluated the 
developaent of the Private Sector Initiative Prograa 
<PSIP>, authorized by CETA's Title VIID. It was the PSIP 
prograa that established the pr~vate industry councils 
173 
<PICa>, aade up principally 0£ business representatives, 
to plan and guide private sector eaployaent training 
activities COSU, 1981>. The study, an empirical 
exaaination 0£ PSIP activities, produced the £ollowing 
principal £indings 0£ interest here. First, PSIP 
activities varied greatly £ro• place to place, and by late 
1981 had achieved "signi£icant iaportance" in only 
one-third 0£ the aitea. 
Second, £actors a££ecting PSIP per£oraance were 
aaenable to local control but not Federal control, and 
included how private industry council aeabers were 
appointed and £unctioned, the caliber 0£ sta££ support, 
the e££ectiveness 0£ the local CETA system, local economic 
conditions, business attitudes, and types 0£ business 
participation. 
Third, PSIP success was proportional to the 
£unctioning 0£ the private industry council. Finally, 
PSIP was instrumental in getting soae program changes in 
the CETA system in hal£ 0£ the sites studied <ETRP, 
1982:117). 
The Ohio State University study shared with Ripley 
and Franklin the £inding 0£ the iaportance 0£ local 
e££orts, and the relatively aodest e££ects 0£ private 
sector inputs. It was less optiaistic about the prospects 
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for Federal atiaulation 0£ greater local private aactor 
effort. 
Willia• Mirengo££'s study of the 1978 CETA Amendments 
found that the new requirements and regulations tended to 
constrain local sponsor flexibility. The establishaent of 
separate youth programs and the PSIP encouraged prograa 
fragaentation rather than integration, and tougher 
auditing and eligibility standards aade prime sponsors 
•ore cautious and less willing to innovate. Planning 
e££orts continued to be disrupted by frequent changes in 
policy and funding allocations coming fro• Washington. 
Tighter targeting of public service employment Jobs did 
shift enrollment to •ore disadvantaged groups, but that 
also had the effect 0£ reducing the skill levels of public 
service employment Jobs <ETRP, 1982:118>. 
To summarize, the studies had several points in 
coaaon. The CETA system seemed to be making some headway 
in the crucial task of integrating government employment 
training efforts into the national eaployaent system. 
Private sector involvement in CETA should be expanded 
carefully, in small steps, with respect for variations 
according to local needs and practices. There was soae 
feeling that local program operators were improving in 
their perforaance, and consequently could profit from more 
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flexible regulations. Program structure must be reviewed, 
and new approaches tried, but in a care£ul way, to: avoid 
aore disastrous system upheavals. 
The subJect 0£ employment training policy, 
particularly public service employment, was a political 
football during 1980. Despite criticisms 0£ public 
service employment, the Administration was generally proud 
0£ its tighter targetting 0£ CETA programs and its 
initiatives to strengthen the role 0£ the private sector 
<New York!!!!!, 1111180,22:4>. In his State 0£ the Union 
address, President Carter proposed an additional S2 
billion expenditure over two years, to create 1.5 million 
Job training positions £or youths aged 14-21. This was 
all that could be spared in a context 0£ retrenchment <New 
York!!!!~, 1/22/80; 1131/80). 
As 1980 wore on, the anti-in£lation £orces in the 
Administration increased their in£luence at the expense 0£ 
the anti-recession £orces. By March, the 0££ice 0£ 
Management and Budget <OMB> was reportedly planning to cut 
50,000 public service employment slots £rom the CETA 
budget, in order to save $523 million <New York !!m~~, 
3/1/80,30:4>. The Senate Budget Committee favored 
176 
eliainating public service employaent entirely <New York 
!!m~~, 414180,IV,6:4>, but the House re£used to go: along, 
and when it reJected the overall Carter budget at the end 
0£ May, Speaker O'Neill attributed his opposition chie£ly 
to the proposed cutback 0£ public service employment 
positions to hel£ the previous level (350,000 slots 
instead 0£ 700,000> <New York I!!~!, 6/2/80,14:1>. 
President Carter appeared to change his mind again 
after Black ghetto residents rioted in Miami. He £lew to 
the city and called £or a new S2 billion increase in Job 
prograas, without speci£ying where the money would go <New 
York!!~!!, 6/10/80,II,12:3>. The intra-Administration 
clash between the expansionists at the Department 0£ Labor 
,, 
and the monetarists at the Off ice of Management and Budget 
worsened, and broke into the press. The I!!~~ reported on 
the controversy in mid-June, and solicited the opinion of 
the Adainistration's chie£ economic policy-maker, Treasury 
Secretary G. William Miller, who said that there were no 
plans for expansion 0£ CETA, and "the greatest 
contribution we can make to Jobs creation is to keep 
inflation down" (6/12/80,26:3>. 
Meanwhile, Senator Edward Kennedy <D-Mass.> made Job 
training an issue in his campaign against Carter £or the 
Democratic Presidential nomination. Kennedy favored 
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spending $3 billion aore for public service employment, 
and an extra Sl billion for youth Jobs <New York I!m~!, 
6/11/80,28:2>. At the Democratic convention in August, 
Kennedy supporters introduced a platfora plank calling for 
a S12 billion Jobs bill. Despite Carter's control of the 
convention, this plank was allowed to win. At the time, 
however, it was widely agreed that the plank's passage had. 
nothing to do with its content; Carter's managers were 
allowing Kennedy's support~rs to win budget planks as a 
tactic, in order to gather more adherents for the crucial 
candidate selection votes. 
Eaployment policy was mostly ignored as an issue 
during the Carter-~eagan campaign. Employment training 
issues were not expanded to a mass public. President 
Carter apparently £elt that employment training policy had 
little widespread public appeal. CETA's image as a social 
spending program would not help Carter in his attempt to 
claim the right-center territory £rom Ronald Reagan, and 
Senator Kennedy's earlier emphasis on employment training 
policy was probably another negative in£luence, since 
President Carter did not want to revive memories 0£ that 
campaign. 
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Candidate Reagan's strategy in the campaign was to 
avoid taking stands on specific policies as much as 
possible. His only action regarding employment training 
policy was a late and rather vague endorsement 0£ a plan 
suggested by Congressmen Jack Kemp <R-NY> and Robert 
Garcia <D-NY>, which would replace current urban 
assistance and employment programs with "urban enterprise 
zones," o££icially-designated slum areas that would be 
empowered to give tax incentives to businesses that 
located there. 
Candidate Reagan appointed an urban a££airs task 
£orce that also had the responsibility 0£ considering 
employaent training policy, which was apparently not 
considered important enough to have a task £orce 0£ its 
own. The task force, aade up of academics and public 
officials, was chaired by Pete Wilson, then Mayor 0£ San 
Diego. Shortly a£ter the election, the task £orce 
reported that CETA should be phased out and replaced by 
the urban enterprise zone concept <New York I!~!~• 
11/21/80,1:6>. It was thought that the total cost to the 
Governaent 0£ the urban enterprise zones would be Sl.5 
billion per year <New York T!m!~' 11/23/80,IV,2:3>. 
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If the Reagan campaign had lacked apeci£ic proposals 
concerning employment training policy, the general tenor 
0£ Reagan's economic views, emphasizing reduced government 
spending £or social programs and a lessening 0£ Federal 
authority, seemed to promise a complete upheaval in 
employaent training policy. Shortly after the 1980 
election, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think 
tank with close links to £igures in the Reagan 
Administration, issued a report on the Labor Department. 
The report called the Employment and Training 
Administration <ETA> one 0£ the most "confused and 
directionless" agencies in the government <ETR, 
12:16:437>. According to the Heritage Foundation, ETA 
tried to pursue, without clear priorities, economic, 
social, and political goals that were o£ten con£licting. 
ETA would require a "maJor overhaul," since its prograas 
were not run very well, were often "inconsistent," and had 
"horrendous" paperwork requirements. All top level 
personnel should be £ired CETR, 12:16:438>. 
When: it came to defining the purpose 0£ ETA, the 
Heritage group was forced to £all back on pious 
generalities. ETA's single mission should be to 
use Federal employment training resources to 
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enable individuals who lack skills to enter the 
labor market in a way that £ul£ills private sector 
needs without displacing the available labor 
supply and in a way that is compatible with the 
overall economic strategy 0£ the new 
Administration <ETR, 12:16:438). 
Longer term goals 0£ ETA should be to serve as a 
catalyst to improve productivity and upgrade the skill 
level 0£ the work£orce. Also, ETA should develop a long 
term plan to solve the unemployment problem among youth 
and the economically disadvantaged "without putting 
everyone on the public dole" CETR, 12:16:438>. How these 
goals were to be accomplished was not spelled out. 
The first specific indications of the new 
Administration's plans £or CETA came in the President's 
budget message in February, 1981, and the concurrent 
release of proposed budget cuts by the Off ice of 
Manageaent and Budget <OMB>. CETA funds were to be cut 
heavily, proportionately more than any other maJor 
program. Public service employment hiring would be frozen 
and the program cancelled as soon as possible. More 
generally, categorical grant programs, including CETA, 
were to be consolidated into block grants to the states as 
part of the Administration's "New Federalism" initiative. 
Ho details had yet been worked out <ETR, 12:24:689-91>. 
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The Adminiatretion wea slow to organize en employaent 
training polic making team. They appointed no experienced 
policy makers to the top echelons of the Labor Department. 
The position of Secretary of Labor was among the last 
Cabinet positions to be filled, and President Reagan~s 
nominee, Raymond Donovan, had to spend auch of his first 
year in off ice defending himself against charges of 
collusion with gangster elements 0£ the New Jersey 
construction industry. 
The Assistant Secretary 0£ Labor for Employment and 
Training would be responsible £or administering CETA and 
designing its replacement~ The Adminiatration~s choice 
for the post was Albert Angrisani, a 31-year-old executive 
vice president 0£ Chase Manhattan Bank. Angrisani had no 
experience in the field of employment training. He had 
handled pension and investment matters at Chase, and had 
served as the Reagan campaign manager in New Jersey, where 
he worked closely with Secretary Donovan, who was New 
Jersey campaign chairman. 
In con£irmation hearings before the Senate Labor and 
Human Resources Committee, Angrisani stressed the themes 
of eliainating waste and excessive regulation and 
restoring the balance between the Federal government and 
the states. He said that CETA had "evolved from a 
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relatively simple decentralized and decategorized program" 
to one that was "categorized, replete with duplication, 
centralized, and di££icult to administer;" he looked 
forward to "reestablishing the block grant concept that 
should underlie the program" CETR, 12:27:774>. He 
particularly supported programs for disadvantaged youth, 
while singling ou·t public service employment as a £ailure •. 
In any new program, the private sector would play a larger 
role: "we will be concentrating our e££orts on the 
private sector not only because it is where the vast 
•aJority 0£ Jobs is, but because these are jobs with a 
£uture" <ETR, 12:27:775). Angrisani was confirmed on 
March 9, 1981. 
Angrisani's first opportunity to express his own 
views, as opposed to prepared testimony, came in an 
interview published in ~Y!!g~!~ ~~~~ on March 31, 1981. 
The editors noted that the Administration had not really 
turned to policy strategies £or employment training 
prograas yet, nor had Angrisani acquired an aide 
experienced in employment training matters. 
When: asked the Administration's basic position 
towards employaent training, Angrisani replied that "we 
aust change the perception that the Government has to do 
this JOb." If' there must be ao~e Federal effort, "lly 
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first priority is to help those who want to get ehead, not 
to resurrect those who don't care." He agreed with the 
White House that all 325,000 public service employment 
Jobs should be cut £rom the FY82 budget, and that youth 
and adult CETA programs should be consolidated, with a 
$670 million budget cut. According to ~Y!!Il~!! ~!!~, a 
11 key 11 House Democrat commented, "£or 'youth 
consolidation,' read 'wipeout'" (3/31/81:54). 
When asked what type 0£ employment training programs 
the Administration might support, Angrisani replied that 
he £oresaw a "potentially big role" £or the military, 
which " ••• could be a natural market, with a broad spectrum 
0£ training £rom electronics to plumbing." On the subJect 
•' 
0£ retraining, he suggested that unions should solve the 
problea by negotiating retraining £unds £rom their 
employers. 
While Angrisani's remarks about using the military 
£or employment training purposes did not bear £ruit in 
legislative proposals, they did cause a section on 
military training needs to be written for the NCEP 1981 
~nnY~! B~2Q~;, as we noted in Chapter Four. The NCEP 
stressed that the military's needs did not overlap very 
much with the needs of the civilian economy <NCEP, 
1981:99-100). 
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Angrisani's interview established themes that would 
become !!!~!2~!~~ 0£ Reagan Administration employment 
training policy. One theme was the at-best grudging 
acceptance 0£ the need £or any government e££orts in 
employaent training. I£ there must be a Federal 
employment and training program, it should be as small as 
possible. 
The idea 0£ the deserving poor is another !~!~!2~!! 
0£ Reagan policy. According to this belief, among the 
unemployed there exists a small core 0£ those who are 
ambitious but have somehow missed the opportunity to get 
good Jobs or gain skills; they were taking a nap when 
opportunity knocked, but now deserve a second chance to 
open the door. In order to be helped, this group has to 
be singled out £rom among the larger band of £reeloadera 
who "don't care" enough to get out 0£ poverty on their 
own. This characterization of the needy, with its 
overtones of blaaing the victim, is one of the starkest 
differences between the attitudes of the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations. 
The Administration was quick to take action against 
CETA. On March 2, President Reagan announced a freeze on 
the public service employment program: no new starts 
would be allowed, and programs would close as funding ran 
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out <New York!!!!!, 3/3/81,812:1>. Reagan requested 
S9.26 billion in cuts in the Department of Labor budget, 
mostly in CETA, and the Senate Budget Coamittee quickly 
approved cuts of SS.5 billion CNew York !!!~!, 
3/19/81,1:6>. This was during President Reagan's 
"honeymoon" period, when the Congress was almost totally 
compliant. 
On April 2, Donovan and Angrisani appeared before the 
House Education and Labor Committee to defend cuts in CETA 
funds for current programs. On the subJect of CETA's 
future role, both Donovan and Angrisani emphasized that it 
would be to provide training for Jobs in the private 
sector, which would soon be revitalized by the President's 
" economic policy. Angrisani stressed that a new CETA must 
be more selective: "we are going to have reduced 
resources. We want to get the people who really do want 
to get ahead. We need to be selective" CETR, 
12:30:873-4). 
After three months on the Job, Angrisani offered his 
assessment of employment training policy in an interview 
with the.editors of grB <12:33-4>. He was firm about 
ETA's top priority: 
I'a being very strict on one point, and that point 
is this: that we are a tra~ning institution. We 
are not an income supplement institution. We are 
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not an income maintenance institution. We are a 
training institution. We must keep that £ocus and 
aake our decisions Con that basis] • 
••• We have only one goal: to identi£y people 
that need training consistent with the legislation 
and to measure immediate placement 0£ those 
individuals--and to get them placed <ETR, 
12:33:968). 
The sharp distinction between training and income 
maintenance is another !~!~!2~!~· The Carter 
Administration had stressed employment training programs 
as a superior £orm of income maintenance, combining relief 
with the potential of increased future productivity. The 
Reagan Administration re3ected this approach, as a 
corollary to its negative attitude towards government 
handouts. The argument over stipends for those in 
training would be one of the most peraisterit in the 
development of JTPA; supporters 0£ stipends insisted that 
the disadvantaged would not be able to participate in 
training programs without a stipend to pay their living 
costs, while the Administration denounced stipends as a 
back-door £ora 0£ welfare payment. 
Angrisani told ~IB that so far the Administration had 
no plans to £rame its own CETA reauthorization 
legislation, but would work to in£luence bills developed 
in Congress. 
Right now, we JUSt want to.be the managers, and 
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the responsibility of the •anager is to bring the 
decision makers and the legislators ••• the most 
clear and honest information that we can have 
<ET.R, 12:33:968). 
Nevertheless, the Administration was committed to the 
block grant approach, and they believed public service 
employment had been a failure, because most former 
participants were not able to find unsubsidized Jobs. In 
a revealing statement of his own attitude towards the 
policy making process, Angrisani said that when writing 
CETA replacement legislation, the Administration would not 
have a massive outreach process but would work with "key 
centers of influence," and discussions had already started 
with those groups. 
Angrisani stressed that it was important to design a 
prograa that was achievable. His message to Congress was 
Don't give me some political document that 
suggests that we're going to solve the short-term 
unemployment problems because of some training 
program, and seven years down the road have to sit 
back and say ••• we don't know <ETR, 12:33:969-70>. 
There was surprisingly little reaction to the CETA 
budget cuts. In an analysis of CETA politics, John 
Herbert of the New York !!~~! pointed out that local 
officials· were not trying hard to save CETA 
<4112/81,27:1>. He blamed the political failure of CETA 
on the success of the 1978 CETA Amendments in tightening 
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eligibility for CETA Jobs to the disadvantaged, and 
li•iting the wage that could be paid. These changes had 
aade CETA less attractive to local officials. 
A study by Robert F. Cook, of the Princeton 
University Urban Regional Center, reinforced Herbert's 
analysis by showing that the goals 0£ the 1978 Amendments 
had in £act been achieved: 
increases were found in the proportion of women, 
ainorities, persons with less than 12 years of 
education, those unemployed for long periods, 
those with low incomes and public benefit 
recipients. 
Cities responded to the tightening of restrictions by 
subcontracting the Job slots to private nonprofit groups. 
It was too difficult or too politically unr~warding to 
create and £111 the Jobs within the local government. By 
the end of 1979, 31 per cent 0£ all CETA slots were 
subcontracted, and the percentage was rising rapidly. 
When the political crunch came, cities <except for the 
extremely poor cities such as Detroit and New York City> 
were already reducing their participation in CETA and had 
small reason to fight for its continuation. 
By June,. the Administration had still not decided 
whether to develop its own CETA replaceaent legislation, 
but Angrisani told an NCEP-sponsored conference on 
vocational education and CETA that whatever new law was 
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developed should have an equal emphasis on training and 
placement. Training and placement are like product and 
sales in the business world, he said. Youth training had 
the greatest potential for return, due to the long careers 
for future payback. In any event, CETA must be made aore 
stable and focused. "We need to take the politics out so 
that the prograa won't change with every administration" 
CETR, 12:39:1132>. 
Meanwhile, a slightly lower Administration official 
was willing to be more specific about the Department of 
Labor's thinking. Speaking to the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors Employaent and Training Council <composed largely 
of local CETA officials>, Robert Jones, Administrator 0£ 
the ETA Office 0£ Management Assistance <on~ level below 
Angrisani>, summarized the key issues in CETA 
reauthorization: 
1. Achieving better coordination between CETA and the 
local Job aarket, so CETA isn't 11 Just a Federal 
program." 
2. An emphasis on output <placement and wages> rather 
than process. 
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3. The "contradicting" issues of aore effective 
aanageaent versus reduced reporting requirements. 
4. Closer relationships between all employment 
training-related programs. 
5. The possibility 0£ targeting CETA to only certain 
areas 0£ the country <ETR, 12:32:991). <This 
possibility never surfaced again.> 
Jones disagreed with the fear expressed by many 
conferees that the Administration's proposed block-grant 
approach £or future CETA programs would mean that all CETA 
appropriations would be funnelled through governors, who 
would distribute the money to suit their own political 
ends. In his view,. "the maJor tenets of CETA won't change 
Cand CETA willl remain a highly structured prograll" CETR, 
12:32:992). 
Jones was not so reassuring when he testified before 
the House. The basic question,. he said,. was 
Who can we serve successfully and what can the 
government do best £or that group? Success [Might 
aeanl= removing most of the program i£ that's what 
is necessary. • •• The complexities 0£ the current 
system are true and they are failures. We can't 
have the public and Congress in confusion about 
how the money is spent CETR,. 12:42:1235>. 
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W4th new leaders at the hela of the Administration 
and CETA's authorization running 6ut, the policy research 
establishment £aced a challenge. Their influence over the 
development 0£ employment training policy seemed 
questionable, to say the least. In June, 1981, the NCEP 
held a con£erence to review CETA's £ailures and 
accomplishments. The keynote speaker was Garth Mangum, 
pro£essor at the University 0£ Utah and a preeainent 
"insider" in employment training policy research. Mangum 
presented a list 0£ the problems and mistakes 0£ CETA that 
resulted in the current political crisis £or employment 
training policy <ETR, 12:42:1232). He squarely addressed 
the problem 0£ making employment training p~ograms 
palatable to the new Administration, and listed the 
lessons to be learned: 
1. "We spent too much"--not in terms 0£ the need £or 
employment training services, but £rom the perspective 
0£ the taxpaying public and in the interest 0£ care£ul 
administration. 
2. "We went too £ar 11 in increasing all social welfare 
programs and regulating business, without realizing a 
substantial backlash was building up. 
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3. CETA "kept bad company" politically, becoming 
identified with even less popular social programs such 
as wel£are, abortion, and gay rights. 
4. ""We changed philosophy" somewhere along the line £roa 
MDTA to CETA. MDTA could accomodate conservative as 
well as liberal rhetoric. Phrases such as "investment 
in human capital" or "rehabilitation" stress personal 
as opposed to societal responsibility, an emphasis 
that shifted under CETA. 
5. Too often CETA programs were given tasks they could 
not do, or solutions were inconsistent with the real 
problems. 
6. Even friends 0£ employment training programs "Blust 
confess to a failure of public management [even 
though] the Job was an extraordinarily difficult one." 
7. Finally, "we didn't prove our strong case .. by putting 
a strong evaluation systeJR into place early. "An 
evaluation system ia a necessary defense for any 
program which would serve a minority and not overly 
popular clientele" <ETR, 12:42:1232>. 
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The mistakes and failures of CETA, combined with the 
outlook 0£ the new Administration, created di££icult 
challenges £or employment training policy. Any future 
employment training program must emphasize sound 
aanagement, experiment and demonstration combined with 
evaluation, and a commitment to political pragmatism. 
Mangum's speech summarized the widespread feeling 
that employment training programs £aced severe political 
challenges. His advice on adapting employment training 
policy to conservative political rhetoric certainly seems 
to have been taken by the NCEP, to Judge by its 1981 
~!!!!!:!!! B!!2e!:!: • 
Also speaking at the NCEP conference, Robert Taggart, 
a former ETA of£icial currently associated with the Center 
£or Social Policy Studies, presented a review and 
re-thinking 0£ the structure of employment training 
programs. He attributed public skepticism toward 
employment training programs in part to inf lated 
expectations. In actuality, the output of various CETA 
service components had been "remarkably consistent" with 
previous program outcomes. CETA had not been a failure, 
but neither had it made any spectacular leaps in serving 
the unemployed. Changes in the system were certainly 
necessary, especially since demographic changes during the 
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next decade will .result in a shortage 0£ the entry level 
workers CETA was prepared to serve <ETR, 12:42:1232>. 
A review 0£ CETA training showed that 
the substantial body of evidence convincingly 
documents the positive impacts 0£ training in 
increasing future employment and earnings 0£ 
participants and in providing society a positive 
return on its investment. Whatever the 
shortcomings in the current sytem, it has produced 
these £avorable results <ETR, 12:42:1233>. 
Unfortunately, while long-term training showed the 
best returns, CETA planning and management were mostly 
directed to "short-term, palliative missions" and 
discouraged training investments CETR, 12:42:1233>. In 
order to be most effective, Federal employment training 
policy should adopt four maJor changes: 
1. Emphasize training, while deemphasizing work 
experience and income maintenance. 
2. Create uniform competency assessment systems to 
measure skill levels and certify competencies of 
participants. 
3. Build a "second tier" of long-term training onto 
current short-term training, so that participants with 
greater potential can move upward. Then, sorting out 
better participants will be "an obJective rather than 
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a taboo." 
4. Use mainstream institutions such as vocational schools 
and community colleges £or training the disadvantaged 
wj\enever possible, to avoid stigma, provide greater 
choice, and apply stricter standards 0£ individual 
per£ormance <ETR, 12:42:1233>. 
Local programs should certainly be consolidated, but 
the best approach would be a dual system with a youth 
program designed £or entry into career training or the 
labor market, and adult programs which provide actual 
career training or career entry activities <ETR, 
12:42:1234). 
Taggarts's conclusions were £urther documented and 
extended in the working paper he and Mangum presented to 
the con£erence. Aside £rom documenting the value 0£ 
training, the paper demonstrated that some 
"non-occupational" training, such as high school 
equivalency classes, English aa a second language, and Job 
search assistance, have a relatively low cost and high 
payo££ <ETR, 12:43:1259). 
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Kangua and Taggart £ound many siailaritiea between 
the CETA experience and the earlier studies 0£ MOTA. Both 
prograaa aade most 0£ their impacts by 
recruiting small proportions of a very large and 
needy group, training them for Jobs within their 
reach, and placing a high proportion 0£ the 
coapleters in the kinds 0£ Jobs which tend to be 
ubiquitous regardless 0£ the state 0£ the economy 
and which provide incoaes at or near the poverty 
line <ETR, 12:43:1260>. 
MDTA and CETA prograas aay not have overcome poverty, 
but they did serve to "reduce distress and increase 
sel£-support. 11 CETA had been a de£inite if aodest 
success,. yet e•ployment training programs had 11never been 
the subJect 0£ popular enthusiasm and periodically have 
coae under serious attack." Mangum and Tagg~rt attributed 
CETA's political unpopularity to the "unspectacular" 
nature of the results, the overpromise of the war on 
poverty,. and the aounting anxiety over inflation, which 
might aake a taxpayer "auch less willing to sacrifice for 
the long run remediation of his 1or her less £ortunate 
fellow citizens" <ETR, 12:43:1261>. 
We should note that public service employment 
specifically, and employment training programs as 
anti-recessionary tools generally,. were not even mentioned 
in Mangum and Taggart's paper, much less de£ended. While 
soberly assessing the possibilities for political success, 
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Hangua and Taggart highlighted the aspects of CETA that 
proaise the greatest long tera prospects of success, 
naaely the programs eaphasizing skill training. 
Many of Mangum and Taggart'a conclusions were further 
rein£orced by a study released later in the year by Mangum 
and Sar Levitan. Their study concentrated specifically on 
the training components 0£ CETA <Levitan and Mangum, 
1981>. Levitan and Mangum's study was less concerned with 
the iaaediate political climate than Mangum and Taggarts's 
paper; rather, it presented lessons learned about 
training £rom CETA programs. After a thorough analysis of 
the problems 0£ prime sponsors, Levitan and Mangua 
concluded that "it is not the whip but guidance that prime 
sponsors need. 11 Considering the litany of problems and 
legislative and adainistrative changes made in CETA, it 
was reaarkable that cost/benefit ratios were still 
positive (Levitan and Mangum, 1981:219). 
Levitan and Mangum's own recommendations £or the 
£uture of CETA pointed the way toward improving CETA as a 
training system. They advocated: 
1. A two-tier training system of classroom instruction. 
The first remedial career entry phase should last no 
aore than thrity-six weeks. The second, more 
extensive phase of specialized occupational training, 
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would be available to those who did well in the £irst 
phase <Levitan and Mangum, 1981:221>. 
2. On the JOb training should be modi£ied to include a 
"try-out" period, in which the trainee"s wages would 
be paid by CETA stipend rather than the employer. 
3. E££orts should be made to avoid training participation 
aerely to obtain allowances: possible approaches 
include a subsistence allowance based on family income 
and cash incentives £or superior performance. 
Training should be stressed rather than income 
1usintenance. 
4. A personnel exchange system would give CETA staff 
experience at local, regional, and national levels, 
along with a national body to provide prime sponsors 
with technical assistance, staff development, and 
curriculum development. The authors hoped these 
e££orts would improve the generally low level of 
•anagement coapetence 0£ the prime sponsors <although 
there were some conspicuous exceptions to that low 
level 0£ quality>. 
5. Performance standards should stress the quality of 
training and long-range results, rather than 
ahort-tera Job placement <Levitan and Mangum, 
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1981:221). 
Taken together, these papers did suggest an eaerging 
consensus 0£ pro£essional opinion on some employment 
training issues. CETA certainly had mani£old problems 
that needed fixing, but there had been some successes and 
so•e valuable lessons. Training proved to be a rewarding 
social investment, with more intensive training showing 
greater returns. More e££ective private sector 
involvement was needed to guide training priorities and 
improve placement. 
The NCEP's policy recommendations reflected many 0£ 
the findings 0£ Mangum, Taggart, and Levitan, although 
they were stated in terms somewhat more attuned to 
immediate political trends. They provided a yardstick by 
which to measure subsequent initiatives and compromises. 
During the summer and fall of 1981, the Department of 
Labor worked to develop an employment training policy. 
While internal developments were kept secret, officials 
appeared in public £rom time to time to give hints about 
the direction in which their thoughts were leading. Their 
coaments revealed the Administration's top priorities: 
cutting employment training £unding, increasing business 
in£luence, and more tightly reg~lating eligibility £or 
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prograa participation. 
Assistant Secretary Angrisani told the American Bar 
Association that the private sector should take the lead 
in training, but it needed more econoaic incentives such 
as tax credits, training vouchers, and depreciation 
allowances. New CETA legislation should £ocus on youth, 
particularly minority youth, who have the highest 
unemployment. The school systems were not doing their 
Jobs in basic and vocational education. 
The private sector, Angrisani said, should realize 
that the Federal government is not going to be the "bank" 
£or training, but make training a line item in a 
corporation's capital budget. Angrisani wa~ proud that 
funding £or ETA program would be drastically reduced. The 
reduced outlays for CETA and other programs were 
"absolutely essential" <ETR, 12:49:1414>. 
Hugh Davies, head of the ETA task force on CETA 
reauthorization, told the National Advisory Council on 
Vocational Education that the Department 0£ Labor was 
developing "viable options" £or CETA rewriting, including 
funneling employment training money through the states in 
block-grants, outlining labor market areas to replace the 
prime sponsor system, meshing youth programs with those 
for adults, and increasing inv6lveaent 0£ the private 
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sector. Since its inception, CETA 
suf£,ered from the lack of clearly stated 
obJectives ••• the failure to identify who the 
program was to serve ••• and the whipping back and 
forth of the system Ceach year). 
ETA's "bottom line" priority would be the placement in 
unsubsidized Jobs of those persons who were in dire need, 
and CETA's focus would be narrowed to reflect that 
priority CETR, 13:2:38>. 
At the annual National Alliance of Business meeting, 
Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan said that the 
Administration would be asking business to play "a maJor 
role" in a revised employment. training system. Donovan 
contended that traditional approaches had failed to 
eradicate the problems 0£ poverty and unemployment, and 
that the business comm.unity would play a "more significant 
role" than ever before in providing employment. training 
for the disadvantaged. "We are out 0£ the business of 
providing public service Jobs as a substitute £or a 
thriving, growing economy," but the Administration would 
seek a "partnership 0£ the public and private sectors Ctol 
provide real Jobs with a future" <ETR, 13:5:105>. 
Appearing with several Congressional staffers at the 
National Governors' Association conference, Assistant 
Secretary Angrisani made it clear that the Administration 
202 
had yet to develop a £irm position on the £uture 0£ CETA 
<ETR, 13:10:213>. The Administration "game plan," the 
mood 0£ Congress, and the overall state 0£ the economy 
would all have an 1n£luence. Out-0£-school disadvantaged 
youth would probably be the main target 0£ new 
legislation. The "bottom line" 0£ placement must be 
stressed in any new program, and there was a "considerable 
case" £or a larger role £or states, Angriaani said <ETR, 
13:10:213). 
Shortly a£ter Angrisani's speech, Under Secretary of 
Labor Malcolm Lovell gave an interview to g!R on the 
subJect of CETA reauthorization. Lovell, in the 
Departaent of Labor's number two Job, was a respected 
labor policy professional whose expertise the 
Administration needed. He was nominated at the end of 
August, 1981--it had taken a long time to £ind soaeone £or 
the position. 
Lovell reported that the Adainistration was not yet 
willing to say what kind 0£ new CETA program it would 
like, but there should be some kind of employment training 
systea <ETR, 13:10:226). Public responsibility £or 
training should continue to be for those "who have fallen 
through the cracks." 
The obJective of CETA--giving people a second 
203 
chance to compete in the labor market--is not 
under attack. • •• However ••• the country lost 
confidence in the program, which grew too rapidly 
and~consequently was out of control in recent 
years. It would be better to go back to a smaller 
program that would really work and then expand it 
<ETR, 13:10:226). 
In November, the Administration floated its first 
trial balloon on CETA reauthorization, in a leak to the 
press of a "tentative" draft of the Department of Labor's 
preliainary fiscal year 1983 budget submission to the 
Off ice of Management and Budget. The story first appeared 
in !h~ ~~!h!ng~En ~E!~ (1112011981>, after which the draft 
was apparently obtained by ~!8, which quoted it more 
extensively than the ~2~~ story. 
According to the draft, CETA would be ~~tirely phased 
out in FY1983, to be replaced by a "Business-Labor 
Training Program" attuned to the Adllinistration's belief 
that 
direct Federal involvement in social and economic 
programs should be reduced and the private sector 
should be relied upon to a much greater extent to 
directly train and to create permanent Jobs in 
which currently unemployed and underemployed 
persons can be placed <ETR, 13:13:283>. 
The new approach would rely on "substantially fewer 
operational sites" and be administered by "consortia of 
private sector eJnployers and organized labor." BLT <as 
the progra• was immediately nicknamed> would receive about 
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S2.2 billion in FY1983, with another S200 million devoted 
to phasing out CETA training already in progress. 
"Innovative designs" would be encouraged, though in ways 
unspeci£ied. A specially-targeted program would provide 
$200 aillion in services to older workers, Indians, and 
migrant £armworkers <ETR, 13:13:284). 
Even the S2.2 billion £igure was something 0£ a 
mirage--it was the £igure £or obligational authority: the 
Departaent 0£ Labor was only planning to spend about hal£ 
that aaount. The total employment training budget £or 
FY83 was now planned to be about S3.4 billion, as compared 
to SB billion in FY81, and the Administration's request 
for S4.5 billion in FY82 <Washington ~g~~, 11/20/81). 
While Congress prepared and introduced bills in the 
last aonths of 1981 (described in Chapter Seven>, the 
Administration used its influence in other ways. Under 
Secretary Lovell appeared at the U.S. Conference 0£ Mayors 
employaent training conference and said that CETA had 
spent S53 billion on training "with very inconclusive 
results" <ETR, 13:13:285). In the future, states should 
be free to designate the agency to receive employment 
training funds, instead of relying on the prime sponsor 
systea <ETR, 13:13:285>. Making this statement to the 
mayors' conference was bearding the lion in its den. 
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At the beginning of Deceaber, the preliminary 
Departaent of Labor budget request for BLT was slashed by 
the 0££ice of Management and Budget from S2.2 billion to 
Sl billion. This was mostly maneuvering, to further 
establish the Administration's resolve and a tough 
bargaining position; it was not meant to be a final 
figure. 
Later in December, another internal ETA proposal was 
leaked. ETA said that 
CETA ought to be replaced by a 
private-sector-oriented program, strictly targeted 
to disadvantaged, out-0£-school youth and wel£are 
recipients, to be funded as part of an employment 
training block grant to the states. • •• The goal 
of our proposed re£orm package is to raise the 
basic marketable skills 0£ those young members of 
society who are currently, or likely to become, 
dependent on state/Federal government income 
support or welfare programs <ETR, 13:16:359>. 
The paper denied that a Federal training program 
could have a significant impact on either productivity or 
unemployment; the implicit goal of the program was to 
reduce welfare costs. The block grants would combine 
funding £or CETA, the Employment Service, the WIN <Work 
Incentive) program, and vocational education, all at a 
reduced level. 
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The paper also suggested active involvement 0£ the 
private sector in planning, design, and program 
administration, training concentrating on skill-shortage 
areas, a subminimum wage £or youths aged 14-21, linkage 
between the training program and the military Cin 
unspeci£ied ways>, and selection £or training 0£ only 
those with the potential 0£ bene£iting. States would be 
encouraged to run the programs on the basis 0£ labor 
•arket areas rather than political Jurisdictions CETR, 
13:16:360). 
At the end 0£ December, the White House agreed to 
restore the BLT budget request to $2.4 billion for FY83. 
This could have been the first step back £rom their 
extreme bargaining position, but it could ai~o have 
reflected internal maneuvering on budget figures between 
the Department 0£ Labor and OMB, with no policy 
significance. 
Throughout its first year in office, the Reagan 
Administration took an essentially adversarial role in the 
formulation of employment training policy. It knew 
Congress:was working on new employment training 
legislation to replace CETA. Rather than developing its 
own comprehensive legislation, the Administration chose to 
act as a pressure group to influence the Congressional 
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bill-aaking: the process they used illustrates •any of 
the tactics an Administration can use to get its way. 
The President and high Department of Labor officials 
used a variety of public £orums to try to define the 
issues in a context that favored their outlooks. At the 
same tiJlle, they established a "tough" bargaining stance 
with Congress, aggressively attacking the existence 0£ 
employment training programs. Their strategy was 
politics-driven, ordered with a view to later trade-offs 
and compromises, rather than policy-driven, or designed to 
accomplish a specific policy goal. Thus, the policy goals 
of the Administration could be kept rather vague, and we 
cannot be sure that they truly wanted everything they said 
they did; some of their announced goals could have been 
no aore than bargaining chips. 
It is clear that the maJority of prominent eaployment 
training policy researchers disagreed with the Reagan 
Adainistration philosophy 0£ budget-slashing, in which 
employaent training programs would proportionately be cut 
the most. This should not be surprising, since the Reagan 
Administration wanted less Federal effort in employment 
training, and those who were professionally committed to 
developing employment training policies were not likely to 
agree that they could devise no better plan than inaction. 
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The £undamentalist £ree-market views o£ten expounded by 
the Reagan Administration precluded the need £or an active 
employment training policy; i£ aarket imper£ections must 
be admitted, the less intervention the better. 
It should also be no surprise that the Reagan 
Administration would tend to distrust the employment 
training policy research establishment. A£ter all, the 
establishment was both tightly interlocked and identi£ied 
with Deaocratic policy. For exaaple, Sar Levitan has 
written a whole series of books defending interventionist 
Federal social policies in general and the war on poverty 
progra•s in particular. Levitan and Mangum wrote a book 
together on the training element in CETA. Mangum and 
Taggart wrote articles together, and Taggart, a former 
Carter Administration ETA official, Joined with Carter's 
Labor Secretary Ray Marshall in the National Council on 
Employaent Policy, which was formed specifically to oppose 
Reagan-inspired cuts in employment training programs. 
A revealing clash between Administration o££icials 
and members 0£ the employment training research 
establishment took place at the 1981 convention of the 
Industrial Relations Research Association, where Don 
Moran, Associate Director for Human Resources at the OMB, 
and Robert Guttman, of the Senate Republican staff, 
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appeared on a panel with several employment training 
researchers. 
Moran clashed with Sar Levitan and Howard Rosen, an 
American University pro£essor and former director 0£ the 
ETA 0££ice 0£ Policy, Research and Development, in an 
acrimonious debate over the role of employment training 
programs in economic recovery. Moran said that "only 
large scale solutions" for healing the economy could help 
the employment situation CETR, 13:17:395>. By this he 
meant the Reagan supply-side budget. He conceded that 
"employment training programs have been help£ul, 11 but 
emphasized that they have been 11overfunded 11 <ETR, 
13:17:395). 
Vernon Briggs 0£ Cornell Can employment policy 
researcher and co-author with Ray Marshall> disagreed with 
Guttman about the record 0£ public service employaent as 
an effective tool for creating Jobs, providing public 
services, and raising participant incomes. Briggs 
defended public service employment and claimed that it 
proved to be £aster, more targeted, and cheaper than a tax 
cut, the :Job-creation device favored by the Reagan 
Administration. In reply, Robert Guttman showed little 
concern £or the record 0£ public service employment. Even 
1£ public service employment had been e££ective, he said, 
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"it is dead politically" CETR, 13:17:396>. 
Congress was not spared the criticism 0£ the 
researchers, either. Nathaniel Semple, £ormerly a 
Democratic Congressional sta££er and currently with the 
Committee £or Economic Development, doubted that Congress 
was capable 0£ coming up with a "reasonable" employment 
training system CETR, 13:17:396). In the ten years he 
spent in Congress, the political process made it 
impossible £or an e££ective employment training policy to 
be developed, much less implemented. Even putting aside 
policy differences, so many Congressional committees are 
involved in the legislative process that coordination is 
impossible. A comprehensive employment training program 
would require the coordination 0£ education,· labor, trade, 
and tax policies, and the various groups involved had not 
shown an interest in coming together on a common ground to 
•ake coordination possible CETR, 13:17:396). Himself a 
former member of the employment training subgovernment, 
Semple doubted that competing subgovernments would 
willingly cooperate or yield their power. 
As the Reagan budget was enacted and the outlook for 
employaent training programs became dimmer, some concerned 
professionals attempted to organize a policy 
counter-offensive. A private group called the National 
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Council on Employment Policy <not to be confused with the 
National Commission for Employment Policy, which I:have 
previously referred to as the NCEP> took action to 
publicize the type of employment training policy they 
favored. The National Council had been in existence since 
1964, when it was organized by Garth Mangum under the name 
President's Committee on Manpower. The National Council's 
opening volley was a report entitled "Management 0£ 
Remedial Employment and Training Progra•s in the 1980s" 
(1981). 
The Council's point 0£ view was straightforward: the 
most prudent approach to employment and training programs 
in the 1980s would be "incremental refor• of the existing 
system" <ETR, 13:20:487>. The Council saw no need to 
alter the "basic structure" of CETA, but new legislation 
should "delineate the roles and relationships 0£ the 
players and the parameters of their managerial 
responsibilities. That does not preclude changing the 
service aix or eligibility criteria" <ETR, 13:20:487>. 
According to the Council, it was a aistaken belief 
that CETA had £ailed; research indicated "that al•ost all 
of the aaJtir CETA components have been a good investment 
for society, and they have returned benefits well in 
excess 0£ costs." Lack 0£ publ~c confidence in CETA was 
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caused by such £actors as £raud and abuse incidents and 
the taxpayers' lack 0£ interest in aiding the 
disadvantaged when the economic pie was shrinking. The 
solution was to improve the current system, not to start 
over. 
The Council £elt that the private sector held no 
panacea £or the structurally unemployed. Turning 
employment training programs over to the private sector 
would be "an act 0£ f'aith not based on any actual track 
record 0£ positive performance on behalf' of the typical 
CETA participant" <ETR,, 13:20:487>. Also,. "the evidence 
suggests that private industry councils cannot replace 
prime sponsors as the managers 0£ local programs,," and 
private industry councils have tended to serve £ewer 
"hardcore disadvantaged" than prime sponsor programs. 
European-style labor market training boards have been 
suggested as a policy innovation,. but they would have 
several disadvantages in the United States. Funded by 
public funds or taxes on payrolls, the European boards 
were responsible for integrating the schools systems and 
employers, mainly through their control of apprenticeship 
positions. United States school systems are not 
structured to serve the training system,. and United States 
business is not used to participation in formal progra•s 
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and is not interested in financing the system through 
special employment taxes CETR, 13:20:488>. 
As opposed to the Administration's hope that state 
governors might somehow £ind a way to run the systea 
better, the authors pointede out that "in truth, during 
the brief eight-year history 0£ CETA, the balance-of-state 
systems and state employment training councils (run by the 
states] ••• have been the weakest links in the system" 
<ETR, 13:20:488>. 
The Council recommended the following management 
changes in the CETA system: 
1. There should be £ewer but larger prime sponsors, with 
one advisory committee each. 
2. The Federal government should continue to have a 
strong say in the allocation 0£ £unds. While 
governors might be given more discretionary powers 
over a portion 0£ the funding, Federal law should 
aandate that a maJor proportion be directly allocated 
to the local level. National programs should be 
retained. 
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3. Stability should be increased through aulti-year 
funding, and incentives should be provided £or.good 
long-range planning. 
4. Per£ormance standards emphasizing immediate placement 
and positive termination rate are "misleading and 
counterproductive" because they £avor short-term 
low-cost programs such as work experience, and ignore 
the long-term gains of costlier training programs. 
"Greater emphasis should be placed on the long-tera 
results if the program payoff is to be increased" 
<ETR, 13:20:488>. 
5. Annual £unding of at least S4 billion per year would 
be necessary to keep the system operatin~ efficiently. 
6. There should be a two-tiered training system such as 
Mangum and Taggart suggested, consisting of short-tera 
reaedial and entry-level training with supportive 
services, and extended career training, which yields 
higher social benefit-cost returns. 
7. Separate funding should be provided for programs for 
disadvantaged and minority youth, as suggested by the 
NCEP in 1980 <ETR, 13:20:488>. 
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In summary, the policy research establishaent, active 
supporters of the employment training policy 
subgovernment, disagreed with the Administration on aany 
points. Most policy researchers allied themselves with 
the subgovernment in its e££ort to counteract the 
in£luence 0£ the outsiders in the new Administration. At 
the same time, the Administration was a ma3or partner in 
the only game in town; without Federal programs, 
employment training researchers would be severely 
underemployed. Their interest lay in getting Congress to 
keep some kind 0£ program going, even 1£ it was not the 
ideal program. 
Next, we shall turn to the attempts 0£ other 
interested parties--state and local governme~t 
associations, employment training service providers, 




INFLUENCING THE FORMAL AGENDA--INTEREST GROUP INPUTS 
"Experience hath shown, that even under the best forms 
Co£ governmentl those entrusted with power have, in 
time, and by slow operation, perverted it to tyranny • 
••• The most e££ectual aeana 0£ preventing this would 
be, to illuminate, as £ar as practicable, the minds 0£ 
the people at large, and more especially to give them 
knowledge 0£ those £acts, which history ~xhibeteth, 
that ••• they may be enabled to know ambition under all 
its shapes and proapt to exert their natural powers to 
de£eat its purposes." 
--Thomas Jefferson, a ~!!! fQ~ ~h~ 
M2~~ ~~n~~~! Q!iiY~!QD Qf Kn2~!~gg~, 1799 
When developing •aJor legislative initiatives, 
Congress generally follows a standard operating procedure. 
First, the comaittees or subcommittees of the relevant 
subgovernment hold a series of hearings, at which 
interested parties testify in favor of the policies they 
wish to see enacted, or in opposition to those policies 
that they do not wish to be implemented. After members 
have introduced bills,. the subcommittee "•arks up,." or 
217 
revises, the bill that will receive concentrated 
attention. A bill that passes the subcommittee will be 
considered by the £ull committee, and, i£ it passes the 
full coamittee, the entire House or Senate. Di£ferences 
in House and Senate versions of bills are settled by a 
conference committee of Representatives and Senators, 
usually members of the original subgovernment committees. 
Congressional hearings have several functions. They 
often serve an information-gathering purpose, building a 
factual record to support policy. They provide a formal 
way £or interested parties to present their views to 
Congress. They are used to present trial balloons, in 
order to test interest group reactions and effectively 
" establish the limits within which bargaining can take 
place. Thus, committee hearings serve as scanning units, 
£ormally keeping the Congress in touch with its 
environment <Etzioni, 1968:282-305>. 
Committee hearings also serve more subtle political 
purposes. Chairpersons often use hearings to build a case 
for their points of view on issues, establishing a 
legislative history favorably weighted towards their side. 
On the other hand, groups whose views will not prevail are 
sometimes invited to address hearings in order to assure 
them that at least they had th~ir day in court, and that 
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their views were care£ully considered. 1£ a Congressman 
can't satis£y an interest group, he can at least give it 
the symbolic reward 0£ expressing its views in public 
<Cobb and Elder, 1983:124-9>. Finally, hearings are used 
to generate publicity £or committee members, and are o£ten 
held in the home districts of the chairpersons. 
In the struggle to influence the governmental agenda 
<in this case, the drafting of a CETA replacement bill>, 
there may be many methods 0£ communicating with Congress 
other than testi£ying at hearings. During JTPA 
development, interest groups held conferences, adopted 
policy statements, sponsored research reports, wrote 
letters, and personally lobbied Congressmen. 0£ course, 
not all coummunications with Congressmen are public. As 
sources £or this chapter, I have examined the record of 
all Congressional hearings having to do with developing 
legislation to replace CETA, as well as all references to 
employment training policy in the ~QD9~!§§!QD§! B!gQ~Q, 
the Washington e2§~, New York I!m!§, Los Angeles I!m!§, 
and ~me!2~m!n~ I~~!n!ng B!eQ~~!r· I will consider policy 
inputs according to their sponsors: £irst the business 
community, then state and local governments, and, finally, 
community-based organizations, principally outreach 
agencies and representatives 0£ client groups. 
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As in most subgovernments, the broad interest groups 
a££ected by employment training policy were represented in 
policy development by a few leading organizations, trade 
associations, interest group-sponsored policy committees, 
and think tanks. While many business representatives 
testified before Congress, made statements in the press, 
or otherwise voiced their views, the essence of business 
views was expressed by the more extensive work 0£ the 
three organizations I will discuss here: the National 
Alliance 0£ Business CNAB>, the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Council for Economic Development. The 
plans offered by those three groups were ·the moat detailed 
aade by any business group, and showed the greatest 
attention to the development of Federal policy. The NAB 
and the Chamber 0£ Commerce would also be active 
participants in the legislative struggle after bills were 
introduced in Congress, and their prior positions deserve 
study. <The Council for Economic Development did not play 
an active role in legislative maneuvering, since such a 
role would be contrary to its character as a think tank 
and consensus-creating group linking corporations and 
academia.> 
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The National Alliance of Business was formed in 1968 
speci£ically to manage auch 0£ the business community's 
participation in Federally-funded employment training 
activities. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is business' 
largest trade association. The Council for Economic 
Development is a business-sponsored, non-profit research 
and education organization whose trustees are drawn from 
corporate and university boards. 
The President of the National Alliance of Business 
during 1980-1982 was William Kolberg. Kolberg had been a 
professional bureaucrat, and he served as Assistant 
Secretary of Labor in charge 0£ employment training policy 
during the Nixon Administration. Kolberg's book on his 
experiences in Governaent is an interesting insider's 
account of the day-to-day trials 0£ developing legislation 
<Kolberg, 1978>. 
Shortly after the 1980 election, Kolberg appeared at 
a conference sponsored by the National Association of 
Counties to outline his views on the future of employment 
training policy. His main point was that the private 
sector should have more control over Federally-funded 
programs. Although he stressed that private business did 
not want to take over the CETA system, Kolberg advocated 
the creation of public corpor~tions to run all labor 
221 
aarket programs, including CETA, the Employment Service, 
and apprenticeship programs. These public corporations 
"should be removed :from governmental and political 
influence and run by boards composed of management and 
labor" <ETR, 12:13:339>. 
g!B reported a :few weeks later that Kolberg's 
proposal to establish public non-profit corporations to 
run the education and training system had "sparked 
considerable interest among employment training 
professionals" <ETR, 12:24:697>. Kolberg told sIB that he 
in :fact had no specific proposal, but he hoped to 
stimulate the revision o:f some 0£ the basic assumptions 
about U.S. employment training policy. He particularly 
wanted to emphasize the need to coordinate the e£:f orts o:f 
CETA and the Employment Service and to increase the 
involve•ent o:f the private sector. Also, a system with 
475 pri•e sponsors was "too unwieldy" and should be 
realigned according to labor market areas instead 0£ 
political Jurisdictions. 
Substituting some other unit :for the CETA prime 
sponsors would remove some o:f the "political tampering" 
from the system, Kolberg believed, but some political 
probleas were probably the "price o:f democracy. 11 Congress 
had contributed to the proble~s o:f employment training 
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policy by re£using to £und the programs £or more than one 
year at a time. The problems between the Employment 
Service and CETA were exacerbated by the £act that 
separate Congressional committees handle the two systems. 
There£ore, change must be stimulated by the executive 
branch <ETR, 12:24:698). 
Kolberg'a remarks contained the geras 0£ several 
proposals to be discussed in greater detail later. 
Perhaps moat important, his view that the Federal 
governaent had a responsibility to continue employment 
training programs was never opposed by important business 
groups, despite the Administration's initial leanings 
against any Federal involvement. Although Kolberg's 
proposal to turn program authority over to 
labor-aanagement consortia was subJect to several 
di£ferent interpretations during 1981, it anticipated the 
Administration's 11Business-Labor Training Program" 
proposal late in 1981. Finally, Kolberg's insistence on 
increased involvement 0£ the private sector became the 
Administration's chie£ priority £or employment training 
policy Ca£ter budget-cutting). 
Under Kolberg's direction, the NAB held a series 0£ 
nine regional policy seminars during the summer 0£ 1981, 
in which it attempted to educ~te its members on 
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develop•ents in employment training policy, while £orm1ng 
a comaon approach to new legislation. In the end, 
participants agreed that structural unemployment was too 
big a Job for either the private sector or the government 
to handle alone, but that they would like to see 
responsibility £or running employment training programs in 
the new CETA turned over to local public-private 
corporations rather than to government. As a training 
strategy, the NAB participants' £irst choice was 
occupational skill training directly tied to an employer 
and, pre£erably, to speci£ic Jobs CETR, 12:6:128). 
The U.S. Chamber 0£ Commerce monitored employment 
training policy developments through its Education, 
Employaent, and Training Committee. In Senate hearings on 
the issue during June, 1981, the Chamber's chie£ concern 
was the need £or training and re-training in highly 
skilled occupations. The government should not neglect 
the displaced worker: 
to neglect the citizen who has worked £or a number 
of years, but who is now displaced due to 
technological change, in £avor 0£ the person who 
has never carried his share 0£ society's 
costA--£or whatever reasons--may be unwise <U.S. 
Congress, 1981b:168>. 
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In response to other testimony, the Chamber expressed 
its skepticism about the use£ulness 0£ tax incentives. So 
£ar tax credits had not been substantial enough to 
stimulate hiring by small businesses, particularly when 
weighing the burden 0£ extra Federal red tape and possible 
audits. Also, businesses must make substantial pro£its to 
bene£it £rom tax breaks <this was be£ore the tax law 
changes that let businesses sell their tax losses to more 
profitable companies) <U.S. Congress, 1981b:148-180). 
By the end 0£ 1981, the Chamber had developed a 
considerably more complex policy statement on employment 
training matters. The Chamber~s statement called £or a 
national employment training policy that would respond to 
' ' 
actual and future skill needs and shortages, retrain 
workers who had been displaced, and provide the 
structurally unemployed with skills. This would "increase 
productivity, raise living standards, and improve the 
quality 0£ life £or all" <ETR, 13:20:488). 
The Chamber said that business wanted input into 
employaent training program planning, but that it was not 
interested in running the whole show. The private sector 
should determine the kind 0£ training to' be of£ered, but 
not necessarily operate or administer the training 
prograa. Training should be £or employment in the private 
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sector, not in the public sector. Programs "should not be 
used as a form of income maintenance or as an instrument 
of fiscal relief for state and local governments." 
According to the Chamber's statement, the Federal 
governaent should confine its activities <except for 
funding, presumably> to five areas: 
1. Creating a positive atmosphere by developing public 
policy options which would encourage private sector 
growth and JOb creation, especially in small business. 
What these options would be was not stated. 
2. Improving the educational system, so that people will 
be better prepared for work. 
3. Supplying labor market information. 
4. Helping educators and employers retrain workers whose 
skills are obsolete. 
5. Focusing government placement services on those who 
are drawing income maintenance and services £roa 
government-funded assistance programs. 
The Chamber also endorsed the idea 0£ block grants to 
states. Finally, it urged that service deliverers should 
be chosen competitively <ETR, 13:20:488). 
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The Chamber's three top employment training 
priorities--training to meet skill shortages, retraining 
and reemployment 0£ displaced workers, and training and 
employaent 0£ the structurally-unemployed--were 
essentially the same as those 0£ the National Commission 
£or Employment Policy. However, the emphasis 0£ the 
testimony 0£ the Chamber, as well as the maJority 0£ other 
business groups, was on skill training much more than 
helping the disadvantaged. To cite one other example, the 
director 0£ the National Tooling and Machining Association 
reminded the Senate Subcommittee that the De£enae 
Industrial Base Panel 0£ the House Armed Forces Committee 
had identi£ied the "critical manpower shortage" as one 0£ 
.. the aaJor £actors £or the decline 0£ U. s ... military 
preparedness" (U.S. Congress, 1981b:255>. Increased skill 
training was there£ore necessary to insure national 
survival. 
The targeting and reporting requirements 0£ CETA, 
designed to help the disadvantaged, were £requently 
attacked by business groups. For example, a 
representative 0£ the Associated General Contractors 0£ 
A~erica, Robert Fay, said that in the experience 0£ 
construction employers "CETA seems to have incorporated so 
aany poverty-oriented prerequisites to participation that 
the program is almost useless as a training vehicle" <U.S. 
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Congress, 198lb:192). 
Business support £or speci£ic programs serving the 
disadvantaged was generally con£ined to two groups, each 
with ties beyond the business community itself. The 
Committee £or Economic Development presented testimony 
supporting programs for the hardcore unemployed, and 
listed some key conditions £or successful participation 0£ 
business in programs to help the disadvantaged: 
1. MaJor and sustained personal involvement of top 
business leadership. 
2. MaJor emphasis on involving small business £iras as 
well as large ones. 
3. Enough flexibility to allow a wide variety of 
organizational arrangements from place to place. 
4. Specialized intermediate organizations to help £iras 
with specific problems, such as Job placements, 
Federal red tape, counseling, or supportive services 
<U.S. Congress, 1981b:135-148>. 
The Committee £or Economic Development, usually 
represented by its vice president, Nat Semple, was active 
throughout the reauthorization process. Before Joining 
the Coamittee £or Economic Development, Semple had spent 
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ten years as a minority staff member of the House 
Committee on Education and Labor. This experience had 
le£t him with a somewhat Jaded view of the possibilities 
£or improving employment training policy. In March, 1981, 
he told the National Association of Counties CNACO> 
conference that the strongest thing CETA had going for it 
was that "no one has thought of an alternative." It was 
up to the supporters of CETA to focus attention on "the 
role 0£ employment training in overall economic policy," 
since the Administration had so far ignored the issue 
<ETR, 12:27:772>. 
By the Fall of 1981, Semple was advising Congress <at 
House hearings> not to try for a comprehensive approach to 
·: 
eaployaent training policy. There were too many practical 
obstacles in the way 0£ a comprehensive approach, Semple 
said, since such a bill would be "approximately 300 pages 
long, involve six different committees, twelve different 
aubcomaittees, and a lot of ruffled feelings" <U.S. 
Congress, 1982a:12>. It was more important to forestall 
imminent disaster to CETA with a short-term salvage 
operation. 
Semple believed that business should have a maJor 
role in any new plan, establishing policy that would be 
carried out by "the professionals we have in the field 
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now." He also advocated trana£erring the responsibility 
£or program operation away from local elected officials, 
although he believed "they must have a critical working 
relationship with any new institutional arrangement" <U.S. 
Congress, 1982a:6-13). 
The second maJor group to support more programs £or 
the disadvantaged was the National Association 0£ Private 
Industry Councils. Thia group crosses the boundary 
between business and CETA participants, since it was 
composed primarily 0£ business representatives who were 
already active in CETA, serving on Private Industry 
Councils <PICs> under the CETA Private Sector Initiative 
Prograa. PICs were well represented at hearings, both by 
aembers 0£ the National Association and individual PIC 
members. 
Since PIC members had already been involved in the 
nuts and bolts 0£ CETA, their comments tended to address 
aore speci£ic issues 0£ CETA policy. Many were concerned 
that the roles 0£ the private and public sectors be more 
clearly defined. For example, the chairman 0£ the 
Cincinnati PIC reminded the House Government Operations 
Subcomaittee on Manpower and Housing that the 
disadvantaged population of the United States £aced 
aultiple barriers to employmen~ "which private employers 
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cannot remove es pert of the profit-making process." The 
public sector must supply basic educational and work 
skills. The maJor obJective 0£ CETA should not be 
placement, but rather economic independence, long-tera 
employment, and mobility within the system <U.S. Congress, 
1981a:202-211>. This statement was an opening salvo in 
the battle over speci£ying performance standards £or 
training programs, about which more will be presented 
later. The point here was that measuring the 
e££ectiveness 0£ training programs simply by placement 
figures was not a good practice. 
PIC members also showed considerable interest in 
changing the boundaries 0£ local service areas <the prime 
sponsors under CETA> to encompass a "natural labor market 
area" CU.S. Congress, 1981a:212-223>. This proposal will 
also emerge later as a ma3or controversy. 
To summarize, the principal ob3ectives 0£ the 
business community were: 
1. A continued Federal role in employment training 
programs. 
2. More business influence over the programs <though not 
£ull responsibility). 
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3. Greater attention to skill training, to avoid £uture 
skill shortages. 
4. Lesa targeting on the disadvantaged, or at least a 
considerable simpli£ication 0£ targeting and reporting 
requirements. 
5. Changes in the geographic boundaries 0£ the present 
system, in order to emphasize services within natural 
labor market areas. 
Far £rom advocating the total destruction 0£ CETA, or 
even radical revisions in the employment training system, 
business groups suggested basically incremental changes in 
existing policies. During the development 0£ bills in the 
subcommittees 0£ the House and Senate, the business 
associations £unctioned as £ull members 0£ the 
subgovernment, operating in the distributional policy 
mode. More money £or skill training meant replacing 
private business expenditure with Federal funding, a 
distributional measure giving more to business and less to 
the disadvantaged. To anticipate the course 0£ our 
narrative, business would not split with the rest 0£ the 
employment training subgovernment until the Administration 
used "issue expansion" tactics, invoking a higher-order 
value than that 0£ the subgovernment, in this case the 
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commitment to massive cuts in social spending. Only then 
did business associations 3oin the Administration to help 
emasculate the very legislation they had, with 
considerable success, helped to fashion. 
The term "community-based organizations" is a bit o:f 
CETA Jargon, a general and inclusive term referring mainly 
to non-pro£it groups who either operated employment 
training programs with CETA funding or represented persons 
who were served by CETA. Many client advocacy groups 
received CETA training contracts, either directly £rom the 
Department of Labor under the National Programs <Title 
III> or £rom local prime sponsors. These groups generally 
supported minimal changes in the structure 0£ CETA, and 
they strongly endorsed increased funding. A £ew examples 
will give the £lavor 0£ their views. 
The Indian and Native American CETA Coalition met 
with the Department 0£ Labor to protest proposed cuts in 
public service employment, claiming such cuts "would 
cripple many tribal government services as well as throw 
thousands 0£ Indians out of work in areas where there are 
simply no other JOb opportunities available" <ETR, 
12:25:726>. Because 0£ their extremely high unemployment 
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rates, Indian reservations had received a relatively large 
share of public service employment funding. This was an 
example of employment training £unds used primarily as a 
substitute £or unemployment insurance and wel£are. 
At Congressional hearings, the National Urban Indian 
Council defended national target programs £or migrants and 
Indians, citing the special needs 0£ Indians and appealing 
to the long tradition 0£ Federally-sponsored Indian 
programs. Sta££ £rom the National Association 0£ 
Farmworker Organizations pointed out that the nature 0£ 
the migrant lifestyle precluded migrant workers £rom being 
served by programs structured at the local level <U.S. 
Congress, 1981b:900-920>. Therefore, the national program 
title, and specifically the contract of the National 
Association of Farmworker Organizations, should be 
continued. 
A spokeswoman for Wider Opportunities for Women and 
the Women's Equity Action League cited the growing trend 
toward the "feminization of poverty" and called £or 
targeting the structurally unemployed, stricter monitoring 
and en~orcement 0£ targeting requirements, and evaluation 
and replication of demonstration proJects <U.S. Congress, 
1981b:859-880>. Included in the parade of organizations 
seeking more £unding £or their clients, the American 
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Legion recommended that more CETA funds be targeted to 
veterans and trans£erred £rom CETA to the Veterans 
Employaent Service CU.S. Congress, 1981b:921-941>. 
An AFL-CIO spokesman agreed that national targeting 
was needed Cthe AFL-CIO was the recipient 0£ national 
program contracts>, and recommended greater linkage 
between Private Industry Councils CPICs> and prime 
sponsors, with PIC representation expanded to include more 
labor, education, and community-based organization input 
<U.S. Congress, 1981b:790-816). This theme was also 
supported by spokesmen £or the National Urban Coaltion and 
SER--Jobs £or Progress, a Hispanic employment training 
group. 
SER--Jobs £or Progress later expanded on their 
testiaony in a policy paper on the proper redesign 0£ 
CETA. The paper was submitted to Congress. According to 
SER, Federal employment training programs should continue 
their emphasis on reaching the disadvantaged, but the 
current prime sponsor system should be replaced by labor 
aarket area systems defined by the states. This was 
needed :because prime sponsors had £ailed to link 
employment training services to labor market needs. The 
"management capability of the local delivery system would 
be enhanced 1£ the system was not so directly tied to the 
235 
political environment" <U.S. Congress, 1981b:836-846). 
E££orts to loosen ties to the political structure:were in 
e££ect e££orts £or greater redistributive emphasis. 
States would thus become more important under the SER 
proposal. Governors would designate new service delivery 
areas, according to labor market area criteria. To decide 
on the proper areas, the governor would take into account 
1> existing consortia 0£ prime sponsors that serve labor 
aarket areas; 2) representation 0£ business groups, 
community-baaed organizations, and labor organizations in 
areas seeking designation as a labor market area; 3) the 
past per£ormance record 0£ prime sponsors applying £or 
designation as labor market areas. States would have 
increased but not complete control over £uriding, a 
position £alling between then current rules and those 
reportedly being developed in the Senate. 
The new program suggested by SER would have three 
parts. Part one would cover employment training services 
for adults, and Labor Market Planning Boards would receive 
75 per cent 0£ all Federal £unds direct from the 
Depart~ent 0£ Labor, with up to 25 per cent 0£ funds 
allocated to the state governor. Part two would serve 
youth and single parents, and all that funding would go to 
the states, to be spent by them or allocated to local 
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areas. Part three would cover national programs and would 
be identical to the provisions 0£ CETA <U.S. Congress, 
1981b:836-846>. Community-based organizations wanted to 
save the national contracts, which were the most 
redistributive elements of CETA, since they were targeted 
on the poorest groups, were relatively independent of 
local political influence, and offered some direct 
representation of the client groups in the design and 
administration 0£ programs. 0£ course, administration and 
overhead payments in national contracts also benefited the 
community-based organizations that administered the 
contracts. 
Host CETA money passed through the hands of state and 
local governments; consequently, they had a substantial 
stake in the evolution of employment training policy, and 
they were extremely active in their attempts to influence 
legislation. Their point of view, in terms of our policy 
making model, was strictly distributional; that is, 
oriented toward dividing the Federal spoils among local 
governmental units. This section will discuss the 
positions on CETA reauthorization developed by the main 
state and local government associations. As the time for 
the introduction of legislation got closer, the 
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associations ha•mered out their own positions with a sense 
of give-and-take, balancing what they really wanted 
against what they thought they could get, given the 
political climate. 
Besides testi£ying before committees of Congress, the 
state and local government associations played an 
extremely important role in the reauthorization process; 
a great deal 0£ the CETA reauthorization debate was 
sponsored by these organizations. It was at the meetings 
of the National Governors' Association, the National 
Association 0£ Counties, and the National League of 
Cities, that Senators, Congressional staffers, and policy 
pro£essionals appeared to give their views and listen to 
the views 0£ others. The associations provided a £orum 
for debate. The part played by the government 
associations in CETA reauthorization provides a good 
illustration 0£ the importance 0£ trade associations in 
policy making. 
In the discussion 0£ state, county, and local 
government inputs to CETA reauthorization, there is one 
overriding point to remember. Each association thought 
that CETA should be continued in some £orm, and each 
association believed that its constituent members were the 
best equipped to administer any new employment training 
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program; they were united to gain more resources overall, 
but divided in a tur£ battle to control those resources. 
Speculation about the £uture 0£ CETA began 
immediately a£ter the election 0£ 1980. At the December, 
1980 National Association 0£ Counties CNACO> meeting, 
speaker a£ter speaker agreed that a new era was at hand. 
Public service employment was surely dead, and there 
seemed to be an inevitable trend toward reducing the role 
0£ the public sector and increasing the role 0£ the 
private sector in employment training programs. 
One 0£ the most prominent representatives 0£ CETA 
administrators was Marion Pines, director 0£ the Baltimore 
CETA consortium. At the NACO meeting, she stressed the 
need to attack the enterprise zone concept 0£ the Reagan 
Administration. In her view, the outlook was not all bad; 
much 0£ CETA might be salvaged 1£ planners could "rephrase 
what we do to make it sound more palatable" to the Reagan 
Administration CETR, 12:13:339-40>. 
HACO was ready to accept ma3or changes in CETA. By 
March, both the NACO Steering Committee on Employment and 
the National Association 0£ County Employment and Training 
Administrators Committee on the Future of CETA Ca 
subsidiary body of NACO> adopted resolutions recommending 
consolidating all CETA titles.into one block grant, and 
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giving local governments much more £lexibility in 
administering those grants CETR, 13:12:773>. 
NACO presented a more coMprehensive set 0£ 
recommendations for employment training policy in August, 
1981. In the usual pattern, these recommendations were 
circulated among the employment training subgovernment. 
NACO's key policy position on CETA was that an 
"institutional role of sustained direction and duration 
should be developed." The key to NACO's recommendations 
was forward funding, or a two-year appropriations miniaum, 
to allow sensible planning. The £uture obJectives of CETA 
should be three-fold: first, it should stress training 
£or the structurally unemployed. Second, it should assist 
industry in gaining skilled workers. Third, it should 
fill the JOb deficit when the normal interaction of 
private industry fails to produce an adequate number of 
Jobs. CETR, 12:48:1342). 
Thus, NACO supported both the skill and welfare 
£unctions of employment training programs. By this tiae, 
NACO had turned away £rom the block grant idea <chiefly 
because= the Administration wanted to give block grants to 
states rather than cities and counties>, and it defended 
the current prime sponsor system, saying that it provided 
for greater accountability, responsiveness, and capacity 
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for resource mobilization <ETR, 12:50:1431>. Although it 
might be desirable in some instances to define service 
areas that corresponded to labor market area boundaries, a 
consortium approach should be encouraged and not mandated. 
Labor market area approaches were especially unpopular 
with suburban area prime sponsors <typically areas with 
relatively low unemployment), who did not wish to be 
consolidated with inner-city prime sponsors. 
The greatest change in CETA should be to simplify its 
structure and requirements, according to NACO. All 
currently mandated programs should be consolidated into a 
single title <except £or national programs). The basic 
CETA title would have three "tiers." The £irst tier would 
cover basic training services, with no restrictions on the 
aix 0£ services that could be o£fered. The second tier 
would serve youths aged 14 to 21, with prime sponsors 
again unrestricted in their choice 0£ program activities. 
Third tier "high impact" £unding would go to areas 0£ high 
and sustained unemployment, and could be used to £und 
activities under tiers one or two CETR, 12:50:1431>. 
NACO advocated simpli£ied uniform eligibility 
standards for participation. Private sector participation 
should be increased by raising the allowable reimbursement 
to employers for on-the-Job training £rom SO per cent to 
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100 per cent 0£ salaries, and by providing 90 day "try 
out" periods £or individuals receiving public £unds. In 
addition, each prime sponsor should have one unified 
advisory council, like the private industry council, 
rather than three, as was th~ case under CETA. 
In sum, the new CETA should be characterized by: 
1. Prime sponsorship as defined in previous CETA 
legislation. 
2. Flexibility to choose locally among allowable 
services, with no presumptive deliverers 0£ services 
(in CETA, some service deliverers were earmarked in 
Federal legislation). 
3. Streamlined requirements, emphasizing performance 
rather than process. 
4. Reduced paperwork and Federal regulations. 
5. Maximum consolidation 0£ existing CETA titles <ETR, 
12:50:1432). 
B~sides the National Association 0£ Counties, the 
chief voices for localism and the current prime sponsor 
system were the U.S. Council of Mayors CUSCM> and the 
National League of Cities <NLC>. Each sent a 
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representative to Senate Subcoaaittee hearings, during 
which their prime concerns were the method 0£ £unding and 
the de£inition 0£ service areas. David Harrell, 
representing the National League 0£ Cities CNLC>, said 
they would support a block grant concept only i£ local 
officials controlled the money. "Cities came to 
Washington in the £irst place because their states were 
unwilling or unable to address their problems," Harrell 
said (U.S. Congress, 1981b:342>. 
Baltimore's Mayor William Schae£er said the USCM 
position was to enhance the present employment training 
system by encouraging local labor market areas to work 
together, thus avoiding ."duplicative administrative 
structures tripping over each other in many areas 11 <U.S. 
Congress, 1981b:365-367). NLC and USCM's positions were 
in basic opposition to those 0£ the National Governor's 
Association, whose representative at the hearings endorsed 
the labor market area plan and recommended that states 
should administer employment training £unda under a system 
0£ block grants to the states, since "coordination can 
only take place at the state ievel, and only then with 
leadership £rom the governor's office" <U.S. Congress, 
1981b:365-367>. The National Governors' Association CNGA> 
position will be examined in more detail below. 
243 
As 1981 wore on, the USCM and NLC became more and 
more opposed to the drift 0£ Republican Congressional 
developments in employment training policy. 
Undersecretary of Labor Lovell appeared at the USCK 
employment training con£erence at the end 0£ November and 
used the occasion to blast CETA's record. After calling 
in television coverage, he claimed Cas had Secretary 
Donovan, both inaccurately> that CETA had spent S53 
billion on training "with very inconclusive results." He 
said states should be £ree to designate the agency to 
receive employment training £unds, instead of relying on 
the prime sponsor system <ETR, 13:13:285>. 
In reply, Joan Bannon, a USCM sta£fer, said that the 
USCM was apprehensive about state control because state 
governments were ignoring the restrictions that existed on 
block grants in other Federal programs. For example, 
under the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 
states took a large cut £or administrative expenses, 
bought expensive equipment for use at the state level, and 
distributed what was left to localities through regional 
organizations that took. another cut for administration 
CETR, 13:13:286>. 
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A series of USCM workshops, primarily composed of 
local CETA practitioners, produced the £ollowing principal 
recommendations on CETA reauthorization: 
1. Prime sponsors should remain the grant recipients. 
They should coordinate their planning with other 
agencies, but there should be no super agency over 
CETA, the Employment Service, and vocational 
education. 
2. The current £unding £ormula should be retained. 
3. There should be no special setasides <reserved funds> 
at the Federal level £or community-based 
organizations, or speci£ication 0£ required 
subcontractors £rom community-based organizations or 
labor organizations. 
4. There should be one advisory council per prime 
sponsor, advisory in nature only, and concerned with 
planning, program design, and evaluation, not 
operations or administration. 
5. Per£ormance standards should be mandated by 
legislation, but not specifically defined in 
legislation. Poor performance shouldn't be punished 
with cuts, but there should be incentives £or good 
per£ormance. Performance· standards should emphasize 
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long-term gains,.and separate standards were needed 
£or youth programs. 
6. Wages and allowances should be continued CETR, 
13:13:287). 
Shortly a£ter the USCM meeting,the National League of 
Cities <NLC> adopted its own similar policy, again very 
different £ram the emerging Administration scenario. The 
NLC denounced state-operated programs, since local 
governments now had had ten years of experience in 
employment training programs. "They know what works Candl 
what doesn't work Candl such experience cannot be 
discarded" <ETR, 13:13:314>. Funding should be on a 
aulti-year basis to improve planning, coordination, and 
stability. 
To further strergthen the system, the NLC said that 
prime sponsors must have "maximum flexibility" in program 
design. Enrollment should be simplified and permissable 
activities very broad. The private sector and labor 
should be brought in on planning and operating programs, 
throug~ such incentives as wage subsidies, tax credits, 
and allowance payments, but the private sector should not 
be allowed program control. Categorical programs should 
be "re-consolidated into a separate basic grant" 
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addressing adult and youth unemployment as unique problems 
<ETR, 13:13:314). 
Aside £rom the government associations, many 
individual prime sponsors sent representatives to testify 
at Congressional hearings, especially those held in the 
£ield. The point on which they all agreed was that the 
prime sponsor system did not need drastic overhaul, and 
that CETA's problems were basically management problems 
that they could solve 1£ Congress or the Department 0£ 
Labor would make the necessary changes. Several prime 
sponsors pointed out that they were being pressured by the 
Department 0£ Labor to achieve higher placement rates in 
unsubsidized employment while serving more disadvantaged 
clients during a worsening recession. This resulted in 
choosing shorter training programs and "creaming" the 
best-quali£ied applicants £or services. As Michael Wilt 
0£ the Lycoming-Clinton County CETA program put it, 11 as 
prime sponsors are mandated to have higher entered 
employment rates, it is obvious who will be cut £ram 
services: those who are the least Job-ready and therefore 
aost in need 0£ service" (U.S. Congress, 1981b:760-771>. 
1£ the local government organizations were increasing 
the volume 0£ their protests, the National Governors' 
Association <NGA> was rather pleased by the direction of 
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policy development. They prepared a position paper 
designed to increase their in£luence over employment 
training programs within the context 0£ Republican 
rhetoric. 
Responding to Assistant Secretary Angrisani~s request 
£or comments on CETA reauthorization <made in an 
interview>, the NGA made public a letter to Angrisani 
giving its own positions. The NGA insisted that 
employment training policy must recognize three £acts 0£ 
li£e in the employment training system: £irst, the 
employer--not government--is the prime mover in the 
"natural labor market £unction." Second, most 0£ the 
educational preparation £or work occurs in the school 
systems. Third,, most occupation-speci£ ic , train·ing takes 
place at the workplace. 
According to NGA, all 0£ these £acts pointed to the 
states as the most logical institutions £or improving 
employment training delivery mechanisms, since it is the 
states who "de£ine the education system, the criminal 
Justice system,, income maintenance programs, unemployment 
insurance programs, economic development activities and 
others with whom coordination is sought." The Federal 
governl\ent should "focus its attention on who should be 
served and general outcome goals," and leave management 
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decisions to the states CETR, 12:48:1382-4>. 
Three groups needed employment training aid the most: 
first, individuals entering or re-entering the labor force 
who lacked the ability to obtain, hold, or progress in a 
Job= second, workers dislocated by Federal policy 
decisions, or whose skills did not match the Jobs being 
created by Federal policy decisions in areas such as 
de£ense and energy; and third, those who su££ered 
arti£icial barriers to participation in the labor £orce. 
Here, NGA adopted the NCEP's analysis, though in more 
vague terms. 
The Federal government's role in employment training 
should be to ensure access to employment training 
opportunities <apparently a phrase meaning to provide 
money>, while removing hindrances to £lexible state 
management. Extensive reporting requirements and 
per£ormance contracting should be stopped. There should 
not be an undue emphasis on cost per placement, since this 
leads to a stress on mere placement rather than providing 
Jobs with a £uture. Wage level improvement and competency 
achievement would probably be better per£ormance standards 
for programs. Youth programs should be separated £roa 
adult programs, because outcome measures £or youth 
programs must be different, and in youth programs a close 
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link with the school system is essential CETR, 
12:48:1382-4>. 
According to NGA, apprenticeship programs should be 
encouraged. They set a good example 0£ cooperation and 
the de£inition 0£ responsibilities between employee and 
employer. In £act, CETA had had little to do with 
apprenticeship programs, other than providing some funds 
for pre-apprenticeship training through national contracts 
to labor unions. 
Program performance could be boosted by three new 
techniques: first, private sector work experience for 
youth as a method for career exploration. Second, a 
sliding reimbursement scale for on-the-Job training, 
starting at 100 per cent of salary and declining over 
time. The current 50 per cent limit on reimbursement was 
thought to be insufficiently attractive to business. 
Finally, lowered participant stipends (below the miniaua 
wage>, which would stimulate employer demand. Since all 
three of these measures constitute subsidies or incentives 
to employers, the NGA was adopting a purely distributive 
approach. 
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Further, Federal legislation should not be used to 
define labor market areas; this should be le£t to the 
states. The Federal government should also not mandate 
which co•munity-based organizations or service-delivery 
organizations should participate in employment training 
prograas. The private sector must be given a .. sense 0£ 
ownership" in the employment training system, but should 
not have to operate any programs unless it wished to do 
so; this would be the responsibility 0£ the states, with 
some private industry oversight <ETR, 12:48:1382-4>. 
As legislation was being shaped £or introduction in 
the Fall 0£ 1981, the NGA developed a new, more detailed 
plan £or CETA reauthorization. 0££icially, the statement 
was issued in response to the Department 0£ Labor~a 
invitation £or comments on a new employment training 
policy.• 
The £undamental position 0£ the NGA statement was 
that the main £unction 0£ all levels 0£ government in 
eaployaent training programs and policy should be that 0£ 
a broker, but that states should play the pivotal role in 
*Incidentally, it was quite unusual £or the 
Departaent of Labor to ask for coaments on a new policy 
without having produced a draft policy itself. 
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organizing government employment training services. The 
NGA assigned to each level 0£ government its proper role 
in the provision of employment training services. 
According to NGA, the Federal government should per£ora 
seven principal £unctions in employment training: 
1. Employm~nt impact analysis of all Federally-proposed 
legislative· or regulatory actions. 
2. Setting health and safety standards, wage standards, 
alien certification standards, and guaranteeing equal 
access to training and Job opportunites. 
3. Providing JOb creation stimulus when the natural labor 
market is inadequate <presumably using £iscal and 
aonetary policies>. 
4. Providing income support when necessary. 
5. Administering national programs for migrants, 
refugees, and Indians. 
6. Funding research, development, evaluation, and 
dissemination of employment and labor information. 
7. Utilizing the Federal tax system to encourage the 
expansion of Job opportunities. 
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In NGA'a view, only the state Governor had the 
capacity to coordinate the allocation and delivery 0£ all 
services directed at the development and mainenance 0£ a 
skilled work £orce. The state should: 
1. Have the responsibility for developing a strategy £or 
targeting Federal and state resources to at-risk 
populations, economically distressed areas, and 
high-demand industries and occupations. 
2. Be responsible for setting performance standards 
regarding the outcomes 0£ education and training 
programs. 
3. Work to expand apprenticeship opportunities. 
4. "Organize the administration of an employment training 
system through negotiating sub-state compacts." This 
could be done following principles established by the 
Federal government, however. The states would 
interpose themselves between the Federal government 
and the localities, and have at least some power to 
determine service areas. 
5. Establish public/private intermediary mechanisms to 
plan local services, and appoint their boards 0£ 
directors. This board would ensure that state 
responsibilities were met, but have no 
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responsibilities £or operating programs directly. 
The local mix 0£ services would be £lexible, since 
the "exact mix 0£ services needed to respond to clients~ 
needs are more appropriately made at the community level 
where services are actually delivered." The local 
agencies would select service deliverers with minimua 
state guidelines. The service system should be "client 
centered," serving both employers and employees. The 
services suggested were extremely comprehensive in scope. 
Finally, the basis 0£ all contracting £or services 
should be competitive performance-based contracting, 
although what per£ormance would be pre£erred was not 
speci£ied. There should be no distinction bet~een 
private-for-profit, private nonprofit, or public 
contractors CETR, 13:10:216>. 
All in all, the NGA made its case £or control of 
employment training funds on the basis of the need for 
management and coordination 0£ local program activities. 
In particular, they would give states almost complete 
control over the funding and evaluation of local programs. 
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To summarize, the city and county governments had e 
strong stake in the existing system. They wanted to keep 
the 6road outlines 0£ the £unds distribution system, while· 
making some changes in program structure and operation. 
They wanted to keep Federal £unds £lowing to their 
Jurisdictions. They would be most closely allied to the 
House Democrats, who wished to continue CETA with £ew 
changes and substantial funding. In contrast, the state 
governors stood to gain £rom Administration plans to give 
more responsibility to them. A relatively greater 
percentage 0£ state governments were in the hands 0£ 
Republicans, and adding CETA to the Administration's "new 
Federalism" initiatives would increase Republican 
influence. 
Coaaunity-based organizations wanted to keep up 
£unding £or their constituents. Most also had strong ties 
to the Democratic party, and would there£ore support 
CETA's continuation during Congressional maneuvering, 
following the House Democratic approach. Community-based 
organizations were the only groups to support expanded 
redistributive policies. 
Business groups were somewhat less united at the 
beginning of the legislative process. They £avored 
continuation 0£ employment training programs in some £orm, 
255 
but soae, who perhaps anticipated the intentions 0£ the 
Administration, supported substantial cuts in £unding; in 
general, they wanted more influence for the private sector 
in planning, but were unsure whether they wanted more 
responsibility £or program operations. 
With the general positions 0£ the non-governmental 
actors in the subgovernment laid out, it was the 
responsibility of the subgovernment's Congressional and 
Administration members to develop legislative proposals. 
It is to this activity that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 7 
EARLY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
"All proJects of government, formed upon a supposition 
0£ continual vigilance, sagacity, virtue and firmness 
0£ the people, when possessed 0£ supreme power, are 
cheats and delusions." 
--John Adams, ~Q~~~, Volume VI. 
With the Administration slow to organize a 
legislative proposal for replacing CETA, it fell to the 
Senate to take the lead in developing new employment 
training legislation. The House was still controlled by 
Democrats, and the head 0£ the relevant committee, 
Representative Augustus Hawkins CD-CA>, was not inclined 
to grease the skids £or easy passage 0£ an 
Administration-backed bill~ he was preparing his own bill 
that would essentially continue CETA. 
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The CETA reauthorization process £ell under the 
Jurisdiction 0£ the Senate Labor and Human Resources 
Committee, chaired by Senator Orrin Hatch 0£ Utah, with 
Senator Edward Kennedy as ranking minority member; the 
key subcommittee was the Subcommittee on Employment and 
Productivity, chaired by Senator Dan Quayle 0£ Indiana. 
I£ employment training legislation was to pass the · 
Senate, Quayle and Kennedy <and their sta££s> were the key 
actors who must £ind a common ground 0£ agreement. 
Quayle's position was £ar the more di££icult. He was new 
in his role 0£ subcommittee chairman, and he had to "sell" 
an employment training program to an Administration 0£ his 
own political party, but an Administration that had £irst 
opposed any employment training programs, ·then rinly 
reluctantly seemed to accept the idea that CETA aight be 
continued in a reduced £orm. Even worse, Quayle and the 
subcommittee sta££ had to proceed without help £rom the 
political appointees in the Labor Department who might 
have been expected to assist; the Labor Department's team 
knew little about the policy area and had to be trained on 
the Job. Kennedy, on the other hand, knew that his was 
not the last word £or supporters 0£ employment training 
legislation; his Job was to obtain the best compromise he 
could, in order to push the context 0£ compromise in the 
direction 0£ the House Democratic alternative. 
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As legislative proposals were developed during the 
summer and £all 0£ 1981, committee and subcommittee 
sta£iers occasionally appeared in public to hint about 
developments, test the waters, and get reactions. Such 
interaction with the policy subgovernment is an important 
part 0£ developing legislation, and sends signals about 
positions and strength 0£ commitment in both directions. 
The leading Senate sta££ spokesman in CETA 
reauthorization was Robert Guttman, legislative counsel 0£ 
the Subcommittee on Employment and Productivity. 
Appearing at the National Commission £or Employment Policy 
conference in late June, Guttman emphasized practical 
legislative problems: "at present we have to focus not on 
what's a good program but what is good legislation.•• 
Whether or not good employ~ent training policy resulted, 
good legislation would consist of those proposals that 
could be passed. In Guttman's opinion, the key question 
£or legislation was how to redesign the delivery system 
£or eaployment training programs. The Senate's current 
thinking was strongly in favor 0£ decentralization and 
against mandated program designs, Guttman reported CETR, 
12:42:1235>. 
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By September, Guttman was able to aake a much more 
comprehensive report Cto the Manpower Policy Counselors' 
,v 
conference>. In terms of political strategy, he reported 
that subcommittee chairman Dan Quayle hoped to come up 
with a consensus bill, and was working closely with the 
Administration, although he would not wait if the 
Administration dragged its feet. Substantively, after 
hearings and staff discussions, there was an emerging 
consensus on four issues: 
1. A "surprising amount" of agreement existed on the 
continuing need for Federal involvement in training 
the disadvantaged, even including the Chamber of 
Commerce, which had never made such a statement 
before. The process of redefining redistributive as 
distributive policies, predicted by Ripley and 
Franklin, had proceeded far enough to attract 
business' support. 
2. Disadvantaged groups should be the top priority £or 
services, and these are chiefly urban minority youth 
and female heads 0£ household. 
3. Something should be done to address the problem of 
experienced workers in declining industries, though 
there was less consensus on "appropriate remedial 
steps." 
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4. The business sector must be aore intimately involved 
in the design and ad•inistration 0£ the new training 
act than had been the case under CETA. 
However, Guttman warned that there was little 
consensus over details 0£ the program, and that maJor 
disputes were shaping up over the structure 0£ the 
delivery system and linkage to other policy areas, such as 
vocational education and the Employment Service CETR, 
13:5:95>. 
Clearly, the hearings had convinced Congress that new 
legislation was necessary, in order to continue the 
Federal role in employment training policy. The unspoken 
but well-understood reality 0£ new employment training 
legislation was that less money would be available than 
under CETA; the Senate subcommittee response was to 
target funding even more tightly than in CETA, identifying 
two hard-core unemployed groups to be served--urban 
ainority youth and £emale heads 0£ household--while 
leaving the door open £or a potentially more 
politically-popular program, assistance to displaced 
workers. 
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According to Guttman, the subcommittee had already 
been able to de£ine the issues to be considered in the 
e~ployaent training debate. In drafting the new training 
act, £ourteen key issue areas would have to be resolved. 
The issue areas may be classified by their distributive or 
redistributive content, as well as their implications for 
subgovernment operation. 
1. The relationship between the new training act and 
vocational education and the Employment Service. This 
was a situation 0£ con£lict between competing 
subgovernments. 
2. The relationship to economic development schemes. The 
Adainistration's Economic Enterprise Zone scheme was 
wending a parallel course through other committees, 
and at some point employment training policy would 
have to be coordinated with it. This was also a 
conflict between competing subgovernments. 
3. Funding stability. Every concerned group had agreed 
that the stability and impact of employment training 
programs were inhibited by the pattern 0£ single-year, 
stop-and-start £unding imposed by CETA. Longer-term 
funding would increase subgovernment dominance over 
the issue domain. 
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4. Displaced workers. The subcommittee needed to test 
the political popularity 0£ such a program before 
co••iting itself to it; the displaced workers title 
0£ the bill was already shaping up as a negotiating 
point, to sweeten the bill for representatives 0£ 
industrial states. This issue was potentially 
redistributive, and also tested the ability of a new 
interest group to gain entry to the subgovernment. 
5. The targeting of clientele, or restricting services to 
the two hard-core groups mentioned above. This issue 
was also redistributive. 
6. Allowance payments to trainees for subsistence. This 
redistributive issue was becoming a liberal y~~~y~ 
conservative battleground. Liberals favored 
subsistence allowance payments at a level of at least 
the minimum wage, as in CETA. Conservatives opposed 
any allowances. 
7. The delivery system, with the resolution 0£ the fight 
between cities and states to control program 
operations. This was an intra-subgovernment dispute 
over distributive policy. 
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8. The extent 0£ consolidation 0£ programs <£or example, 
merging youth and adult programs>. This issue, 
another intra-subgovernment struggle over 
distribution, was tied up with the debate over the 
locus 0£ program control. 
9. Audit and compliance requirements. 
10. Data reporting systems and paperwork. 
11. Liability. These three points were essentially 
technical issues without policy interest, and will not 
be £urther considered here. 
12. Addressing the problem 0£ £uture skill shortages. 
This was the chie£ concern 0£ business groups who 
testi£ied at hearings. Since it would involve 
subsidies to business, it was a distributional policy 
issue that tested business' power in the 
subgovernment. 
13. Geographical distribution 0£ £unds. Thia point 
concerned the exact £ormula to be used to distribute 
funds, a hardy perennial distributional issue common 
to almost all social legislation. 
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14. Per£ormance standards for prime sponsors and 
contractors. This was an important technical issue, 
since performance standards would have a strong 
in£luence on program content. The debate was two£old: 
£irst, should per£ormance standards be set nationally, 
and if so, how strictly? Again, this point was 
related to the issue 0£ how much authority the 
Department 0£ Labor should have over local programs. 
Second, should per£ormance standards emphasize 
placement and cost per trainee, stimulating 
short-term, low-cost training programs, or encourage 
skill acquisition in more intensive training programs 
serving £ewer persons? In Guttman's view, it was 
probable that per£ormance standards would place more 
emphasis on placement rates in unsubsidized 
e•ployment. This issue had both distributive and 
redistributive connotations, thus causing extra 
di££iculties. 
Even in September it was obvious that plans would 
probably have to be scaled down to £it budget 
restr~ctions, and Guttman stressed that CETA must win 
support £rom a new coalition 0£ interests, and not be 
viewed as "an inherited albatross" <ETR, 13:5:96). 
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Senator Quayle outlined his policy stance in a speech 
to the National Alliance 0£ Business. He said that 
Federal JOb training services must be "very care£ully 
targeted" on the chronically unemployed, since "certain 
budget limitations are becoming a £act 0£ li£e. •i The 
thrust 0£ a new system must be "performance oriented 
[training andl not JUSt another thinly disguised income 
maintenance program." Quayle promised that the 
subcommittee"s program would be a "maJor departure £rom 
CETA inasmuch as we will expect labor and industry to tell 
us what skills are needed, rather than having government 
sociologists providing that guidance" <ETR, 13:6:118>. No 
more speci£ic reJection 0£ the policy pro£essional 
establishment can be imagined, although in £act Quayle"s 
proposals did incorporate many 0£ the ideas 0£ policy 
researchers. 
A tentative legislative proposal, developed by 
Guttman £or the Senate subcommittee and dealing with only 
a £ew issue areas, was ready £or unveiling at the National 
Governors" Association conference at the beginning 0£ 
November, 1981. The governors were apparently considered 
the friendliest possible audience, since the bill would 
increase their powers at the expense 0£ local governments. 
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The new Senate subcommittee proposal dealt mainly 
with program structure. The new system would replace 
prime sponsors with service delivery areas de£ined by 
state governors, and within each area, planning decisions 
would be made by a private sector council, similar to the 
existing Private Industry Councils. This proposal would 
also provide £or a separate youth component and emphasize 
per£ormance standards. More speci£ic details were not 
given. 
A Senate Labor Committee sta££er, Kris Iverson, added 
that the £irst priority 0£ the Administration and the 
Republican-controlled Senate was reducing Federal 
spending. A £uture employment and training program, in 
order to survive, 
must not provide £or income maintenance, must not 
have an extensive Federal bureaucracy, must not 
target £unds to special interest groups, and must 
give a greater role to business and state and 
local governments <ETR, 13:10:213). 
This is a nice illustration 0£ the politics 0£ policy 
making. The subcommittee sta££ and Senators, wrestling 
with the problems 0£ writing legislation, emphasized 
reaching consensus and technical design and 
problem-solving. The £ull committee sta££, at the next 
more general level 0£ policy consideration, maintained a 
£ocus on the more general political goals 0£ the 
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Administration, minimizing welfare payments, cutting the 
Federal bureaucracy, and increasing the role of business. 
Thus, subgovernment and wider Administration policy making 
was developing on parallel paths. Reconciliation of 
competing goals would have to wait. 
The National Governors' Association conference was a 
particularly interesting one, in that representatives of 
the Senate, House, and Administration all spoke on new 
employment training legislation, but none appeared to have 
spoken to the others. The only point all mentioned and 
agreed upon was that CETA faced a difficult situation in 
Congress, and needed support from those who wanted 
e~ployment training programs continued. Although 
Republican members of both houses of Congress and in the 
Administration seemed headed in a generally similar 
direction, characterized by increased state control and 
less money, no coordination of policy development was 
evident in their remarks. 
The £irst public mention of funding levels £or a new 
employment training bill came later in November, when 
Guttman told the U.S. Council 0£ Mayors' Employment and 
Training Council that Senator Quayle would soon introduce 
an outline of a proposed reauthorization bill, calling for 
about a S3 billion annual expenditure. The plan would 
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e~phasize state control and private sector involvment, 
allowances would be severely restricted, i£ not abolished, 
and some, but not all, money would be targeted <ETR, 
13:12:268). Any budget levels would be hypothetical until 
the Budget Committee £ixed overall authorizations. 
The state 0£ Senate negotiations was revealed on 
November 23 when Senators Quayle, Kennedy, and Hatch 
placed statements in the ~2ng~~!!!QB!! B~£Q~g outlining "a 
new approach to employment training" <~2ng~ B~£·, 
11/24181:514073-75>. This marked the beginning 0£ 
Congressional £loor debate on a new employment training 
law and deserves close attention, as each of the parties 
attempted to de£ine the context within which legislation 
would be considered. 
Despite £requent re£erences to the need £or a 
bipartisan agreement, several di££erences in philosophy 
were apparent. Senator Quayle placed employment training 
in the context 0£ improving productivity, since ''our 
economy £aces many problems 0£ which in£lation and 
unemployment may be the most visible but the lack 0£ 
produ~tivity growth is certainly the most important." 
Although the primary role in employment training belongs 
to the private sector, the Federal government has 
the responsibility to help those who cannot 
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succeed in the labor market because they have not, 
£or one reason or another, been helped by those 
institutions which help the vast maJority 0£ our 
citizenry. This is a matter both 0£ social 
J~stice and economic necessity. We cannot a££ord 
a class that does not participate in our 
prosperity and we need to utilize all our sources 
0£ productive labor in order to insure our 
prosperity. 
Quayle acknowledged the responsibility 0£ government to 
take action in training the disadvantaged, and he 
recogni2ed that £or them the market economy had £ailed; 
he rather art£ully sidestepped the apportionment 0£ blame 
£or that £ailure. 
Quayle outlined £ive maJor needs that any employment 
training proposal must address: 
1. The involvement 0£ the private sector must be 
strengthened. 
2. Since "the Federal Government is not the repository 0£ 
all wisdom," the states must be given 11 a preponderant 
voice in designing programs to meet their needs as 
they are perceived locally." 
3. Training programs must be clear in their purpose 0£ 
preparing people £or Jobs and not merely a disguised 
£ora 0£ income maintenance. 
270 
4. The system must be result-oriented. "We must ineasure 
outcomes and avoid nonproductive concern with process 
'and procedure. 11 
5. The various parts 0£ the system must be integrated and 
coordinated. 
Quayle appended to his remarks an "Outline 0£ a New 
Approach," with £our maJor headings. The £irst, "The 
Delivery System," stated that responsibility £or planning 
should be given to a private sector-oriented council, in 
which "the business community aust have e££ective control, 
both state and local governments must play a signi£icant 
role, and there must be appropriate representation 0£ the 
needs 0£ client groups." Governors would ·have the power 
to de£ine service delivery areas, unlimited by uni£ora 
population criteria. Governors would also have the 
discretion to trans£er responsibility £or adminstering the 
grant £rom the present prime sponsor to the council. 
Thus, the £irst section 0£ the article represented a 
"hard" position on control by business, along with a 
fairly £irm stand on state control, but with room for 
bargafning. 
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The second heading, "Program Structure," provided £or 
the consolidation 0£ current grants <£1ve under CETA> into 
one, with the proviso 0£ a miniaum percentage to be spent 
on youth. Eligibility would be limited to the 
economically disadvantaged, with the possibility 0£ 
revising the current means tests. There was no mention 0£ 
displaced workers; Quayle did not in £act want them 
included in this bill, but but wanted a separate bill 
dealing with displaced workers. 
Per£ormance criteria would to be a key element 0£ the 
new program. For adult programs, the measure would be 
"earnings gained :from pre-program experience to a 
representative period (perhaps six months> a£ter program 
termination," while £or youth the measure.would be the 
"acquisition 0£ competencies which are determined by the 
council as acceptable in the local labor market." This 
position represented a slight concession to the groups 
stressing skill training, as opposed to those who only 
wished to minimize the cost per trainee. Allowance 
payments <wages> would be prohibited "or limited to cases 
of extraordinary circumstances ... 
Consideration 0£ national Federal programs £or 
special populations <Indian, 11igrant, and Job Corps 
programs> would be separated from the new system and left 
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for later considerations. This represented wishful 
thinking, as the £ate 0£ national programs was sure to be 
an i~portant issue, and their proponents knew that to 
separate national programs £rom the employment training 
reauthorization bill would be to lose leverage over other 
employment training constituencies. 
The third section 0£ the outline dealt with changes 
in the Wagner-Peyser Act, which governs the Employment 
Service. The changes would coordinate Employment Service 
activities more closely with employment training 
activities. The outline's fourth section, entitled "A 
Broader Look, 11 was quite general and merely reminded the 
Congress 0£ the need to remember the relationship 0£ 
employment training to vocational education, the problems 
of dislocated workers, and the need to address skill 
shortages end affirmative action <QQng~ B~~., 
11124/81:514073-74). 
Senator Kennedy gave the Senate a Democratic view of 
employment training needs. A£ter criticizing President 
Reagan's economic recovery plan generally, Kennedy focused 
on the likely lack of skilled workers in the 1980s and 
1990s. The coming skill shortage "presents an opportunity 
to increase employment among the millions 0£ disadvantaged 
and structurally unemployed by improving their skills to 
273 
enable them to compete more ef£ectively," he said <gQ!!9.!. 
B~g., 111241s1:s14075>. 
It may seem strange that while the Republican Senator 
Quayle stressed the government's responsibility to help 
the disadvantaged, Senator Kennedy chose to stress 
improving skills in order to compete more effectively in 
the market. Helping the disadvantaged might seem the more 
"liberal" argument, while skill-building was the constant 
theme 0£ business during the hearings. Two points explain 
this apparent discrepancy. First, adversaries in 
Congressional debates commonly couch their arguments in 
terms 0£ the principles 0£ the other aide, in order to 
Justi£y their own ends. More important, the arguments 
presented here were related to the proper .size 0£ the 
employment training program needed. It was clear that any 
program must serve the disadvantaged. Targeting the 
disadvantaged alone was anAdministration strategy to keep 
the overall size 0£ the program as small as possible; 
emphasizing skill training, as Kennedy did, would imply 
that a much larger population should be served. 
Senator Kennedy was the only speaker to point out the 
value 0£ employment training programs based on evaluation 
data £rom past programs; data showed that participants in 
classroom training recorded income gains of S300 per year 
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compared to a control group, while participants in 
on-the-Job training had income gains 0£ between S400 and 
S906 per year. Employment gains seemed to persist, since 
70 per cent 0£ program completers were employed two years 
a£ter training. On-the-Job training was particularly 
e££ective, with a positive bene£it-cost ratio 0£ 2.18:1, 
and there were also positive bene£it-cost ratios £or Job 
Corps and classroom training. 
Kennedy enunciated the Democratic approach to a 
revamped employment policy: 
The need is to trans£orm the crazy quilt 0£ 
Federally supported employment training programs 
into a coherent system that can respond to the 
country's changing manpower needs. 
This re£orm should go beyond CETA to include the ' 
Employment Service, vocational education, WIN, and other 
prograas. 
Kennedy's approach represented not merely a wish £or 
a more integrated policy approach, but an important part 
0£ the Democratic political strategy. CETA was 
politically weak; the larger the area covered in new 
employment training legislation, the more possible 
constituents served, the greater the potential political 
support for passing a new bill. 
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Kennedy believed that decision-making should remain 
with local officials, although "governors must play a 
greater role in coordinating related programs in their 
states," perhaps in the area of monitoring and evaluation. 
The lines were clearly drawn here: Democrats with the 
cities, Republicans with the governors. 
While the number 0£ service delivery areas could be 
reduced to provide economies 0£ scale, maJor cities and 
counties should continue to receive direct funding. Local 
o££icials would have the dominant role in planning and 
directing programs. Labor must be represented, since 
"experience both in the United States and abroad has shown 
labor-aanagement cooperation to be an effective means 0£ 
solving the problems 0£ dislocated workers." Quayle had 
aade no mention of labor participation. 
Adopting the NCEP recommendations, Kennedy said that 
priority in service delivery should be given to industries 
and occupations that were growing, and to those 
individuals with the greatest problems--"disadvantaged 
youth, women who are heads of households, and the 
structurally unemployed, dislocated workers from 
hard-pressed regions." He agreed with Quayle on the basis 
£or performance standards, although he would add the 
provision of basic education services to the allowable 
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types 0£ activities £or youth <g2~g~ B~s., 
ll/24/81:S14075-76>. 
Taken together, the Quayle and Kennedy principles 
reveal more di££erences than consensus. The potential £or 
partisan con£lict was even greater, £or Quayle was playing 
a conciliatory role in his statement, the role of "good 
cop." The "bad cop" was Senator Hatch, who, as Chair•an 
of the £ull Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 
was entitled to the last word in the Senate debate. Hatch 
returned to the Administration's overriding commitment to 
cut social spending. When he came to a more speci£ic 
consideration 0£ employment training policy, he emphasized 
the need £or change in the present system, taking a aore 
right-wing line than had Quayle: 
For aany years we have dealt only with the 
symptoms 0£ unemployment in the £orm 0£ increased 
welfare benefits, public service Jobs, and more 
Government spending £or contracted services. 
Clearly we must take a longer look at such 
e££orts, however well-intentioned, and develop a 
strategy which will address the underlying causes 
0£ unemployment and skills shortages. • •• While 
CETA has contributed many measurable achievements 
to society, there is an indisputable need £or some 
•aJor changes in its construction and goa~s. 
While avoiding speci£ic proposals, Hatch supported 
Quayle's approach to employment training policy, 
underlining the need to separate "human capital 
development" programs from incoae maintenance programs. 
277 
(Qgng~ B~~., 11/24/81:514076>. Quayle's analysis of 
employaent training programs in terms of human capital 
recalls the approach of the 1981 NCEP B~B9~t <Chapter 4, 
above>. 
A£ter the Thanksgiving recess, Quayle's subcommittee 
released a dra£t summary employment training bill called 
the "Training £or Jobs Bill," dated December 16, 1982. 
The draft avoided the whole problem of defining service 
delivery areas by giving governors the power to designate 
them. There would be a State Job Training Council to 
advise the governor. Twenty-five per cent 0£ its members 
must be from Private Industry Councils, 25 per cent from 
local governments, 25 per cent from labor and the 
economically disadvantaged, and 25 per cent £rom state or 
other public agencies <ETR, 13:17:383). 
A revised Private Industry Council <PIC> would 
replace the prime sponsor as the administrative arm 0£ the 
employment training system. This marks a change in the 
role 0£ the PIC £rom advisory committee to administrative 
agency. The PIC would be made up 0£ 60 per cent 
representatives from business, and 10 per cent each from 
local government, education agencies, labor, and 
community-based organizations. The PIC must draw up the 
annual plan, and could manage programs itself, but it 
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could not run all of its own programs. 
The dra£t speci£ied the contents 0£ the annual 
employment training plan the PIC would be required to 
submit to the Governor: a description 0£ services and 
programs to be provided, procedures £or selecting service 
providers (the subcontractors who would provide actual 
training>, procedures for identifying and selecting 
participants, budgets, and expected per£ormance 
accomplishments. This plan would be subJect to the 
approval 0£ the governor, whose decision would be £inal, 
except £or appeals to the Secretary 0£ Labor CETR, 
13:17:402). 
Performance criteria would be defined separately £or 
youth and adults. The basic measure of performance for 
adults would be increased earnings <over a 11 reasonable 11 
period) and reductions in income maintenance payments. 
Youth standards could be locally developed based on 
employment competencies. I£ PICs or their contractors 
failed to fulfill performance standards, they may be 
replaced as program agencies by the governor. 
In selecting service delivery agents, prime 
consideration would be given to the cost and effectiveness 
of the service based on past performance. The level of 
occupational skills provided must be acceptable to 
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employers in the area. 
Funds could be used for substantially the same 
purposes as in CETA, except that no stipends or allowances 
would be permitted <ETR, 13:17:403). This reflected 
Administration thinking. Roughly 40 per cent 0£ progran 
funds would be reserved for youth activities <under age 
19>. The PICs' administrative costs would be limited to 
15 per cent of their total budget; this re£lected concern 
over the high administrative costs of some prime sponsors 
under CETA. 
Eligibility £or program services would be limited to 
those who are disadvantaged. This was defined as having 
income no more than 70 per cent of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' lower living budget for the six months prior 
to training, or receiving cash wel£are payments or food 
stamps <ETR, 13:17:403>.* 
The Senate draft did not deal with displaced workers. 
This was a function 0£ the Senate's committee structure. 
Displaced workers were under the Jurisdiction of a 
*A. variable figure, amounting to about Sl0,000 
annually for a family of £our in 1984, thus roughly S7,000 
for program participation. 
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different Senate subcommittee, and it was not possible to 
combine the issues at the subcommittee stage •. 
Some ~ational programs would be retained. This 
represented a concession to the Democrats and a de£eat £or 
the Administration, which was more hard-line than the 
Senate Republicans on this issue. Senator Hatch o£ten 
singled out the Job Corps, provided £or under the national 
program title, as an example 0£ an e££ective employment 
training program. 
Hot all existing national programs would be retained, 
however. 0£ the 22 per cent of total £unds reserved £or 
national programs, Job Corps would receive 66 per cent, 
Indian and Native American programs 10 per cent and 
aigrants 10 per cent. These percentages were highly 
hypothetical; they would keep £unding levels roughly at 
current levels i£ the entire program were £unded at 
roughly current levels. There was no provision £or the 
continuation 0£ other existing national programs, which 
were chie£ly those 0£ the outreach organizations (such as 
the Urban League and ~TP, Inc.> and labor unions. 
Minority outreach groups and labor unions, both enemies of 
the Adainistration, would be punished, while Senator 
Hatch's pet program, the Job Corps, would be rewarded. 
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Another provision 0£ the Senate subcommittee dra£t 
would create a new Commission on Employment and 
Productivity, to replace the National Commission for 
Employment Policy. The new commission would be privatised 
in much the same way as envisioned £or CETA. The 
Commission would have a maJority 0£ members who were chie£ 
executive o££icers 0£ ma3or private £or-profit 
corporations <ETR, 13:17:405). Other appointees would be 
from organized labor, state and local government, 
education agencies, and the Secretaries of Labor, 
Education, and Commerce ~~ Q!!!~!Q• Federal funding of 
the Commission would have to be at least equally matched 
by private funds, which presumably would be obtained 
primarily from foundations. 
Shortly after the release of the Senate bill summary 
<and as the Congress was recessing for the holiday break>, 
Senator Quayle's subcommittee released another letter, 
stating that three bills would be introduced to replace 
CETA. Bill Number One would be the draft bill discussed 
above. Bill Number Two would address skill shortages, 
especially in industries critical to defense needs. It 
did not deal with disadvantaged workers. Bill Number 
Three would serve veterans. 
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The Secretary of Labor would be required to publish a 
list 0£ skilled occupations experiencing substantial labor 
shortages. The Secretary 0£ Defense would determine which 
0£ those shortages were hurting de£ense procurement by 
delaying delivery dates or increasing the costs 0£ weapons 
systems. He could then require de£ense contractors to 
provide training in those skill-shortage areas, and add 
the training costs to the contract. 
Bill Number Two also would provide £or tax credits, 
incorporating provisions introduced in an earlier bill <S. 
1813> by Senator Hatch. I£ training were offered in an 
occupation on the skill-shortage list, the employer could 
receive a tax credit 0£ up to 50 per cent 0£ the workers' 
£irst year wages, and up to 30 per cent 0£ the workers' 
second year wages CETR, 13:18:428-31>. Bill Number Two 
was not considered at the same time as the principal 
employaent training bills, and dropped £rom sight. 
Bill Number Three, called the Veterans' Employment 
and Training Act 0£ 1982, would authorize a separate 
veterans program independent £rom other employment 
training e££orts, and reorganize existing efforts £or 
veterans. CETA had mandated that a certain percentage of 
services go to veterans, and this had.created competition 
between the needs 0£ veterans and the needs 0£ the 
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disadvantaged <ETR, 13:18:412>. The veterans program 
would be authorized at SlOO million £or FY1983. 
The two supplemental bills <Numbers Two and Three> 
parallelled rather closely the concerns about skill 
shortages and de£ense bottlenecks expressed by business 
during hearings, as well as the concerns 0£ veterans' 
groups. Once it seemed likely that some £orm of CETA 
reauthorization would pass, the introduction 0£ separate 
bills was a bad sign £or the groups whose interests were 
separated £rom the main legislation. They had gained the 
agenda, but their pre£erences were likely to receive only 
symbolic consideration. 
Hone 0£ the three bills offered a solution to the 
main political dilemma, which was how to satis£y the 
constituents of employment training programs <and by 
constituents I mean state and local government and 
industry, not individual training participants> while 
cutting funding. At this point, only the veterans' 
program had an authorization attached, and it was quite 
small. 
After the Christmas recess, ETR reported that Senator 
Quayle was was trying to make his bill acceptable to 
Senators Kennedy and Hatch. Robert Guttman told ETR's 
editors that the maJor differences between Quayle and 
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Kennedy were over "how the program ought to be organized, 
rather than what the programs ought to do" CETR, 
13:10:481). In £act, a£ter this point there was 
practically no debate over the authorized content 0£ 
training programs £or the disadvantaged. Program content 
was to be le£t to Labor Department regulation, or to the 
discretion 0£ the prime sponsors, a £ailure 0£ decision 
making of the type deplored by Lowi <1979). 
A aa3or remaining di££er~nce was over the designation 
0£ service delivery areas to replace CETA's prime 
sponsors. Quayle wanted to let the governors designate 
service delivery areas, but Kennedy wanted Congress to set 
the standards. Also, Kennedy reportedly wanted a separate 
youth bill, while Quayle's bill simply called £or 
setasides 0£ available £unds £or youth services <ETR, 
13:20:481). 
The editors 0£ ETR o££ered their own interpretation 
0£ events: 
At bottom, the divisions between the Democrats and 
Republicans may arise £rom political 
considerations that have little to do with 
employment training policy. Certainly the 
Republican proposals, giving a large amount 0£ 
discretionary power to the states, adhere closely 
to the Administration's emphasis on the 11 new 
Fede~alism'' CETR, 13:20:481-2). 
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Kennedy knew House Democrats were preparing a bill 
that essentially would renew CETA. His JOb was to get 
whatever concessions he could £rom Senate Republicans, 
thus putting the House in a stronger bargaining position. 
By the beginning of February, Quayle and Kennedy were 
able to reach agreement. They held a Joint press 
conference to announce the introduction of their bill, S. 
2036, entitled the "Training £or Jobs Act." Quayle said 
that he was still unable to enlist the support 0£ Senator 
Hatch, who was waiting £or the Administration to come up 
with a bill 0£ its own. Quayle had kept the 
Administration informed on his bill's development from the 
£irst, he said, but had received no commitment from the 
Administration. Perhaps the rapidly rising unemployment 
rate, which had reached ten per cent,. "might provide an 
incentive" to the White House for a commitment <ETR, 
13:22:557>. 
Kennedy said that he and Quayle had reached an 
acceptable compromise on the issue of program control,. and 
the bill was not "a turn-back program to the states, and 
not a turn-your-back program for the poor,. the hungry, and 
the unemployed" <ETR, 13:22:557>. The bill, with FY83 
authorized £unding of S3.9 billion, would provide one 
million training slots per year. 
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A summary 0£ the bill was placed in the g2n9~~~~!2n~! 
B~EQ~g February 2, along with statements by Quayle, 
Kennedy, and co-sponsors Paula Hawkins CR-Fla> and 
Claiborne Pell CD-RI>, who were also members 0£ the 
subcommittee. Each Senator stressed the aspects,0£ the 
bill closest to his approach, while praising the other 
members £or Joining in a compromise proposal. Senator 
Quayle pointed out £ive highlights 0£ the bill. 
First, the involvement 0£ the private sector would be 
strengthened, by giving local PICs the power to plan and 
administer the programs. Second, the bill decreased the 
role 0£ the Federal government and increased the 
responsibilities 0£ the state governments, "in keeping 
with the Reagan Administration's goal 0£ rede£1ning state 
and Federal responsibilities." Third, the bill would £und 
training programs only. No public service employment 
would be allowed, and training allowances were prohibited: 
"this bill is not an income-maintenance program." 
Fourth, the bill narrowly targeted £unds to those who 
are disadvantaged, "who even under the best 0£ 
circumstances cannot compete in the labor market because 
0£ their lack 0£ education or training." Fi£ty per cent 
0£ funds must be allocated to training 0£ youth <under 22> 
CQgng~ B~g., 2/2/82:5247). Finally, due to the need to 
287 
reduce the Federal de£icit, £unding should be kept at the 
same basic level as the current funding for CETA CS3.8 
bilfion>. "Since the new program will be operating with 
less funds than it really needs, it must be more 
efficient" <Qgng.!. ~!!::·, 2/2/82:S248>. 
Following the three bill strategy previously 
announced, Senator Quayle also introduced the Veterans 
Employment and Training Act CS. 2037), and the De£ense 
Procurement Training Demonstration ProJect Act CS. 2038). 
S. 2038 was labelled a "demonstration proJect only." S. 
2037 and 2038 were not co-sponsored by the Democrats, 
another indication that these bills were token efforts 
Senator Hawkins underlined the "central the•e" of the 
legislation, to enhance the role of PICs. She listed some 
of the groups who supported that enhancement: 
In testimony ••• the U.S. Conference 0£ Mayors, the 
National Association of Counties, the Chamber 0£ 
Commerce, and the Business Roundtable all agreed 
that PICs should be given a larger role in 
developing and administering employment training 
programs. 
Speaking £or the Democrats, Senator Kennedy chose to 
describe the bill from a different point 0£ view: 
We act today on a bipartisan basis to try to 
answer the pleas of the unemployed. • •• We have 
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learned from past experience. We know that 
training the disadvantaged is a good investment. 
It makes taxpayers out of tax users. It raises 
the Nation's productivity. It is the best kind of 
supply-side economics, because it is not JUSt 
investment in tools and robots, but investment in 
human capital, too. 
Kennedy called the bill a "£air compromise reached 
after long negotiation." Although the bill was not the 
program that either Kennedy or Quayle originally proposed, 
it was a "realistic start toward meeting one of the 
Nation's most urgent economic needs--Jobs £or those who 
want them" <£gng~ ~~~., 212182:5249>. 
Senator Pell also saw the bill as a contribution to a 
national e£fort to raise employment. He pointed out the 
similarities between the bill and CETA, rather than the 
differences, and hoped that the changes in the 
administrative structure would "breathe new life into CETA 
and create a system of which all of us can be proud" 
Although the Senators called their work bipartisan, 
it was clear from the content of their remarks that S. 
2036 was a shaky compromise proposal. Each side 
approached the issue £ram a different point of view, and 
neither side made a commitment to try to bring the bill 
through £loor action in its present £arm. The compromise 
did establish a common ground from which to negotiate 
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further. The Senators knew that the House was likely to 
pass a more liberal bill, while the Administration, which 
had~not made any commitments, might introduce a more 
conservative bill. The Senate bill provided a point of 
reference, a context within which negotiations toward a 
real compromise might take place. 
In order to understand later negotiations, it is 
necessary to examine the principal bills in some detail. 
As £inally introduced, S. 2036 had six titles. Titles 
I-III provided for training services, with a S3.8 billion 
authorization £or FY83. S836 million was allocated to 
national programs, with 66 per cent to Jobs Corps, 10.5 
per cent £or Indian programs, 10 per cent £or migrant and 
seasonal farmworkers programs, and 13.5 per cent £or 
technical assistance, labor market information proJects~ 
pilot pro3ects, research, evaluation, and program 
administration. S226 million was authorized to governors 
£or statewide programs, and the remaining S2.698 billion 
for allocation to states and suballocation to Service 
Delivsry Areas CSDAs>, the term for the local training 
Jurisdictions that would replace the prime sponsors of the 
CETA system. Those funds would be distributed in two 
steps: £irst to the states, with 50 per cent allocated 
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according to the number unemployed for more than fifteen 
weeks, and 50 per cent according to the number 0£ 
economically disadvantaged in the state; second, within 
each state according to the number 0£ disadvantaged 
persons in the labor £orce of the SDA compared to the 
number in the state. 
A State Job Training Council would be established to 
advise the governor. At least one £ourth 0£ the members 
of the state council must be representatives of local 
PICs. 
There was an elaborate process 0£ de£ining SDA 
boundaries. Working £rom CETA prime sponsor boundaries, 
PICs and local elected o££icials would petition the 
governor £or new SDA designations. The bill speci£ied 
that the governor must approve any petition £rom a local 
government with a population 0£ 250,000 or more, unless 
the PIC did not concur. Otherwise, governors must approve 
Joint petitions £rom PICs and local o££icials, unless 
"such agreement would not carry out the purposes of this 
Act." Decisions might be appealed to the Secretary of 
Labor. 
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Every new SDA must have a PIC, with a maJority of 
representatives £rom private industry. The remainder of 
the· membership must include representatives £rom local 
government, education agencies, organized labor, 
community-based organizations, economic development 
agencies, and the Employment Service <g2ng~ B!£•, 
2/2/82:S251). 
The PIC would be responsible £or developing the SDA 
plan and could hire sta££ £or this £unction <g2~g~ ~!£•, 
2/2/82:5252). The PIC could be the recipient and 
administrator 0£ £unds, although at least 80 per cent of 
Federal funds must be subcontracted by the PIC. This 
aeant that in practice PICs would not be able to actually 
operate training programs themselves, but wou1d have to 
purchase training services from other contractors. No 
more than 20 per cent of funds could be spent for 
administration. 
To be eligible £or program services, an applicant 
must have an income 0£ no more than 70 per cent of the 
Bureau 0£ Labor Statistics lower· living income level for 
the prior six months, or be receiving welfare payments or 
food stamps CQQng~ B!9•• 2/2/82:5252>. 
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No stipends or allowances would be allowed, but funds 
could be used to pa~ wages to a participant £or a period 
up to six weeks while the person per£ormed services £or a 
private-£or-pro£it employer as part 0£ a program to place 
the participant in regular employment with the employer 
<known as the try-out scheme>. Also, in a loophole 
inserted by the Democrats, £unds could be used to 
reimburse participants £or costs incurred while 
participating in the program <Qgng~ 8~9., 2/2/82:5252>. 
The meaning 0£ this clause was not precisely clear. In 
some CETA programs, participants had been reimbursed £or 
the costs 0£ child care or transportation to the training 
program; this may have been what was meant. On the other 
hand, the imprecise phrase could have been deliberately 
ambiguous, serving as a placeholder in the bill £or a 
clause to be resolved later. 
Fifty to seventy-five per cent 0£ £unds must be 
targeted to youth <under age 22). Performance standards 
for youth could be locally developed by the SDA 
administrator based on employment competencies recognized 
by the PIC and on placement and retention in employment. 
For adults, the basic performance measure would be the 
increase in earnings and reduction in cash welfare 
payments over an unspeci£ied period; governors could 
prescribe variations in the standards. 
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A National Commission on Employment and Productivity 
would replace the National Commission £or Employment 
Pol~cy. Its purpose would be to ''examine and make 
recommendations on broad pol~cy questions relating to the 
nation's productivity and to labor £orce utilization and 
training" <9gng~ B~S·• 2/2/82:5253>. The Commission would 
have representatives £rom private industry, organized 
labor, state and local government, and local educational 
agencies, with the Secretaries 0£ Labor, Commerce, and 
Education as non-voting members. Federal £unds to operate 
the Commission must be matched by private gi£ts £rom 
£oundations or industry. 
A dislocated worker program was contained in Title V, 
with SlOO million authorized £unding in f.Y83. Federal 
funds could pay no more than 50 per cent percent of 
program costs, with the remainder to be matched by the 
states <9gng~ B~~·· 2/2/82:5253>. 
S. 2036 represented more continuity than change. 
$3.8 billion was approximately the same amount CETA was 
currently receiving <though less than in any year of the 
Carter Administration>. Governors would receive some 
added powers, but most £unds would pass through to the 
local governments. Private industry would have more 
influence, but labor and community groups would retain 
294 
representation. Funds would be strictly targeted on the 
most disadvantaged, an Administration priority, while the 
no stipend provision was given at least a small loophole 
the Oeaocrats wanted. Both sides agreed on targeting 0£ 
youth services, and on per£ormance standards. The 
Republicans succeeded in privatising the National 
Commission £or Employment Policy, while the Democrats 
managed to include a title £or dislocated workers, albeit 
with only very small £unding and a state matching £unds 
requirement. 
In the House, the Democrats, with organi2ational 
control, decided to introduce their own employment 
training bill without seeking input £rom the 
Administration. Jurisdiction £or employment training 
legislation lay in the Committee on Education and Labor~ 
chaired by Carl Perkins 0£ Kentucky, and the Subcommittee 
on Employment Opportunities, chaired by Augustus Hawkins 
0£ Cali£ornia. Hawkins was in charge of developing a 
bill, along with the subcommittee's ranking minority 
member, James Je££ords of Vermont. Hawkins' staff 
director in charge 0£ CETA reauthorization, Susan Grayson, 
made aany appearances be£ore interest groups during the 
course 0£ the debates. 
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From the beginning, the context 0£ the Reagan victory 
and economic plan made it clear to the House Democrats 
that they £aced an uphill battle. Grayson warned a July, 
1981 National Association of Counties con£erence that CETA 
was in £or·£urther drastic budget cuts, because CETA did 
not represent a national employment training policy E!~ !~ 
and because it was associated with public service 
employment, "which is synonymous with fraud and abuse" 
<ETR, 12:46:1343). 
The House leadership seems to have decided rather 
early in the development of the bill to establish a tough 
bargaining position by introducing a bill that preserved 
most 0£ the current CETA system. In September, 1981, 
Clark Rechtin, sta££ counsel 0£ the House Education and 
Labor Committee, told the Manpower Policy Counselors' 
conference that Education and Labor Committee chairman 
Carl Perkins was committed to the present CETA delivery 
system, although with some improvements, and opposed block 
grants to states. The "most publicly prominent" issue 
under co•mittee review was the relationship between the 
Federal, state, and local governments, Rechtin said, but 
that was not the "most important" question. The House did 
at least agree with the Senate on the maJor issues to be 
settled: 
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1. Clarifying the goals of the employment training 
system. 
2. Determining the eligibility requirements £or program 
participants. 
3. De£in1ng per£ormance criteria £or sponsors. 
4. Streamlining management and paperwork. 
5. Determining the proper mix of services to be offered. 
Like the Senators, Representative Perkins believed 
that it was critically important to leave decisions 
about service mix to local program operators. 
Both houses wished to link CETA to vocational 
education, but there were political and structural 
problems, Rechtin said. This was code; Rechtin meant 
that vocational education was under the Jurisdiction 0£ a 
di££erent subgovernment and a di££erent subcommittee, and 
it was highly unlikely that the vocational education 
subgovernment would be willing to diminish its own 
influence over the legislation <ETR, 13:5:95). With the 
employment training subgovernment £acing challenges, it 
was no time to begin disputes with other subgovernments. 
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Several Democratic speakers appeared at this 
conference, end they were predominantly gloomy about the 
prospects £or substantial £unding £or employment training 
programs. Most interesting was the view of Representative 
David Obey <D-Wis.>, who saw "virtually no chance" of 
maintaining a S3 to S4 billion training program over the 
next £ew years <ETR, 13:5:96>. 
Obey outlined two strategies for Democrats who 
supported employment training programs. The first, which 
he favored, was to offer a comprehensive alternative 
strategy, "a real counter-o£fensive," even if it was 
doomed to lose. Failing that, the President's proposals 
should go to the floor £or a straight up and down vote, 
and let the Republicans take the blame 1£ their policies 
failed. 
The second strategy, which Obey predicted Democrats 
would actually follow, was a "damage control strategy." 
"We'll protect the inches now instead of the yardstick 
next year,," he predicted <ETR,, 13:5:96). This was Obey's 
•ethod of decribing the form of incremental, compromise 
policy making normally utilized by a subgovernment 
considering distributional policy. Obey was right about 
the daaage control strategy, but a somewhat milder 
counter-offensive also turned out to have its place in 
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that strategy, as we shall see. 
House Republicans took a generally low profile during 
hearings on employment training bills. During the House 
hearings in his home state 0£ Vermont, Representative 
Je££ords was the only spokesman £or a comprehensive 
approach to redesigning education and training programs. 
He warned that 1£ Congress did not act to de£ine 
the Federal government's role 0£ establishing an 
overall goal £or Federal training programs, the 
opportunity to develop a comprehensive approach 
will be lost £or at least the remainder 0£ this 
decade <U.S. Congress, 1982a:24>. 
While Je££ords introduced his own bill <examined below>, 
his appeal £or a comprehensive strategy was to go unheeded 
by his £ellow Republicans. 
Representative Hawkins' Subcommittee on Employment 
Activities released a dra£t "Human Capital Development and 
Productivity Act" on December 17, 1981. Chairman Hawkins 
promised to introduce a £ull bill, slightly revised, early 
in January. The bill would contain £our titles and would 
include a permanent authorization, in an attempt to give 
employaent training programs more stability in funding and 
planning. The amount 0£ funding to be authorized was not 
speci£ied. 
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Title I was entitled "community public-private 
training·and employment assistance system." It contained 
three sections. Section One dealt with the designation 0£ 
prime sponsors. The section retained current prime 
sponsors that served a population 0£ 100,000 or more. 
Instead 0£ requiring prime sponsors to serve labor market 
areas, the section authorized a two per cent bonus 
appropriation £or large units of government that £ormed 
consortia covering labor market areas. Consortia 0£ units 
0£ government that served leas than 100,000 would be 
required to serve a labor market area. This was a small 
concession to the proponents of service delivery according 
to labor market area, and a good example 0£ how 
concessions and horse trading complicate legislation. 
Rather than settling the issue 0£ political units y~~~Y! 
labor market areas, Hawkins' proposal would allow both, 
but with a small incentive in £avor 0£ Jurisdiction by 
labor market area. He could claim to be encouraging labor 
aarket areas and increasing the power of choice 0£ 
localities, by making the bill less prescriptive, both 
traits .desired by the Republicans; but the incentive 
actually o££ered Ca two per cent bonus) was so small as to 
have no probable practical effect. In addition, however, 
prime sponsors <or, in the new terminology, Service 
Delivery Areas> were defined, planning and administrative 
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authority would stay the same as in CETA, that is, with 
the localities rather than at the state level. Thia was a 
"ha'rd" Democratic position :from which to begin bargaining. 
The second section covered Private Industry Councils 
<PICs>. It would slightly enlarge the influence o:f' 
business, but much less so than the Senate bills. Each 
prime sponsor would have one advisory body, the PIC, with 
concurrent approval with the prime sponsor £or planning 
and implementation 0£ Federally-£unded education and 
training activities. The PIC would not replace the prime 
sponsor as administrative body, but would have veto power 
over the prime sponsor. Members o:f' the PIC would be 
appointed by the governor or local elected o££icials <an 
unsettled point 0£ contention> £or two years, with 
vacancies to be appointed by a maJOrity 0£ the members 0£ 
the PIC. A maJority 0£ the PIC must be representatives 0£ 
business; the remainder must represent labor, economic 
development agencies, education providers, and 
community-based organizations. 
The third section dealt with program planning 
requirements. First, administrative costs were limited to 
15 per cent 0£ program £unds. Here Democrats and 
Republi~ans agreed that administrative costs must be 
considerably less than they had been under CETA <estimates 
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were varied and disputed, but the most common was 38 per 
cent CM1rengo££, 1981; U.S. Congress, 1981al>. Second, 
thev prime sponsor and PIC must develop annual or bi-annual 
plans approved by both bodies. The plan must include 
per£ormance goals, and minimum per£ormance standards would 
be established on the basis 0£ placement in unsubsidized 
employaent, retention in unsubsidized employment, 
participant earnings gains, and reduction in wel£are 
costs. These criteria were broader than in the Senate 
bills. For youth, separate per£ormance standards would be 
developed, including attainment 0£ education competencies, 
school completion, re£erral to other training programs 
such as apprenticeship, or enlistment in the military. 
Per£ormance standards could be negotiated, taking into 
account local economic conditions, but prime sponsors that 
£ailed to meet per£ormance standards £or two years could 
lose their eligibility as prime sponsors. 
Title II covered education and training services £or 
the economically disadvantaged. The £irst section dealt 
with £unding. The £ormula was such that a continuation 0£ 
£unding at the level 0£ FY82 would produce local 
allocations little changed £rom CETA. Seventy-three per 
cent 0£ all £unds would be allocated to prime sponsors 
according to a national £ormula taking into account 
unemployment and low-income. £actors. Ten per cent 0£ 
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funds would be allocated to states for state-wide 
programs. Five per cent 0£ funds would be reserved £or 
bonuses to prime sponsors who exceeded their per£ormance 
goals. Ten per cent 0£ funds would be available as 
incentive matching grants, to be matched one £or one with 
private funds. Two per cent of funds would be a bonus for 
consortia that combined to serve labor market areas. 
Prime sponsors would receive a single grant, with a 
50 per cent setaside £or youth. Subsidized non-profit 
employment would be allowed; subsidized for-profit 
employment would be allowed for youth aged 16-19. 
Regulations concerning wages, allowances, and duration of 
employment would remain the same as in CETA. This was a 
maJor difference with the Senate bills, a,lthough 
eligibility standards £or services were the same as in the 
Senate bills. 
Title III dealt with displaced workers. States would 
have the responsibility for developing a coordinated plan 
to serve displaced workers. Federal funds would have to 
be matched one-£or-one from state sources. 
Title IV covered nationally-administered training 
programs. Current programs for Indians, migrants, 
seasonal £arm workers, the Job Corps, research and 
development activities, and.training and technical 
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assistance would be retained. The National Commission £or 
Employaent Policy would be reconstituted by making it an 
independent Commission to advise the Congress and the 
President on the impact of economic policies on 
employ~ent. The new Commission, to be renamed the 
National Commission on Employment and Productivity, would 
consist 0£ £i£teen representatives £rom business, labor, 
and the general public (no governmental representatives> 
to be appointed by the President with the "advice and 
consent" 0£ Congress CETR, 13:16:378-80). Thia proposal 
dif£ered considerably £rom the Senate's. 
Hawkins actually introduced his bill on January 25, 
1982, with only two substantive di££erencea £rom the 
December draft. First, the name was changed, to the 
"Community Partnership £or Employment and Training Act" 
<H.R. 5320). Second, Title III, the displaced worker 
program, was changed somewhat in its administrative and 
planning structure, to give the states more 
responsibility. States would still be required to match 
Federal £unds on a one-to-one basis, but unemployment 
benefits to persons in training would be considered as 
part 0£ the matching funds <Q2ng~ B~s., 1125/82:£7-9>. 
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In his remarks on the floor of the House, Hawkins 
said that the bill's "essential purpose is to improve the 
•a€ch between the skills 0£ the labor £orce and the needs 
0£ the economy." He £elt it was important to retain the 
prime sponsor system, since "to scrap this system now in 
£avor 0£ an untried, new institutional mechanism would 
result in certain delay, waste, and possible failure." 
Also, it was appropriate that local prime sponsors 
continue to control the program, since "local elected 
o££icials are ultimately accountable to the voters £or the 
use 0£ these Federal £unds" <~gng~ B~~., 1/25/82:E8>. 
Hawkins emphasized the fact that his bill would 
simplify the requirements of CETA, £rom which it di£fe~ed 
in £our ma)or ways: 
1. The private sector woul9 be given £ull partnership in 
determining how Federal £unds would be spent. 
2. Greater flexibility in training decisions was given to 
prime sponsors. 
3. Measurable performance standards would be introduced. 
4. Two new programs would be added, one £or displaced 
workers, the other to help areas with higher than 
average unemployment <Qgug~ R~~., 1/25/82:E8>. 
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Throughout the development 0£ JTPA, Representative 
Hawkins, whose district includes the Watts area of Los 
Angeles, was the consisent champion 0£ an active 
employment training policy, and the most insistent in 
trying to retain the redistributive elements 0£ employment 
training to the highest possible degree. In particular, 
he £ought £or the highest funding levels and was the issue 
entrepreneur who again and again saved at least the 
possibility 0£ paying stipends to those in training. 
Unsatis£ied with both the Hawkins bill and the Senate 
bill, Representative Je££ords <R-VT> introduced his own 
bill, called the "Productivity and Hums~: Investment Act" 
<H.R. 5461>. It struck a balance between the service 
delivery systems 0£ the Hawkins and the Senate bills, but 
in terms 0£ program design and content it was more 
prescriptive than the others--that is, the types 0£ 
programs that would be required or allowed were £ar more 
specifically defined in the legislation. 
In Representative Je££ords' view, Congress should 
share the blame £or criticism 0£ the employment training 
.system. 
The programs did not have the opportunity to 
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Mature or to grow because the necessary stability 
was not provided. Each time the economy changed, 
Congress altered the goals, mission, programs and 
required outcomes, reports and responsibilities in 
~the legislation <Qg~g~ B!~·, 2/4/1982:E239). 
Je££ords believed the record 0£ CETA taught certain 
lessons. First, several types 0£ programs were 
success£ul, as measured by their cost-bene£it ratios; 
on-the-Job training, Job Corps, and classroom training. 
were JUSti£ied on that basis. Work experience programs 
improved post-program labor market success only when 
targeted and combined with classroom training. The 
greatest long-term bene£1ts came £rom training that was 
long enough to enable the participants to achieve 
measurable and certi£iable competencies that were requ~red 
in the labor market. Finally, it was be~ter to use 
existing training institutions, such as community 
colleges, rather than maintain segregated and £requently 
second-class approaches such as in training centers 
limited to CETA participants. 
New employment training legislation must address £ive 
main needs: £irst, the role 0£ local, state, and Federal 
government should be clari£ied. Second, stability must be 
given to the program through £reestanding legislation. 
Third, £raud, abuse, and overregulation, too common in 
CETA, must be countered. Fourth, the contribution 0£ the 
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private sector should be strengthened. Fi£th, the proper 
balance needed to be struck 0 between training youth and 
adults, the displaced and the disadvantaged, and the 
unemployed and the underemployed" <QQng~ B~~., 
2/4/82:E239). The "proper balance" between youth and 
adults was de£ined by the dra£t bill as 30 per cent 0£ 
available £unds to be spent on youth. 
Je££ords~ bill provided £or a permanent 
authori2ation, with an authori2ed appropriation £or FY83 
0£ S3.6 billion <g9ng~ B!g., 2/8/82:E263>. The bill was 
based on a system 0£ local labor market area boards, 
guided and monitored by the state government. The basic 
service delivery unit would be a labor aarket area with a 
population 0£ at least 200,000, but the ,governor could add 
or subtract £rom those units under certain conditions. 
Local elected o££icials would have consultation rights in 
the designation 0£ labor market areas, and could appeal to 
the Secretary 0£ Labor. The chie£ elected o££icals 0£ the, 
labor market area would choose an labor market area 
investment board <the equivalent 0£ a PIC>, with a 
MaJority 0£ representatives £rom business, to replace all 
councils required by CETA. The labor market area 
investment board would do all planning, contracting and 
monitoring 0£ services (called "investment services" in 
the bill> <Q9ng~ B!S•, 2/2/82:E583-4>. The labor market 
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area investment board must make up a two year plan subJect 
to approval by the chie£ elected of£icial 0£ the labor 
market area and then by the state, which would have £inal 
authority. 
The state government would be given considerably more 
power than under CETA. Besides designating labor market 
areas, the states would audit and monitor plans and 
performance by local boards, coordinate statewide 
activities and establish standards and priorities £or 
state incentive grants, and coordinate action with the 
private sector to establish advanced business training 
programs £or participants who had successfully completed 
basic training <9E~9~ ~~~., 2/8/1982:E264). 
Federal responsibility would be to set standards £or 
fiscal accounting, establish a uniform management 
in£ormation system, and develop a per£ormance-rating 
system to be used in awarding bonuses £or good 
per£ormance. National programs, research and evaluation 
activities, and technical assistance would be retained 
from CETA. 
:Funding formulas were established £or programs at all 
levels. Local boards should spend 30 per cent 0£ £unds on 
youth programs, 30 per cent on remediation and training 
activities for adults, 30 per cent on labor market 
309 
exchange activities <replacing the £unctions 0£ the 
Employment Service>, and 10 per cent on administration. 
St'ates should spend 25 per cent on oversight and support 
0£ local board activities, 50 per cent on state grants, 
and 25 per cent on state-operated investment activities, 
although up to 20 per cent of state £unds could be used to 
establish incentive grants <Qgng~ B~~., 2/8/82:E264). 
Allowable youth services were rather speci£ically 
de£ined, based on earlier Youth Initiatives legislation 
that had died in the 1980 Congressional session. Four 
types 0£ youth training would be allowed: education £or 
employment <GED courses>, pre-employment skills training, 
entry employment experience, and school-to-work transition 
assistance. 
The design 0£ adult training activities followed the 
suggestions of Robert Taggart, whose ideas were discussed 
in Chapter Five. First-tier training would be less than 
1,000 hours and include occupational training, 
employability skills training, remedial education, and 
OJT. Second-tier training could last between 1000.hours 
and two years, and include occupational training and 
retraining, post-secondary education, and contracts with 
private business for combined on-the-Job training and 
institutional training plus internships. Job Access 
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Assistance would consist of incentives to employers. 
including try-out employment of up to 250 hours <with 
wages paid by government £unds>, employment bonuses, and 
tax credits <g2ng~ B~~., 2/8/82:E264>. 
In £unding and administrative structure, Je££ords' 
bill was closest to Cuayle's. In the area 0£ program 
content, Jeffords of£ered a new approach, largely based on 
the advice 0£ policy professionals; his bill paid more 
attention to the actual content 0£ training programs than 
any 0£ the others. 
Je££ords' role in the subgovernment was the obverse 
0£ Kennedy's: he wished to achieve compromises that would 
weaken the House Democrats' bargaining position with the 
Senate. In addition, he had policy interests 0£ his own, 
and acted as issue entrepreneur £or the policy preferences 
he had adopted £rom the work of employment training policy 
professionals. 
With three bills already be£ore Congress, none 0£ 
them:similar to the ill-fated "BLT" proposal, the 
Administration leaked a new draft bill 0£ its own to the 
National Association 0£ Counties <NACO>. Several 0£ the 
features suggested in the BLT proposal were altered. In 
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keeping with President Reagan's campaign £or a "new 
Federalism" concept, block grants to the states would 
~ 
replace the directly funded consortia of private sector 
employers and labor. FV83 funding would total S2.387 
billion, the same as in the President's draft budget, 
released at the beginning 6f February CETR, 13:23:597>. 
This was the lowest proposed authorization 0£ the four 
proposals. 
Governors would be given extensive powers under the 
proposal, even more than under the Cuayle bill. The 
governor would designate service delivery areas CSDAs> 
based on maJor labor market areas, ignoring political 
Jurisdictions unless the cities had a population 0£ over a 
million. The governor would appoint and· chair a state 
training board, with 60 per cent representatives of 
private industry, to develop statewide plans, review local 
plans, and allocate £unds to the service areas. The 
governor would also appoint the local level councils, 
similar to PICs, that would plan local programs. 
To be eligible for services, a participant would need 
to be disadvantaged and either under 25 or on welfare. 
There were no provisions for services to others except in 
the much-reduced Cto S200 million> targeted national 
programs. Job Corps would also be greatly reduced. 
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Allowable activities would be similar to CETA, except 
that no stipends, allowances, or subsidized wages would be 
allowed. The Secretary of Labor would establish 
(unspecified> minimum Federal performance standards, 
though state standards could vary <ETR, 13:23:598). 
When, a few weeks later, the Administration publicly 
released its dra£t bill, now entitled "A Job Training Act 
0£ 1982," a few items had been changed £rom the earlier 
leaked draft. Although governors would still be firmly in 
control 0£ employment training activities, the figure £or 
automatic selection 0£ a city as a substate SDA was 
lowered from one million population to 500,000, presumably 
a concession to local government interests. 
The state training council makeup was changed 
slightly. Business representation must be 51 per cent, 
local government representation 20 per cent, with the 
remainder including the state Employment Service, the 
state vocational education agency, labor, community-based 
organizations, and others. Local PICs were to advise SDAs 
and would have to approve any plans. Thus the bill seemed 
to establish a dual authority, separating the 
administrative and planning roles. 
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Up to ten per cent 0£ state funds could now be used 
to serve participants who were neither aged 18-25 nor 
wel£are recipients. The NCEP, not mentioned in the 
earlier draft, would be renamed the National Commission on 
Employment and Productivity, with more representatives 
£rom the business community, plus the Secretaries 0£ 
Commerce and Treasury <ETR, 13:24:627-629). 
Senators Hatch and Quayle were co-sponsors 0£ the 
Administration bill <S. 2184> when it was £ormally 
introduced on March 9. There were a £ew new changes, 
including a £urther guarantee to maintain local government 
units serving a 500,000 population as SDAs, modification 
in the allocation formulas, and the addition 0£ a special 
program £or veterans--something 0£ a resurrection of their 
proposals CQ2ng~ B!~·, 3/9/1982:51814-1818>. 
The Administration obviously regarded its bill as a 
starting point £or negotiations. Assistant Secretary 
Angrisani called the dra£t bill "not a £ixed position by 
any means" and noted that any employment training 
legislation must respond to "budget realities." Decisions 
on th~ overall budget would set the limits on employment 
training. Training £or skill shortages was "very high on 
our priority list," Angrisani said <despite the £act that 
the Administration bill limited access to training to 
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those aged 18-25 or on welfare>. Better labor market 
1n£ormation was also needed, Angrisani said; this despite 
the fact that the Administration had cut funding for labor 
statistics <ETR, 13:24:629-31>. 
At a National League 0£ Cities workshop, Under 
Secretary of Labor Lovell defended the Administration bill 
and repeated his criticisms of CETA, especially the 
"income transfer" portions, public service employment, and 
stipends and allowances. Good training programs, he said, 
would attract participants without offering stipends. 
The basic reason for turning programs over to the 
states was that the Federal government had been unable to 
develop programs that met the "varied needs of the various 
areas." A new program should provide "maximum 
£lexibility." The Administration bill was not intended to 
help dislocated workers, but their situation must be 
considered in the future <ETR, 13:26:679-81>. 
At a press conference held after the introduction of 
the Administration bill, Secretary of Labor Donovan 
faulted CETA for trying to serve too great a diversity of 
clien:ts, using a delivery system that was "too 
complicated," spending too much on wage subsidies and not 
enough on "real training,'·' and £ailing to involve the 
private sector. 
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Assistant Secretary Angrisani repeated the charge 
that CETA had spent S53 billion in seven years,; serving 
about three million people annually. CETA's Job placement 
rate had been only 30 to 40 percent, and it had had only a 
"minimal" impact on the earning capacity of participants, 
while being plagued by problems 0£ political patronage, 
fraud, waste, heavy Federal intervention, and regulation. 
At a cost of S2.4 billion, the Administration's prograa 
would serve one million persons out of an eligible 
population of 5.2 million Cl.8 million disadvantaged youth 
aged 16-25 and 3.4 million welfare recipients>. 
Seventy-£ive per cent 0£ all funds would be spent on 
training, as opposed to 18 per cent in CETA, where 44 per 
cent 0£ funds were spent on stipends. Administrative 
overhead and support services would be limited to 25 per 
cent of funds. 
Angrisani, stressing that motivation was a necessary 
ingredient £or successful training, believed that 
eliminating stipends would not create "a maJor stumbling 
block £or those who want training." Lovell added that in 
the past some participants had come £or "the money, not 
the training," and they must be weeded out. The 
no-stipend program would be a "self-evaluating tool" for 
local program planners and operators, who would have to 
o££er an effective program in order to keep up enrollaents 
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<ETR. 13:27:699-700). This was a cynical Justification 
£or not o££ering stipends. 
All the maJor proposals were now be£ore Congress. 
The Hawkins bill could be called the most "liberal," as it 
proposed the largest expenditures, the most Federal 
involvement, and a continuation 0£ most Carter 
Administration policies, while the Administration bill was 
the most "conservative," o££ering the least money and 
Federal involvement. The Quayle and Je££ords bills £ell 
somewhere between the other two bills. A comparision of 
the maJor provisions 0£ the bills shows the key areas 0£ 
agreement and disagreement. 
The amount of authorized £unding was a maJor area 0£ 
disagreement, even though the Budget Committees had a 
superordinate authority over any £igures the employment 
committees might set. The Hawkins bill would provide SS.O 
billion in FY83, with S3.0 billion £or state and local 
programs, SO.S billion £or displaced workers, and Sl.S 
billion £or national programs. The Quayle bill called £or 
S3.9 billion, with S2.96 billion £or state and local 
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programs, S0.1 billion £or displaced workers, and S0.836 
billion £or national programs. The Je££ords bill would 
aake FY83 a transition year in which to wind up CETA 
programs, with S3.6 billion £or CETA and the Employment 
Service combined. In FY84, the £irst year 0£ the new 
program, S4.0 billion would be authorized: S2.0 billion 
£or local training and labor exchange activities, S0.56 
billion for state programs, and Sl.4 billion for national 
programs, including displaced workers. Finally, the 
Administration bill called for a FY83 authorization 0£ 
S2.387 billion, with Sl.8 billion for state and local 
programs, S0.200 billion £or national programs, and S0.387 
billion £or the Job Corps. 
Each bill suggested slightly different formulae for 
distributing funds to the states, but all were based on 
percentages that reflected the state's share 0£ youth, 
unemployed, disadvantaged, or, in the case of the 
Administration bill, the state's share 0£ welfare 
recipients. All the bills allocated most of the funds to 
state and substate program operators, with some funding 
reserved for the use of the Governor. 
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The delineation 0£ service delivery areas :(SDAs> was 
another area 0£ disagreement. The Hawkins bill, quite 
similar to CETA, allowed the Secretary 0£ Labor to 
designate local political Jurisdictions 0£ 100,000 or more 
as service delivery areas. In addition, ell existing CETA 
prime sponsors would be eligible to continue as service 
delivery areas £or £ive years Cthe "grand£ether" clause>. 
In the Quayle bill, current prime sponsors~ areas would be 
used until the governor proposed tentative changes, or the 
prime sponsor and the PIC petitioned the governor for a 
change. The governor would have the discretion to 
subdivide the state into SDAs. Local political 
Jurisdictions with a population 0£ 250,~00, or where the 
local o££icials and the PIC requested the governor, must 
be designated as SDAs, unless the PIC and the governor 
raised substantive ob3ections. Then the Secretary 0£ 
Labor would decide the dispute. 
In the Jef£ords bill, the governor, with the approval 
0£ his state board, must divide the state into labor 
market areas. Local political Jurisdictions of 200,000, 
or consortia 0£ Jurisdictions with a combined population 
0£ 200,000, must be named labor market areas unless the 
Governor ob3ected. Again, the Secretary 0£ Labor would 
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resolve disputes. 
The Administration proposal would give the power 0£ 
designation 0£ substate SDAs to the Governor's Job 
Training Council, with his or her approval. Jurisdictions 
0£ 500,000 or more would be eligible to apply for 
designation as substate SDAs. 
In the area of planning and program administration, 
all the bills would, to varying degrees, strengthen the 
input of private industry. Hawkins' bill would require a 
PIC with a maJority 0£ the members £rom business and 
industry, and other representatives £rom labor, education, 
community-based organizations, and economic development 
agencies. PIC members would be appointed by the local 
chief elected of£icial. The program plan would be Jointly 
developed by the prime sponsor and the PIC, and would have 
to be approved by a ma3ority of the PIC. I£ the prime 
sponsor and the PIC disagreed, the Secretary 0£ Labor 
could have another agency develop the plan. Plans wpuld 
be submitted to the governor £or review, but the Secretary 
0£ Labor would have £inal approval. 
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The Quayle bill had three differences from the 
Hawkins bill. First, PICs would actually plan prograas, 
and could administer them. Second, PIC business and 
industry members must be nominated by "local general 
purpose business organizations," such as the Chamber 0£ 
Commerce. They must be "owners, chie£ executives, or 
o££icers 0£ business concerns who have or have had pro£it 
or loss experience £or an autonomous part 0£ a business ... 
This re£lected the concerns voiced by business during 
hearings that local elected o££icials sometimes appointed 
political cronies rather than bona £ide representatives 0£ 
business. Third, the governor could resolve disputes 
between the prime sponsor and the PIC, although his 
decision could be appealed to the Secretary 0£ Labor. 
The Je££ords proposal provided £or unitary planning 
and administration by a Labor Market Investment Board, 
with a membership similar to Quayle's PIC. The state 
Labor Force Investment Board would approve local plans, 
with the Secretary 0£ Labor to resolve disputes. 
The Administration bill's planning £unction resembled 
Quayle's. Each substate area must have a PIC. In areas 
0£ over 500,000, the local o££icials could develop the 
plan and run the program, but the PIC must approve the 
plans and programs. In smaller substate SDAs, the 
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governor's council would designate the entities to plan 
and run individual programs. 
All of the bills authorized a wide range of education 
and training activities; in fact, little attention was 
paid to actual training-program content, except for the 
J'e££ords bill's provisions establishing two "tiers" 0£ 
training, short- and long-term. All 0£ the bills required 
a substantial setaside of monies £or youth programs. All 
the bills authorized supportive services of various kinds, 
with the Administration bill limiting funding 0£ such 
service to 10 per cent 0£ the total. 
All the bills placed limits on administrative costs, 
which were widely considered to have been too high under 
CETA. Jeffords would allow 10 per cent for administrative 
costs, Hawkins and the Administration 15 per cent, and 
Quayle 20 per cent. 
:The payment of training allowances was another area 
of dispute. The Administration bill provided for no 
allowances. Quayle permitted no allowances, except for 
"modest sums" as rewards for successful prograJl 
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completion, or reimbursement for a trainee's cost of 
participation in training. The Jeffords bill permitted 
alfowances, with the maximum amounts· set in relation to 
the Bureau 0£ Labor Statistics~ low income standards. The 
Hawkins bill continued the CETA system 0£ allowances, 
which required that participants in training be paid an 
allowance, in most cases the minimum wage. Only Hawkins 
retained the idea of employment training as an income 
supplement as well as a training program. 
All the bills required the Secretary of Labor to 
develop program performance standards £or youth and 
adults. By performance standards, the Congress and 
Administration meant output measures, such as the rate 
that program completers entered unsubsidized employment or 
the program cost per trainee, rather than requirements 
a££ecting program process or structure. The Republicans 
were £ond of calling output measures "bottom line 11 
per£ormance standards. 
All the bills provided £or incentive bonuses £or 
particularly e£fective service providers. Similarly, all 
provid~d for state programs separate £rom local e££orts. 
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One theme that has received relatively little 
attention in the literature 0£ policy making is that of 
expectations <Ripley and Franklin do discuss expectations 
0£ cooperation in a subgovernment [1980:89-911). 
Expectations, while not easily sub3ect to study using 
current academic methods, are among the most important 
factors in producing legislation. Legislation is shaped 
according to the expectations 0£ its £ramers 0£ what their 
colleagues will accept. Thus, £or example, the folklore 
0£ the Senate distinguishes between the ma3ority (members 
0£ both parties> who are "in the club," who work within 
the seldom-stated but widely-perceived collegial bounds of 
common expectations, and those who are are outsiders or 
"mavericks." While mavericks may view themselves as men 
0£ principle, they are often considered by the ma3ority to 
be politically naive, persons who influence the course 0£ 
events less than they could. 
The calculus of expectations is strongly related to 
the process 0£ winnowing the issues. Faced with a strong 
challenge from the new Administration <even though they 
did not yet know any specific details 0£ what that 
Administration would support>, the employment training 
subgovernment reacted according to new expectations. For 
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example, even the Hawkins bill, which was the most 
activist, the closest to Carter Administration policies, 
.. 
and the most redistributive in design, omitted the 
earmarking 0£ £unds to community-based organizations, 
national outreach organizations, and labor unions. 
Hawkins must have considered such provisions hopeless, 
given the current political expectations; thus, £ormer 
members 0£ the subgovernment in good standing were 
banished, and their proposals winnowed out 0£ the policy 
process. 
0£ the maJor issues to be resolved, £unding could be 
viewed as both a redistributive and distributional issue. 
In its redistributive aspect <how much money would be. 
spent on stipends or wages £or the disadvantaged who were 
in training>, the question was sharply partisan, with 
Democrats the champions 0£ the disadvantaged. In its 
distributional aspect, the £unding issue represented a 
power struggle between state, local, and business 
interests. Party lines were not quite so sharply drawn, 
though most Democrats £avored local government interests, 
while the Administration represented the states and 
Congressional Republicans looked out £or business 
interests. The divisions were re£lected in the di££erent 
approaches to planning and administrative powers, as well. 
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Employment training policy professionals appear to 
have had substantial in£luence on the content 0£ the 
bills, although at this point many provisions were still 
undefined. One exception was the almost complete lack 0£ 
Congressional interest in the content 0£ training 
programs; only the Je££orda bill attempted a redesign 0£ 
program content, based on the recommendations 0£ Taggart 
and Mangum <discussed in Chapter Five>. 
In the choice 0£ those to be served, the overriding 
commitment to budget-cutting drastically narrowed the 
£ocus 0£ the bills. Skill upgrading was excluded, despite 
the combined support 0£ business and labor, and the 
recommendations 0£ the National Commission £or Employment 
Policy <NCEP, 1980). Displaced workers~ the third needy 
group identified by the NCEP, would receive only token 
£unding. Not even the Hawkins bill would restore all the 
cuts in CETA already made by the Reagan Administration. 
Although unemployment was rising, the idea 0£ using 
employment training programs as an anti-recessionary tool 
was a dead letter. 
Once the £our maJor employment training 
reauthorization bills had been introduced, the 
aubgovernment was structured £or compromise bargaining, 
illustrating the distributive mode 0£ policy making 
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<Ripley and Franklin, 1980:88-94). As a newcomer to the 
subgovernment, the Administration's role is especially 
iri~eresting. Slow to get organi2ed in the employment 
training policy area, the Administration introduced 
virtually no new ideas to the policy process. Their 
prograa was presented in a rather sketchy £ashion, and it 
did not introduce ideas new to the subgovernment. 
The Administration's success lay in imposing some 0£ 
its overriding political expectations (budget-cutting, 
"new Federalism") on the subgovernment. This shi£ted the 
context within which compromise would take place, pushing 
the proJected compromise in a more politically 
conservative direction. 
Once the £our bills were introduced, the formal 
agenda £or decision-making had been set. In the next 




REACTIONS AND LOBBYING 
"Many who regarded legislation on the subJect as 
chimerical, will now £ancy that it is only dangerous, 
or perhaps not more than di££icult. And so in time it 
will come to be looked on as among the things possible, 
then among the things probable;--and so at last it will 
be ranged in the list 0£ those few measures which the 
country requires as being a.bsol utel y needed. That is 
the way public opinion is made." 
--Anthony Trollope, ~h!n~~! E!nn 
Once the four employment training reauthorization 
bills were introduced, the greatest further winnowing 0£ 
options would take place in the subcommittees. In each 
subcomaittee, two competing bills had to be molded into 
one that was acceptable to the subcommittee's maJority. 
At the same time, the subcommittee must keep abreast 0£ 
developments in the other House, in order to take into 
account possible con£licts and compromises in the 
Conference Committee. Lobbying is often intense during 
the stage 0£ subcommittee markup since the £arm of bills 
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is still relatively £luid then; at each succeeding stage, 
options are £ewer and positions progressively harden, as 
ia·sues are reduced to only one dimension, with a "liberal" 
or "conservative" position <Kingdon, 1981:290-291; Ripley 
and Franklin, 1980:92-93>. This chapter examines the 
positions most strongly supported by employment training 
interest groups during subcommittee and committee 
consideration 0£ the £our CETA reauthorization bills. 
During the period when House and Senate subcommittees 
were marking up employment training bills, the attention 
0£ business organizations was centered on two issues: the 
role 0£ the private sector in the plann~ng and 
administration 0£ local employment training programs, and 
the need to provide skill training. 
The National Alliance 0£ Business <NAB> took the lead 
role. Although many business organizations supported the 
continuation of employment training programs in some form, 
the NAB spent the most time working to influence the 
speci£ic content 0£ the new legislation. The NAB, along 
with the National Association 0£ Manu£acturers and the 
U.S. Chamber 0£ Commerce, quickly declared their support 
£or the Administration bill, while the Business Roundtable 
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and the Council on Economic Development made general 
statements supporting increased private-sector involvement 
in.~employment training programs <U.S. Congress, 
1982c:46-60). 
The NAB also praised the Quayle bill, although it 
pressed £or still more changes to "depoliticize" 
employment training by removing local governments £rom 
control of the programs. NAB needed to comment on the 
Quayle bill as well as the Administration bill, since they 
did not know which bill would provide the skeleton £or 
mark-up and subcommittee passage. 
The NAB supported a strong governors' role at the 
state level, service delivery areas CSDAs> drawn on the 
basis 0£ labor market areas, and planning power £or the 
PICa. They were concerned about the strict targeting 
requirements contemplated by Quayle. In their view, 
greater flexibility was needed, and targeting programs 
exclusively to the economically disadvantaged would 
discourage business participation; the requirement that 
100 per cent of participants be disadvantaged should be 
reduced to 75 or 80 per cent, which would make it possible 
to serve dislocated workers quickly, rather than waiting 
until they were destitute and dependent on wel£are C~IB, 
13:22:563-564). 
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The NAB also strongly supported the labor market area 
as the basis for establishing SDAs. They contended that 
this would overcome the split between the inner cities, 
where the unemployed reside, and the suburbs, where the 
Jobs are. Consequently, governors should be required to 
establish new SDAs, rather than being simply allowed to do 
so, as the Quayle bill suggested. 
Within the states, the powers of the PICs should be 
expanded at the expense 0£ the prime sponsors. According 
to NAB President William Kolberg, the PIC's powers should 
be further expanded to remove dependence on the prime 
sponsor for administrative funds-- 11 the absence 0£ such 
protection is killing the PIC system right now." Most 
important, the new system, whatever its details, must make 
·; 
a clean break with CETA, which "has lost all credibility" 
<g!fi, 13:22:563-564). 
The PIC issue was the main focus 0£ hearings held in 
New York City under the sponsorship 0£ Representative 
Hawkins' Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities 0£ the 
House Education and Labor Committee. The principal 
question was how much authority the PICs should have. 
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Speaking on behal£ 0£ the PICs 0£ New York, New 
Jersey, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, Herbert Daha 
said that PICs should be able to run their own programs. 
Con£ining business to an advisory role would guarantee 
non-involvement, he said. Dahm also opposed the labor 
market area approach, since areas within a single labor 
aarket area, £or example a city's inner city and its 
suburbs, can have very di££erent problems <U.S. Congress, 
1982b:582-597). Thus, there was disagreement within the 
business community itself over whether inner city and 
suburban programs should be linked. 
Ted Small, president 0£ the New York City PIC, 
stressed the importance 0£ the private sector in training, 
but said that business didn't want to ha,ndle •.•public" 
decisions like who to serve. Small disagreed with the 
Administration and Quayle-Kennedy proposals to eliminate 
stipends and allowances; a new worker hired by business 
receives wages while training, and so should 
publicly-funded trainees. I£ stipends were dropped, 
participation might be confined to the most disadvantaged 
<those on welfare> and the least disadvantaged. The 
middle groups might prefer to remain in a low-paying, 
dead-end Job rather than enter a training program and 
accept an immediate economic loss <U.S. Congress, 
1982b:388-396>. 
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Another suggestion would have expanded the 
geographical Jurisdiction of the PIC while retaining the 
prime sponsor system. Lillian Roberts, industrial 
commissioner 0£ the New York Department 0£ Labor, 
supported a new middle-0£-the-road proposal to expand 
state authority. Her "appendage" to the Hawkins bill 
would give the state the power to de£ine labor market 
areas that could include several prime sponsors. Although 
the existing prime sponsor system would remain intact, 
each labor market area would be served by a single PIC. 
This could overcome the parochialism 0£ the prime sponsor 
system. According to Roberts, current prime sponsors 
didn't know what was going on outside their boundaries, 
and thus £ailed to train people £or Jobs that did exist, 
,. 
and also trained people £or Jobs that did not exist. In 
addition, they were unable to coordinate their e££orts 
with state-wide programs <U.S. Congress, 1982b:342-381>. 
Hawkins replied that it was better to o££er incentives £or 
the £ormation 0£ larger area consortia rather than 
mandating labor-market-area PICs, but Roberts said that 
incentives weren't substantial enough and "leave too much 
to chance" <U.S. Congress, 1982b:342-381>. 
333 
Studies 0£ the actual records 0£ PICs under CETA 
produced rather modest assessments 0£ their uses. Richard 
de ·•Lone, President of Public/Private Ventures, a 
non-pro£it corporation that £ocuses on economic 
development and employment training issues, presented the 
results 0£ a £our-year study 0£ PICs to a Joint 
Congressional hearing. 
The study concluded that while new legislation should 
allow and encourage the emergence 0£ private sector-led 
boards with broad responsibilities, "expectations should 
be modest." "The private sector is not everywhere ready 
or inclined" to accept responsibility for employment 
training 0£ the disadvantaged. PICs had played a very 
limited role in CETA, by their own choice. While state 
and local o£f icials should make the expansion of the 
private sector's role a high priority, they should 
themselves remain the spine 0£ the system, to "provide· 
continuity i£ private interest waxes and wanes, and to 
assure that programs and policies do serve the populations 
targeted by legislation and political mandate." 
Public/Private Ventures £ound that PICs tended to serve 
"less di££icult populations." This propensity raised the 
question 0£ whether business-oriented training programs 
would be su££iciently interested in serving those who were 
being targeted by the Administration. <U.S. Congress, 
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1982e:748-766>. 
Elements 0£ the business community interested in 
upgrading and retraining issues took a slightly di££erent 
tack--they £ound a new £orum £or their views. Perhaps 
sensing e dim prospect £or the inclusion of substantial 
funding £or retraining in the employment training bills 
currently under consideration, the House Budget Committee 
held hearings on retraining needs at which several 
business representatives and a member 0£ the National 
Commission £or Employment Policy testi£ied on the merits 
0£ a new approach to retraining. 
Pat Choate, 0£ TRW, Inc. Chis book on the need £or 
massive investments in infrastructure, a~~~!£~ !n BY!n~, 
" was making a stir at the time>, suggested that the 
creation 0£ a sel£-£inancing employer/employee training 
£und, based on the Individual Retirement Account <IRA> 
model, was the best way to meet the retraining and 
reemployment needs of workers displaced by technological 
change and economic developments. The training £und would 
be based on a 50/50 match £rom all workers and their 
employers, up to a apeci£ied amount. The money would be 
made available to displaced workers in the form 0£ 
vouchers that could be used £or retraining, Job search, 
and relocation coats. While this system would serve the 
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dislocated worker, the need for upgrading and advanced 
skill training for employees would continue, and should be 
bo~ne by private industry, since the training would be 
highly Job-specific. Choate thought tax credits would be 
"the most effective direct means of providing incentives 
to upgrade or retrain the workforce" <U.S. Congress, 
1982c:85-112>. Franklin Lindsay, chairman 0£ the 
executive committee 0£ Itek Corporation and of the 
research and policy committee of the Committee for 
Economic Development, also supported Joint contributions 
to a pension-type fund, to be used by dislocated workers 
<U.S. Congress, 1982c:85-112>. 
Dan Saks, formerly staff director of the NCEP and 
then a guest scholar at the Brookings In~titution, 
advocated an expanded Social Security system of human 
resource accounts. 
As students, people can borrow against the 
account; as workers, pay into the account; and 
as dislocated workers, use the account to pay for 
JOb search assistance, retraining, relocation, and 
perhaps even early retirement and training £or 
their children if they die or are incapacitated 
<U.S. Congress, 1982c:72-84). 
~Isabel Sawhill, a former member of the NCEP <and an 
employee 0£ the Urban Institute>, agreed with Saks, and 
added that 
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assisting dislocated workers is important not only 
because of the possible hardship that plant 
shutdowns or layo££s may impose on individuals and 
their families but because a mechanism is needed 
to induce workers to accept industrial change. In 
the absence 0£ such a mechanism there will be 
strong political pressures to bail out weak 
industries, to discourage imports, and to 
introduce more restrictive work practices or JOb 
protection schemes <U.S. Congress, 1982c:2-22>. 
Witnesses agreed, however, that Federal efforts would 
still be needed to help the disadvantaged. Taking a more 
cautious view, consulting economist Anthony Carnevale said 
that, given the climate 0£ recession and high 
unemployment, it would be "di£££icult to get workers to 
agree to a program that would £urther reduce real income" 
<U.S. Congress, 1982c:113-160). William Kolberg 0£ the 
NAB added that current high budget deficits worked against 
introducing new tax credit incentives. Moreover, he noted 
that the resource base £or sel£-£inancing schemes, such as 
a training IRA, shrinks during a recession, citing the 
experience 0£ the unemployment insurance £unds <U.S. 
Congress, 1982c:60-72>. 
Although it received a repectful hearing, the idea of 
a "training IRA" was not seriously considered as a 
component 0£ employment training legislation in 1982. The 
proposal gained considerably more publicity in 1984 when 
it was promoted as one 0£ the "new ideas" in the 
Presidential campaign of Senator Gary Hart 0£ Colorado. 
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As the debate on employment training proposals 
sharpened, business interests £aced a dilemma. Their 
speci£ic interest in skill training and their reluctance 
to embrace strict targeting 0£ the disadvantaged clashed 
with their broader commitment to the Reagan policy 0£ 
budget cutting. Also, it would be a mistake to consider 
"business" a monolithic interest group. Business groups 
involved in the employment training subgovernment 
represented only a minority 0£ all businesses; during the 
debate over JTPA, larger, more general-purpose business 
groups <even other divisions 0£ the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce) were supporting the Administration's plans to 
cut all social spending, and did not care to single out 
speci£ic programs to be excepted from cuts. The 
Administration successfully practiced issue expansion on 
the business commmunity, appealing to a broader and more 
a~biguous set of values. In the end, the broader 
commitment would prevail. 
Aside £rom business, the principal private sector 
lobbyists were the community-based organizations. They 
showed little interest in the relative power 0£ PICs, 
except to assure that community-based organization 
representatives would continue to have reserved slots on 
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the PICs. 
Outreach agencies were afraid that they would be 
losers in the legislative process, and, in truth, things 
looked bad £or them. They had received substantial 
funding through national contracts with the Department 0£ 
Labor under CETA, and all the Reagan "New Federalism" 
initiatives would drastically cut national program 
funding. Also, some of the largest outreach agencies were 
closely identified with the Democratic Carter 
Administration; £or example, Ernest Green had left the 
leadership of RTP to become Assistant Secretary of Labor 
under Carter (the position Albert Angrisani held under 
Reagan>. Community-based organizations attempted to 
salvage what they could from the Congr~ss. 
In an interview with the editors 0£ g!R, a SER-Jobs 
£or Progress spokesman praised the Quayle bill~s emphasis 
on improved relations with the private sector, as well as 
the intention 0£ measuring programs according to 
performance rather than process. But he argued that the 
draft £ailed to provide £or su££icient representation 0£ 
the client community, and there should be more emphasis on 
the role of community-based organizations. Also, SER 
opposed the sh1£t away £rom prime sponsors, since the 
prime sponsor system was Just beginning to work well <g!B, 
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13:26:684-5). 
In hearings, Richard Cherry, senior vice president of 
the New York Urban Coalition, defended the positLve role 
0£ community-based organizations. Arguments about state 
or local control missed the point, he said; as long as 
community-based organizations were given an important role 
and substantial autonomy, training programs would run. 
effectively. <U.S. Congress, 1982b:405-419). 
Reverend Leon Sullivan, head of Opportunities 
Industrialization Centers <OICs> of America, said that the 
cost of crime would be future evidence £or the need for 
aore training services. The "question then will be riots? 
or Jobs?" (U.S. Congress, 1982e:131-146>. 
Labor union representatives were publicly less 
concerned with the details of a new program structure than 
with funding cutbacks. Compared to the needs caused by 
rising unemployment, even the Hawkins bill fell far short. 
of the effort needed, they felt. The AFL-CIO executive 
council called for a program to provide training for the 
unemployed and public service Jobs for the long-term 
unemployed. The AFL-CIO proposal would bring employment 
training funding up to at least SS.6 billion. The council 
also opposed the enterprise zone concept <~IB, 13:24:642>. 
At hearings, AFL-CIO spoke~men defended CETA's record, 
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citing studies that showed positive cost-benefit ratios. 
David Livingston, 0£ District 65, United Auto Workers, 
warned that dramatic action was needed to halt the 
nation's slide into depression. More specifically, he 
also defended the practice 0£ paying stipends during 
training <U.S. Congress, 1982b:396-402>. In lieu of an 
even larger program, the AFL-CIO supported the Hawkins 
bill, with increased funding <U.S. Congress, 1982e:2-35>. 
The youth training portions 0£ the bills attracted 
their own coalitions of interest groups. They were 
stimulated by the release of a study performed by the 
Congressional Budget Office <Christense~, 1982). 
Part of the study dealt with CETA youth programs. 
Studies of youth employment training programs produced 
four main findings: 
1. Work experience alone, such as summer JOb programs, 
did not increase employability for youths. 
2. Substantial gains in employability resulted £rom a 
combination of services, including remedial education, 
well-structured work experience, and training. 
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3. Imposition of minimum behavioral and program 
performance standards was important to program 
success, and the "failure to weed out noncooperative 
participants Cwasl sel£-de£eating" <Christensen, 
1982:60-7). 
4. Placement services and Job-search training appeared to 
be low-cost and effective ways to increase short-term 
e•ployment rates for Job-ready youths. 
The report suggested that the existing youth 
employment training system be retained but improved by 
forward funding <guaranteed appropriations more than one 
year in advance), program consolidation, greater emphasis 
on training and education <as opposed tq subsidized 
employaent>, greater training incentives for private 
employers, less emphasis on income transfers, and 
targeting of funds to distressed areas rather than 
disadvantaged individuals <Christensen, 1982:70-76>. 
The Youth Practitioners Network, a coalition of 208 
members from PICs, prime sponsors, education, state 
employaent agencies, business, and community-based 
organizations, published a report entitled fQ£~~!Il9 ~~~~~~ 
Qn YQY~hl b~g!!!~t!~~ B~£Q!!~Il~~t!Qn! f[Q! th~ E!~!~ 
<1982>. The Network's coordinator, Erik Butler of 
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Brandeis University, told the editors of ~IB that the 
Network would pre£er the Hawkins bill, but, given 
po·l it i cal rea 1 it i es, they focused their comments on the 
Quayle-Kennedy bill, which was "not all that bad, and in 
some cases quite good." But even Hawkins" S5 billion in 
£unding would be inadequate to meet training needs. Since 
the Quayle-Kennedy bill was about "midway between the 
Hawkins and the Administration bills," it would likely be 
"the rack on which all other amendments CwouldJ be hung" 
<~IB, 13:27:704-5>. 
The highlights 0£ the Networks legislative 
recommendations were as £allows: 
1. They agreed that eligibility should be restricted to 
economically disadvantaged youth, except £or 10 per 
cent discretionary £unds. 
2. There should be a 50 per cent £unds setaside £or youth 
services. 
3. They would pre£er local control to state control; a 
locally-administered system would "best represent the 
interests 0£ disadvantaged young people." 
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4. They had mixed feelings about the proper role and 
influence of PICs. 
5. Keeping in mind the political reality of fewer Federal 
dollars, they did not oppose the elimination of soae 
stipends, but they maintained that some youths could 
not participate without financial assistance. 
6. Short- as well as long-term per£ormance standards 
should be devised. Short-term standards should be 1) 
the entered employment rate; 2> improvement in 
educational status; 3) improvement in measured 
competencies. Long-term measures should be developed 
after a six-month or one-year follow-up study of 
participants. <gIB, 13:27:705-6). 
In the balmier climate 0£ the Carter 
Administration, youth employment training 
organizations expanded rapidly, made plans £or the· 
future based on the youth training legislation that 
failed to pass in 1980, and seemed to be carving out a 
subgovernment for themselves. A separate role for 
youth employment training was never well-enough 
established to represent a real youth subgovernment, 
so although the retrenchment 0£ the early 1980s cannot 
be termed subgovernment disintegration, youth 
organizations had to be. content to try to earmark a 
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percentage 0£ employment training £unding £or youth 
programs within an integrated training structure. 
During the days the employment training bills were in 
committee, the most energetically-lobbied issue was the 
question 0£ the relative powers to be given to state and 
local governments. We should expect this distributive 
issue to be settled incrementally, but the issue 0£ 
program structure seemed to demand a choice 0£ one level 
of government or the other as chief administrator. 
City and county interests naturally pre£erred the 
Hawkins bill, which protected the curre~t prime sponsor 
system. However, given the Administration's political 
popularity and early success, it was highly possible that 
the Quayle or Administration bill would be the basis for 
new legislation, so they wanted to in£luence the shape of 
those bills as well. 
As soon as the maJor bills had been introduced, the 
National Association 0£ Counties <NACO>, National League 
0£ Cities <NLC>, and the U.S. Conference 0£ Mayors <USCM> 
Joined forces to issue a Joint policy statement, in which 
they agreed on £our basic principles that should govern 
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new employment training legislation: 
1. CETA was still e££ective end should continue to exist; 
it did need more involvement £rom the private sector. 
2. Service Delivery Areas CSDAs> should be determined by 
statute, not by the governors. 
3. Chief elected o££icials should have the right 0£ £irst 
refusal to act as a prime sponsor. 
4. The Private Industry Council <PIC> should have limited 
concurrent planning authority. 
NACO's Associate Director, Jon Weintraub, told the 
editors 0£ ~IR that NACO was firmly committed to the 
Hawkins bill, because it would give a primary role to the 
authority of locally elected officials, while also 
providing a strong role for the business community. NACO 
had two maJor concerns with the Quayle bill. First, the 
revised PIC would have the responsibility £or planning, 
while programs could be administered by another 
body--presumably the existing prime sponsor or a local 
government agency. This would create the potential for 
setting up rival bureaucracies and adversary relations. 
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Second, the question 0£ accountability was not 
clearly answered. "If performance isn't up to standard, 
who should bear the responsibility," the groups that 
planned the programs, or the group that implemented the 
plan? The Hawkins bill would avoid these problems by 
establishing a single agency to plan and operate 
employment training programs at the local level. 
NACO did not support the Je££ords bill because it 
would not "continue the special Federal-local relationship 
within the existing prime sponsor system and Cwouldl not 
continue a level 0£ authority £or the elected county 
officials." Jef£ords' bill was also "far too 
prescriptive" <g:rg, 13:23:601). 
The USCM's Director of Employment Services, Steve 
Cain, told s!B that they were backing the Hawkins bill 
because it strongly supported locally operated programs 
and recognized that "locally elected officials are more 
responsive to the community." USCM was critical of the 
Quayle and Jeffords bills for much the same reasons as 
NACO <~!B, 13:23:600-602>. 
After the Administration bill was formally 
introduced, the city and county associations all reacted 
negatively. All the associations criticized the bill's 
low funding levels and narrow eligibility standards. A 
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USCM spokesman noted that children would be allowed to 
participate, while the heads 0£ the households they lived 
in would not. 
USCM, NLC, and NACO all challenged the granting 0£ 
supreme authority to the states. NLC welcomed the change 
in the latest dra£t that required the selection 0£ cities 
with a population 0£ 500,000 as substate delivery areas, 
rather than only allowing it, but £ound the cuto££ limit 
too high, as did the NACO, which said that the CETA limit 
0£ 100,000 should be retained. NLC praised the change to 
give local PICs the authority to designate local 
administrative entities and select the services to be 
delivered, rather than assigning those powers to the state 
as in an earlier dra£t <~!B, 13:26:684-~>. 
At House subcommittee hearings held in New York City, 
the viewpoint 0£ mayors was typi£ied by the testimony 0£ 
Mayor Koch, who favored the Hawkins bill. He urged 
"adequate £unding levels" Cat SS billion, Hawkins was the 
highest>, and said the Administration proposal represented 
a 11 40 per cent reduction from the skeletal levels at which 
we are currently operating." 
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Koch's maJor obJection to the Hawkins bill was to the 
requirement that local PICs have veto power over priae 
sponsors' program plans. The private sector should 
participate in an advisory role only, since the 
considerations involved in providing employment training 
services to the disadvantaged differed from those 
businesses must meet in designing training £or their own 
use. Also, 11 providing concurrent approval £or program 
planning Cby the PICl while vesting accountability in the 
prime sponsor ••• runs counter to sound management 
principles" <U.S. Congress, 1982b:336-341). 
Appearing before the NLC, Senator Quayle tried to 
overcome what he called "local cynicism about governors." 
He assured the audience that his bill ~rovided sufficient 
guarantees for an independent role for localities. "It 
[would bel very difficult, almost impossible, for a 
governor to overturn decisions Jointly approved by local 
officials and the local PIC," he said <~IB, 13:26:680>. 
Not surprisingly, the viewpoint 0£ governors was 
diametrically opposed to that of mayors. At the 
mid~winter meeting of the National Governors' Association 
<NGA>, governors allied themselves with the 
Administration. In particular, the governors endorsed 
employment training block grants, which would give them 
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aoney with the fewest strings attached. Secretary Donovan 
appeared at the meeting, and said that Job training could 
"be best handled by the states in conJunction with their 
local economic units" because governors best understand 
the changing demographics, economic forces, and skill 
needs within their states. He told the governors .. your 
role is paramount. The Federal role is going to be 
minimal" < g:n~, 13: 25: 654 > • 
The NGA adopted a new position paper on employment 
training, in which they took a more conciliatory position 
towards the Administration, compared to earlier 
statements. The emphasis on the state's role in the NGA 
statement was similar to the Administration bill, but NGA 
re3ected that bill's narrow targeting. The NGA proposal 
amounted to more than a replacement 0£ CETA; it suggested 
a unified, state-run system o££ering services to all 
employers and workers. While the whole population had 
employment training needs, the three groups that needed 
particular attention were, first, those £acing barriers to 
employment--minorities, youth, older workers, women, and 
the handicapped; second, individuals "£ailed by the 
conventional system 11 --welfare recipients, people with 
limited English proficiency, school dropouts, and 
offenders; and, third, dislocated workers. NGA also 
supported national programs £or Indians, migrants, and 
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re£ugees. 
The governors recommended that administrative control 
0£ the employment training system be in their hands. 
Thinking big, they suggested that the system should 
include not only the £unctions now served by CETA, but 
also those 0£ the Employment Service and parts of 
unemployment insurance and wel£are. The states would draw 
up a state plan and allocate employment training £unds to 
substate delivery areas where needed <g!B, 13:25:664-5>. 
Governor Pierre du Pont of Delaware was the chairman 
0£ the employment training committee of the NGA. At CETA 
replacement hearings held by the National Commission for 
Employment Policy, he outlined a trai~ing program that 
would give virtually all authority to governors. Under 
his plan, states would receive block grants with no 
strings attached, though with 20 per cent matching funds 
required. State programs would be operated by 
public/private non-profit corporations whose members would 
be selected by the governor. Only the governor would have 
the in£luence and prestige to attract the individual 
decision-makers whose participation was necessary for 
program success, du Pont said. Local employment training 
councils would exist only 1£ the state council thought it 
necessary, and funds should be completely untargeted. 
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However, training should be directed at prevention rather 
than remediation, with particular emphasis on the 
transition £rom school to work and from one Job to another 
<g!B, 13:24:629-31; reprinted in Mangum, 1982>. 
Congress was £ar £rom resolving the issue 0£ state 
~~~!Y! local control. At Joint hearings, the d1££erences 
were obvious. On the House Subcommittee, there appeared 
to be little interest among the Democrats to make any 
changes in CETA beyond those contained in the Hawkins 
bill, while a Senate sta££er told the editors 0£ ~IB that 
the Senate Subcommittee would be concerned with developing 
legislation that would pass the Senate, and would not be 
working with one eye on the House <~TB, 13:28:729>. Susan 
Grayson, a House staffer, told the NCEP'hearings that the 
locus 0£ control issue could be the toughest to resolve, 
since Senators represent states, while Representatives 
represent localities <aIB, 13:24:630; a nearly identical 
statement appears at U.S. Congress, 1982d:475-485>. 
To summarize, the most heavily-lobbied issues can be 
grouped in £our categories. First was the issue 0£ 
funding, in many ways crucial to the determination of 
other issues. Second was the purely distributive issue 0£ 
control, whether state or local, private or public. Third 
was the issue of targeting and the mix of services, 
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striking the balance between youth and adults, the 
hard-core disadvantaged end those who needed to upgrade 
existing skills, or who were dislocated workers. These 
issues had both distributive and redistributive elements. 
Finally there was the redistributive issue 0£ stipends, or 
whether the new employment training law should have an 
element 0£ income trans£er as well as training. 
Governmental actors spent most 0£ their e££orts 
trying to in£luence Congress on distributional issues, 
with attention to issues 0£ program structure only 
inasmuch as Federal stipulations threatened to tie the 
hands 0£ lower levels 0£ government. The business 
community, while lobbying £or more resources to be 
directed to them, began to cool its enthusiasm for 
Federally-funded training as it adopted the 
Administration's commitment to lower social spending in 
general; they decided they would prefer the Reagan tax 
cut to a red-tape-ridden subsidy. Community-based 
organizations and unions were le£t es the champions of 
more Federal spending and the old CETA structure, and 
their star was not in the ascendant in the rearranged 
political zodiac of the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER 9 
JTPA--COMPROMISE AND PASSAGE 
' "E lascia pur grattar dov'e la rogna!" CAnd let them go ahead and scratch where it itches!] 
--Dante, f~£~9!~9 
One element, too little appreciated outside Congress, 
driving legislators towards incremental compromise is the 
sheer pressure 0£ time. The incredible volume 0£ policy 
issues before the Congress each session, combined with the 
myriad responsibilities of Congressmen and the current 
necessity £or almost constant campaigning, all militate 
against the reflective consideration 0£ radical policy 
innovations. Often, the practical choice is to comproaise 
between existing preferences or do nothing. The deadline 
for the expiration 0£ CETA--September 30, 1982--was a 
constant goad to the deliberations of the subcommittees 
and coaaittees. No one wanted simply to cancel all 
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eaployaent training programs on October 1, and merely to 
extend CETA £or a tera of months would be a g~ f~gt2 
victory for anti-training forces and a defeat for the 
subgovernaent. Time pressures will not be mentioned at 
every Juncture in the process of comproaise on JTPA, but 
they should be kept in •ind. 
During markup, the House Subcommittee on Employment 
Opportunities was able to compromise on almost all of the 
issues separating the Hawkins and Jeffords proposals. 
Where a con£lict remained, Representative Hawkins' view 
prevailed with the subcommittee. Although there were few 
important differences, the bill the subcommittee marked up 
was actually a new version, introduced as an amendment in 
the fora of a substitute £or the original bill. Public 
service employment was retained in the bill, and the 
funding authorization was actually increased, froa $5 to 
$6 billion <iIB, 13:30:779). 
One issue le£t unresolved was that of setting the 
•iniaua size of the pri•e sponsor area <these areas came 
t.o be called "service delivery areas" in JTPA>. Jeffords 
tried to aaend the bill to require that cities have 
populations of at least 200,000 to autoaatically qualify 
as prfae sponsors, but the subcoJRaittee accepted Hawkins' 
coaproaise figure of 125,000. Under CETA, the ainiaum 
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figure had been 100,000, which aeent that aost cities 
could be priae sponsors, with the programs under the g~ 
f~St2 control 0£ the aayor. In fighting to keep the 
population ainimums low, the Democrats were protecting the 
interests 0£ mayors. Larger minimum population 
requireaents meant that aany service delivery areas would 
consist 0£ consortia of local governments, requiring more 
higher-level coordination and increasing the g~ f~gtg 
in£luence 0£ governors; the Republicans favored this 
approach. 
Each prime sponsor would have a private industry 
council <PIC>, dominated by representatives of business. 
The bill retained a Joint planning role £or PICs with 
priae sponsors. No funds could be spent· without approval 
0£ the PIC, which would have "active participation" in 
planning, as well as its own paid sta££. PIC members 
would be be appointed by the priae sponsor from 
noainations aade by appropriate groups, and could not be 
removed without cause. The subcoaaittee resisted attempts 
by Representative Weiss <D-NY> to weaken the authority of 
PICs or their control by business. Representative Harold 
Washington CD-IL> added requirements that PICs and state 
eaployaent training councils "reasonably" reflect local 
deaographics, and that ainority businesses be represented 
on PICa. 
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In an atteapt to add stability to the operation 0£ 
training prograas, the planning process was aade biennial 
rather than annual. The governor was given the power to 
propose changes in the plan be£ore sending it on to the 
Secretary 0£ Labor £or £inal approval <~IB, 13:30:777>. 
The state would be given greater input into 
coordinating training programs with educational agencies 
and other state agencies, and new restrictions were placed 
on the coaposition 0£ state training councils: 25 per 
cent 0£ aembers aust coae £roa business; 25 per cent £rom 
the state legislature or state training-related agencies, 
25 per cent £roa units 0£ local governaent, and 25 per 
cent £roa the general public, organized labor, and 
coaaunity-baaed organizations <sIB, 13:30:777-778>. 
Eligibility criteria for Title II Ceaployaent 
training services £or the disadvantaged> were retained, 
targeting 90 per cent of funds for the disadvantaged. 
Half 0£ priae sponsor funds would be targeted to youth 
aged 16-21, with soae flexibility according to demographic 
factors. Jeffords' proposal for "try-out" eaployaent for 
youth was adopted. 
357 
Title III, £or displaced workers, was also changed. 
The Secretary of Labor would retain 25 per cent of Title 
II~ funds for distribution as the need arose, with the 
other 75 per cent distributed to states <with a 50150 
state •atching requirement) according to formula. 
National prograas would be retained, with PSE allowed 
under another name. The National Commission on Employment 
Policy would be expanded from 15 to 19 members, with two 
each to be appointed by the House and Senate leadership 
<g!B, 13:30:779>. 
The treataent 0£ allowances was changed. The 
aubcoaaittee adopted the Jeffords approach of allowances 
on the basis 0£ need, according to several formulae. 
Here, Hawkin• retained the principle of ·allowances, while 
retreating froa the CETA regulation that all trainees be 
paid at least the ainiaua wage. Incentive bonuses for 
auccess£ul coapletion 0£ training were also authorized 
<g!B, 13:30:778>. 
While conceding relatively little, Hawkins was able 
to unite hia aubcomaittee, except on three points: the 
size 0£ priae sponsor areas, the provisions to allow 
public service eaployaent, and the level of authorized 
funding. At this point, the funding issue was not 
critical to the aubcoaaittee, since deteraination 0£ 
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£unding levela was largely out 0£ their hands. The House 
and Senate Budget Coaaittees were wrestling with budget 
li~ita, as the battle over the size 0£ the budget was the 
aost high-pro£ile issue before the Government during the 
Spring 0£ 1982. 
The situation 0£ the subcoa•ittee illustrates one 0£ 
the aaJor structural di££iculties 0£ the legislative 
process. The subcoaaittee was £orced to design a program 
without knowing how much money they would have to spend on 
it; they could only guess that the £inal appropriation 
would be something between Sl.6 and S6 billion <more 
realistically, they were probably expecting a coaproaise 
between the Administration's 82.4 billion proposal and 
Hawkins' $5 billion £igure; privately, ·:Deaocrats said 
they would be happy to retain £unding at about the current 
level--83 to $3.7 billion>. Members of the subcoaaittee 
had to aake a political JUdgaent about how auch aoney · 
would be forthcoaing, and tailor a prograa of the 
appropriate aize. 
It was obvious that the aore general, partisan 
struggle over the aize of the Federal budget would be the 
aain deterainant 0£ the size of eaployaent training 
prograaa. At a U.S. Conference of Mayors aeeting, Rick 
Praeger, a staf£ aeaber £roa the House Budget Coaaittee, 
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predicted that eaployaent training £unding would £all 
soaewhere between $3 and $6 billion, but eaphasized that 
funding £or eaployment training prograas would not be 
deterained on the aerits 0£ the programs, but as part of a 
auch larger issue 0£ how all discretionary domestic 
spending would be treated in the current budget 
negotiations <~IB, 13:33:855>. 
While the eaployaent training bill was proceeding 
saoothly through the House, negotiations in the Senate 
broke down a£ter the Administration apparently coamitted a 
political blunder. Secretary Donovan and Senator Qu~yle 
announced agreeaent on a coaproaise bill they said 
coabinad the beat £eaturea of the Administration bill and 
the Quayle-Kennedy bill, only to see the 11coaproaiae11 blow 
up and the Senate aubcoaaittee markup cancelled, throwing 
the bill behind schedule. Quayle had apparently worked 
out a coaproaiae with the Adainiatration, but soaeone 
failed to get Kennedy's approval. Senator Kennedy's 
off ice received the coaproaiae bill March 29, and the 
Dep6rtaent 0£ Labor issued a press release announcing the 
coaproaiae that afternoon, before receiving any word fro• 
Kennedy. An aide to Kennedy told the editors of E!B that 
"the senator felt that the. Adainistration had not given 
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hi• auff icient tiae to consider the proposed coaproaise 
before aaking a public announcement that agreement had 
been reached." The staffer added that "no one is 
coaaitted to anything now," and the aarkup was cancelled 
<gIB, 13:30:780>. Another Kennedy aide, Kitty Higgins, 
told a conference held by Microeconomic Policy Counselors 
that the Adainiatration "wanted Kennedy off the bill" <no 
longer wanted hi• aa a cosponsor>. While it is iapossible 
to know for certain, one could speculate that this was the 
first indication by the Administration that it sensed soae 
political advantage in passing an eaployment training 
bill, in which case it did not want to share the credit 
with Senator Kennedy. 
Soae details of the failed "coaproaise11 were 
reported, and they give us an idea of the comaon ground 
between the Adainistration and Senate Republicans: 
1. -No funding level was set. 
2. The designation of substate service delivery areas 
would be determined by S. 2036, but the ainiaua 
population necessary to be assured prime sponsor 
atatua waa changed to 400,000 <the Administration 
bill's figure was 500,000, the Quayle bill's 250,000>. 
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3. Tha delivery ayatea would work priaarily through block 
grants to atatea, but there would be aeparate titles 
for displaced worker prograas and national progra••· 
4. Prograa aervicea would be liaited to the diaavantaged, 
with a 50 per cent aetaside £or youths aged 16-25, in 
or out 0£ school. 
5. No stipends would be allowed; supportive services 
would be capped at 15 per cent, not 10 per cent as in 
the Adainiatration bill. Supportive services could 
include "teaporary cash payaents to individuals to 
enable the• to participate in training'' <gIB, 
13:30:780-782). 
Iaaediately after the failed "compromise," Assistant 
Secretary Angrisani decided to give a long interview to 
~IB· He said that the failure 0£ the compromise bill did 
not change the fundamental principles in the 
Adainiatration'a propoaal, which were block grants to 
atatea, no wages or allowance, business involveaent at the 
PIC level, and training in occupations with akill 
ahortagea. 
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Despite recent atudiea that ahowed PIC-operated 
prograaa served a saaller percentage 0£ youth, wal£are 
recipients, and high school dropouts than other CETA 
prograaa, Angrisani did not think there would be aore 
"creaaing•• in the new training prograa. The systea would 
"be £orced to serve a very specific Market" of the 
disadvantaged. However, given that proposed £unding of 
$1.8 billion <the Adainistration's latest figure> would 
provide only "a 20 per cent market penetration" <there 
would be prograa positions available £or 20 per cent of 
those eligible £or participation), prograa operators would 
be looking £or "the 20 per cent who will bene£it aost fron 
the progra1n • •• 
Angrisani eaphasized the need £or highly-activated 
participanta. The Adainiatration package would work 
"becauae there are no wagea or allowance, and the person 
who gets into the prograa is really going to want to 
iaprove hi• or herself. • •• What wages and allowances do 
ia ruin the aotivational aspects of the prograa" <E!B, 
13:31:804).• 
Angrisani expressed confidence that business could 
handle their new responsibility for Federally-funded 
training programs. 
The buaineaa coaaunity has a real ownership in our 
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prograa. That ahould be enough for thea to want 
to aaa it aucceed. • •• Although local official• 
will have to aign off on the plan, and aubait it 
Jointly, ••• basically the initiative ia with the 
PIC. 
Angrisani adaitted that the Adainiatration'a prograa 
would not addraaa the problea of the shortage of skilled 
labor, which was forecast for future years. One prograa 
could not solve the need for skilled workers and the· need 
to train the disadvantaged, and the new aystea would not 
try, he aaid. 
It's enough of a problea Just getting thea 
[disadvantaged trainees] i~to the work£orce • 
••• The real thrust 0£ the bill is getting them 
into entry-level Jobs and then letting the natural 
ayatea take over. 
Angriaani was disappointed that it was iapossible to 
develop a truly coaprehensive eaployaent training ayatea, 
aa had been discussed the previous fall: "what aakes 
sense Clogicallyl doesn't necessarily aake sense in a 
political environaent" <sTB, 13:31:804-805>. 
•critics of the Adainistration's plans found 
Angriaani's arguaents obJectionable. For exaaple, George 
Washington University's Sar Levitan characterized the 
Adainiatration's position as "let the• eat training" <s!B, 
13:32:832). 
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By the and 0£ the Eaatar receas, Senators Quayle and 
Kennedy, but not the Adainiatration, reached agreaaent on 
a· "aark-up docuaent11 £or the subcoaaittee. Quayle" a 
tactic, reaching di££erent "coaproaisea .. with Kennedy and 
the Adainiatration, strikes ae as surprising and rather 
creative. Senator Quayle never aade it clear whether he 
had abandoned the earlier comproaise £or the later. 
In the Quayle-Kennedy coaproaise, funding levels were 
not aet, although Quayle said that he expected final 
£unding 0£ between 83 billion and $3.S billion. Service 
delivery areas would be defined auch as in the original 
Quayle bill, with a few exceptions. Local governaents 
with populations over 500,000 aust be accepted as SDAa. 
Applications £roa governments with a pQpulation of 250,000 
or more aust be accepted i£ they were supported by local 
business organizations. Applications £roa governaents 
with a population less than 250,000 that were supported by 
local business organizations could only be reJected by the 
governor with specific findings 0£ £act that a larger area 
would be aore effective in promoting the purposes of the 
act--a vague clause that indicated the coaproaiae was a 
shaky one. ReJections could be appealed to the Secretary 
of Labor. The state JOb training council <which could 
perfora aoat of the duties of the governor>, would be 
required to have 51 per cent private industry aeabership 
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and 20 per cent local government aeabership.; 
Eligibility requirements were changed slightly, ao 
that 90 per cent 0£ £unds would be targeted to the 
economically disadvantaged, de£ined by low income <but 
participants need not necessarily be wel£are recipients>. 
Fi£ty percent 0£ all £unds would be reserved £or those 
under age 25. 
As in the House, the question 0£ stipends produced a 
knotty compromise proposal; the comproaise eliainated 
funding liaits on supportive services, and changed their 
de£inition to include "necessary cash assistance payaenta 
to individuals to enable thea to participate in training." 
It also would allow loans, to be repaid a£ter training. 
Kennedy was £orced to accept the end 0£ CETA-like 
stipends, but le£t the door open £or some cash payaents. 
Despite the comproaise, Senator Kennedy said that .he 
planned to o£fer more aaendments in the full coaaittee 
<~!B, 13:32:827-828>. When assessing the tactics 0£ both 
aides, it should be reaembered that tiae was an iaportant 
factor. According to the Reconciliation Act of 1981, 1£ 
neither house 0£ Congress passed a replacement CETA bill 
by September 10, 1982, CETA would be automatically 
extended in FY1983. This would be a failure £or all 
sides, while in political.terms the balance 0£ power over 
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eaployaent training prograas would pass fro• the Congress 
to the Administration. Senator Kennedy could obstruct the 
progress of •the bill in order to gain proviaiona he 
wanted, but too great a delay would be disastrous. The 
Adainistration could blame Congress for failing to produce 
new legislation, while retaining the power to change aany 
of the features of CETA unilaterally, through changes in 
regulations. 
The Administration was unhappy with the 
Kennedy-Quayle compromise. Assistant Secretary Angrisani, 
speaking to the National Association 0£ Private Industry 
Councils, said that the new bill was too close to CETA, 
and i£ Congress re£used to £ollow Administration 
principles, "Job training isn't going tC? last... He added 
that eaployment training already had two strikes against 
it, MDTA and CETA <~IB, 13:32:827>. Following the 
breakdown 0£ the Quayle-Adainistration "co:raproaise, 11 t.he 
ri£t between the Adainistration and the Congressional 
Republican leadership steadily widened, with veto threats 
becoaing leas veiled as passage of the new eaployaent 
training act caae closer. 
Meanwhile, a counterattack £roa the le£t waa being 
prepared in the Senate. Senator Metzenbaua <D-Ohio) 
prepared £our aaendaents £or coaaittee consideration that 
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would aove the new eaployaant training bill closer to 
CETA. Senator Metzenbaua's aaendaents would restore 
proposed Job Corps £unding cuts, allow payment 0£ wages 
£or a summer youth program, provide displaced worker 
prograa £unding 0£ 8500 aillion <the original 
Quayle-Kennedy bill provided SlOO million>, and allow any 
government unit with 100,000 population to be a service 
delivery area as long as it had local business support £or 
its application <~!Br 13:32:829>. Note that even 
Hetzenbaua'a proposals did not suggest retaining stipends 
£or adults; that issue was now settled in the Senate. 
Heither Metzenbaum's nor any other controversial 
amendments were considered during Senate subcommittee 
deliberations. The Quayle-Kennedy coaproaise passed with 
only a £ew ainor changes, because aeabers agreed to hold 
controversial amendments £or £ull coaaittee markup. 
The reaction 0£ the Administrati~n was surprising. 
Secretary Donovan sent a letter to Senator Quayle in which 
he said that he was "extreaely disappointed" that the 
Quayle-Kennedy coaproaise bill was aarked up instead 0£ 
the Administration bill or the earlier 
Adainiatration-Quayle coaproaise. Donovan stated that "we 
entered into negotiations for a consensus bill at your 
request" and called Quayles'a decision "an unexpected 
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turnaround .. <~IB, 13:33:851). More interesting than the 
disingenuous tone of this letter was the decision to 
publicly chastise Senator Quayle. The Administration was 
alowly turning up the heat on its Republican colleagues, 
but it is entirely possible that this strategy was being 
followed with Quayle"s cooperation; as the "good cop" in 
the negotiations Cor as the British would say, the "wet">, 
Quayle could use the Administration"a displeasure as a 
bargaining point with the Democrats. 
Senator Hatch, chairman of the £ull Labor Committee, 
served as spokesman for the Administration after the 
subcoaaittee aarkup (although he voted in £aver 0£ the 
coaproaise, which passed 7-0>. He said that the 
Adainiatration obJected Most strongly to five features of 
the bill: £irst, the failure to prohibit allowances; 
second, the use of public sector employers to provide 
on-the-Job training, which was too close to being public 
service eaployaent aasquerading under another name; 
third, the establishaent of a loan fund to pay allowances 
to participants, a backdoor approach to stipends; £ourth, 
the failure to limit support services to 15 per cent; and 
fifth, requiring pass-through funding to service delivery 
areas, instead of providing for state control of funding. 
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Hatch called the employaent training legislation "one 
of the aost iaportant bills we have this year," and said 
"I've worked •Y tail off to reach an agreement," but 
warned that the Administration would not accept a "CETA 
revisited" <EIH, 13:33:851). 
At this point, prospects for further compromise 
seemed poor. Kitty Higgins, Senator Kennedy's aide on the 
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, said that 
neither Kennedy nor Quayle was likely to move farther in 
the direction of the Administration position. In fact, 
she predicted movement in the full committee would be in 
the opposite direction, since Senators Weicker and 
Stafford, though Republicans (froa Connecticut and 
Veraont, respectively>, would support the Democrats in the 
full coamittee. Senator Hatch was anxious to work out a 
coaproaise, Higgins said, but the Quayle-Kennedy 
supporters were not very hopeful about the prospect 0£ 
bringing the Administration into agreement with the• <g!B, 
13:33:854). 
Without the need to worry about negotiations with the 
Administration, the House Education and Labor Committee 
coapleted full coaaittee markup by the beginning of May. 
There·were relatively few •aJor changes made, and while 
the bill caae aarginally closer to the Quayle-Kennedy 
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coaproaise, it essentially ignored Administration 
proposals. 
Most notably, the public service employment <PSE> 
title was removed from the bill, to be introduced 
separately as a Job creation bill by Hawkins, with 
3effords' support. Hawkins agreed with 3e£fords that PSE 
remained a problem to public perceptions, and was now 
politically unpalatable C~IB, 13:34:887>. By permitting 
the PSE provisions to be removed £roa the bill and 
subaitted separately, Hawkins insured PSE's defeat through 
inattention; the bill would have no chance of being 
considered by the House during the current session. 
Hawkins recognized that PSE was politically dead, btit he 
preserved his status as its champion •. After separating 
the PSE provisions from H.R. 5320 and incorporating thea 
into a new bill CH.R. 6250>, Hawkins managed to have the 
Education and Labor Committee pass the new bill, but it 
died in the full House <~!B, 13:35:935). 
Earlier, I have called this tactic of splitting into 
new bills programs that cannot be passed a symbolic 
reward, but the tactic can sometimes have more than 
syabolic content. Many measures take more than one 
session to beco•e law, and to achieve partial success 
during a session is the strongest foundation for the next 
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aeasion's e££orta. Paaaing a bill through a coaaittee ia 
o£ten considered a good year's work by lobbyists taking 
the long view, as the quotation £rom Trollope at the 
beginning 0£ Chapter Eight asserts. 
The most severe split in the Education and Labor 
Committee was over £unding. An attempt to reduce the $6 
billion authorization to the Administration £igure 0£ $2.4 
billion was de£eated, but Hawkins accepted a £igure 0£ 
S5.4 billion, re£lecting a loss 0£ S850 million £ro• the 
removal 0£ PSE and an addition 0£ $250 million to training 
progralls. 
On the issue 0£ service delivery areas CSDAs>, 
Je££ords £ailed to raise the minimum population £igure £or 
a prime sponsor to 200,000. Hawkins, who had raised the 
limit during subcommittee hearings £roa 100,000 to 
125,000, agreed to raise the limit further to 150,000 <c£. 
Quayle-Kennedy 250,000>. Jeffords did succeed in 
eliminating the "grandfather clause" allowing current 
small prime sponsors to continue through 1988, and 
inserted a clause requiring those prime sponsors in a 
single labor aarket area to establish a JOint PIC. 
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Republicans atteapted to increase the power 0£ the 
PICa, but without success. The Administration supported 
an amendment o££ered by Thomas Petri <R-WI> giving the PIC 
the responsibility £or planning with the "subsequent 
concurrence" 0£ the priae sponsor. This was apparently 
their calculation 0£ how £ar they aight be able to aove 
the House, to establish a better bargaining position £or 
Joint conference. The aaendaent was raJected, however. 
Attempts to aove the bill in the other direction were no 
more successful; the committee also reJected an amendaent 
of£ered by Representative Ted Weiss CD-NY> to lessen the 
role 0£ the PIC in the planning process <gIB, 13:34:887>. 
Representative Marge Roukema CR-NJ> introduced 
several amendments based on her bill H.R. S8S2, to require 
that prime sponsors enroll at least SO per cent 0£ their 
adult participants in "customized" training programs,, 
which were to include guaranteed hiring commitments £roa 
industry, and to o££er bonus payments to employers who 
hired trainees at the end of training. Committee members 
were sympathetic, but agreed only to add a clause making 
the SO per cent a goal and not a requirement. 
On the subJect 0£ allowances, the committee reJected 
another Administration-backed proposal to make allowance 
payments optional at the discretion 0£ the priae sponsor. 
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Instead, they would be dependent on need, according to a 
£oraula. Other amendaents would allow 14 and 15-year-olda 
to participate in suaaer youth programs, and required the 
Secretary 0£ Labor to establish research and evaluation 
programs <~TB, 13:34:888>. 
The House Coaaittee did not take a £inal vote on 
passage 0£ H.R. 5320, but decided to wait until it waa 
clear that the Senate would be able to act on its bill 
during the summer session <~IB, 13:34:887>. In the 
meantime, however, the House Coaaittee did release ita 
report on H.R. 5320. Comaittee reports become part 0£ the 
legislative history 0£ a bill and are used to interpret 
congressional intent if questions arise about specific 
provisions of a law. The reports attempt to clari£y 
legislative provisions. 
According to the House report, if eaployaent training 
prograas were funded at the full authorization level 0£ 
95.4 billion, approxiaately 2.25 million persons could 
receive services. According to the Congressional Budget 
0£fice, 16 million persons would qualify for Title II 
<training> alone, so only 14 per cent of the potential 
population could be served. Also, the $5.4 billion figure 
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represented a 47 per cant cut fro• the 1979 authorization 
level, when uneaployment stood at 5.8 per cent, compared 
to 9.4 per cent at the beginning 0£ 1982 <~!B, 13:37:988>. 
The committee report paid considerable attention to 
the role 0£ Private Industry Councils <PICs>. The PIC 
would be established "as an independent board not subJect 
to the control of a prime sponsor." It could functicin as 
an administrative entity or as a policy board, but 0 the 
division 0£ £unctions and responsibilities should be 
determined locally in an agreement between the PIC and the 
prime sponsor" <~TB, 13:37:985). It was assumed that the 
administrative entity, whether it was the PIC or another 
body, would contract out services on a competitive basis, 
rather than operate its own programs. 
Performance standards, as contemplated by the 
committee, should measure not only absolute outcomes, but 
also progress toward outcomes. The issue of designing 
per£ormance standards for employaent training programs is 
highly technical, and not really germane to this study; 
it is worth noting, however, that even the legislators in 
the employment training subgovernment found the issue 
confusing and never successfully came to grips with it. 
In the end, Congress left the definition of performance 
standards up to the Department of Labor in its regulatory 
375 
process: for the Department of Labor's guidance, the 
committee could do no better than the following rather 
ambiguous statement: "it is not the intention 0£ the act 
to serve only the most JOb ready. It is the intention 0£ 
this act to serve clients who can benefit substantially 
£rom participation" <s!B, 13:37:986>. We can deduce that 
the committee was concerned that performance standards 
should not encourage "creaming," or serving only the 
easiest clients. The report specifically stated that cost 
per participant should not necessarily be considered an 
e££ective measure of benefit or performance. Here the 
committee was reflecting the concerns that many employaent 
training professionals had expressed during hearings. 
The committee warned that the Federal g6vernment 
should not specify the program aix, but leave that 
responsibility to the prime sponsors. Also, noting that 
previous studies had shown that longer term training had a 
more significant impact on earnings and employment, the 
bill "expressly prohibits the Secretary from disapproving 
any plan solely on the basis 0£ the type and duration 0£ 
training proposed" <5!8, 13:37:987>. 
The committee continued to aake a case for stipends. 
Since only around a third 0£ current CETA participants 
were receiving welfare or unemployment insurance 
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assistance, "there ia an obvious need £or a provision 
allowing £or the payment 0£ allowances £or those not 
receiving any £orm 0£ income assistance" <g!B, 13:37:986). 
While incentive bonuses on the completion of training 
would be allowed, the committee did "not believe that a 
substantial portion 0£ £unds should be used" £or this kind 
0£ payment. Similarly, cash employment bonuses to 
employers who agreed to hire trainees upon completion 0£ 
training would be allowed, but the committee did "not 
intend that employment bonuses account £or more than 
one-hal£ the wages paid to an eligible individual £or the 
£irst six weeks 0£ employment beyond completion 0£ 
training" <~!B, 13:37:986>. Finally, the committee 
asserted that H.R. 5320 should have a long-term 
anti-inflationary e££ect, because it would increase the 
supply 0£ skilled workers and promote greater productivity 
<~IB, 13:37:988>. 
In the Senate, an intensive round 0£ .negotiations 
paid 0££ when all sides were able to reach a compromise, 
and the Labor and Human Resources Committee unanimously 
passed an amended version 0£ S. 2036 at the end 0£ May. 
Due to complications in the Senate's schedule and the 
budgetary process, it would probably have been fatal to 
the bill not to compromise before the end of May. Again, 
all the parties chose to accept a compromise rather than 
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give up the bill. 
The Administration won the aaJority 0£ the points 
that were compromised. Funding was not included in the 
amended bill, since it was no longer the responsibility 0£ 
the Education and Labor Committee. A series 0£ decisions 
in the Budget and Appropriations Committees would 
determine eventual £unding levels. The Senate budget 
resolution, which was pending, would provide S3.9 billion 
for employment training programs, while the Michel-Latta 
budget proposal, endorsed by the Administration, would 
provide S3.2 billion <~!B, 13:38:1006-1007). In the 
House, the Budget Comaittee had voted to freeze employment 
training funding at S4.137 billion for each of the next 
three years, although negotiations were far from over 
<~!B, 13:36:955>. 
The three areas in which the Administration won aaJor 
changes were the payment of wages or stipends, the 
definition and limitation of supportive services and 
administrative costs, and the participation of public 
sector employers. In return, the Administration had to 
accept a new title with a summer youth employment program, 
which would pay wages <under various names, summer youth 
programs have operated since the late 1960s>. 
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Supportive services were redefined as those 
"necessary to enable an individual ••• to participate in a 
training program" that an individual could not af£ord to 
pay on his own, and could include "transportation, health 
care, child care, meals, temporary shelter, financial 
counseling, and other reasonable expenses." But, 11 the 
term supportive services does not mean and shall not be 
interpreted to mean wages, allowances, or stipends" <~IR, 
13:38:1005>. In order to further restrict payment 0£ 
non-training expenses, the compromise required that the 
total cost of administrative and supportive services could 
not exceed 30 per cent 0£ a state's £unds, although 
individual service delivery areas could exceed 30 per 
cent. Committee members agreed they would atteapt to 
define administrative costs and add the definition on the 
Senate floor <§IB, 13:38:1005>. 
The subcoaaittee version of the Quayle bill was 
criticized by the Administration £or containing on-the-Job 
training in the public sector. This was too close to 
public service employment £or the Administration's taste. 
The £ull committee amended the bill to read that in any 
service delivery area the ratio 0£ public to private 
sector on-the-Job training recipients could not exceed the 
ratio between governaental and nongovernmental eaployaent 
in the area <i!B, 13:38:1006). Here again is the sort 0£ 
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coaproaise that makes Federal programs and regulations 
unduly complicated. Neither side won its point, and the 
coaproaise mandated a procedure that was likely to cause a 
great deal 0£ trouble in practice. 
Senator Metzenbaum success£ully proposed an amendment 
to lower the matching £unds provisions 0£ the displaced 
worker program £or states with high unemployment. This 
was a de£eat £or the Administration <s!B, 13:38:1006>. 
As in the House, the report of the Senate Labor and 
Human Resources Committee took pains to clari£y the role 
of PICS and to provide guidance for the development of 
per£oraance standards. Unlike the House report, the 
Senate report emphasized an enhanced role for governors. 
State governors would have the "basic supervisory role" in 
the new program. They would determine service delivery 
areas <SDAs>, prepare state goals and obJectives to guide 
local planning, approve local plans, and resolve 
differences between PICs and local governments. They 
would also be responsible £or £iscal and accounting 
standards and audits <g!B• 13:41:1090). 
The Senate also went beyond the House in underlining 
the independent character of the Private Industry Councils 
in the planning process. The report made it clear that 
the PICs' business representatives were to be nominated by 
380 
buaineaa organizations, not political leaders. PICs would 
be given the responsibility to develop the program plans 
tor their SDAs. They would be £ree to select any training 
activity that was designed 11 to prepare disadvantaged 
persons for, and place them in eaployaent." PICs could 
choose to function only as policy and planning boards, or 
to act es administrative entities, contracting £or 
services or delivering them directly <s!B, 13:41:1089>. 
This was less restrictive than the House version. 
Service providers would be selected on the basis of 
quality and the cost of providing services. Concern for 
cost-e£fectiveness should not lead to an emphasis on 
low-cost, quick-placement programs that sacrificed 
quality. 
The committee discussed perforaance standards but, 
like the House, avoided defining them. They aust be 
related to outcomes: "Congress expects to be told that 
for each Sl 0£ investaent in training that the nation has 
received a speci£ied number of dollars in return through 
increased earnings and welfare reductions." But since 
there were nany methodological questions to be resolved, 
the Secretary of Labor would be given the responsibility 
for developing perforaance standards <EIB, 13:41:1090). 
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Wagea, atipenda, and allowances would not be allowed, 
and cash payments ea supportive servicea would be 
permissible "only as they are deemed necessary to enable 
certain individuals to participate" <~!Br 13:41:1090). 
This language acted as a placeholder, or a reminder that 
the issue was still unsettled; it re£lected an agreement 
to delay resolution 0£ the issue until later. 
As the employment training bills progressed towards 
floor action, it became apparent that the Republicans were 
winning the overall battle 0£ the budget, and as a result 
the employment training appropriation would be toward the 
lower end of the range. The critical aoaent was the 
House's passage 0£ the Michel-Latte budget in June; this 
budget, as revised, provided S3.023 billion for employment 
training programs, in e££ect a £reeze et FY82 levels, 
witho~t counting FY82 spending deferred froa FY81 
<approximately S?OO aillion>. 
During the later stages of Congressional negotiation, 
the edainistretive and planning role of the PICs received 
the aost attention fro• professional and interest groups. 
With the final £unding level narrowed down to the S3-4 
billion range, and the redistributive issue of stipends 
practically settled <even if they were allowed in some 
fora, there would not be su££icient funds to pay very aany 
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atipenda>, the baaically distributive issue of who would 
control the planning and adainiatration of the prograas 
took center stage. 
The most enthusiastic supporter of broader powers for 
the Private Industry Councils was, not surprisingly, the 
National Alliance of Business. A report they released on 
the PICs in the CETA prograa (which were somewhat 
di££erent in structure and functions £roa those proposed 
£or JTPA> claiaed that PICs had aanaged to achieve 
signi£icantly higher program performance and more 
desirable program content than other aaJor CETA adult 
training programs. The NAB report claiaed this 
per£oraance was due to the £act that PIC-supported 
prograas used aore on-the-Job training than other 
prograas. The PICs knew how to get results and therefore 
ahould be given more power, depoliticizing the training 
systea <5!B, 13:44:1183>. As we saw in Chapter Five, 
on-the-Job training programs did have the highest 
benefit-cost ratios of any CETA activity, but whether that 
was due to the allegedly good Judgment and 
depoliticization 0£ the PICs was less clear. 
Robert Knight, executive director 0£ the National 
Association of Private Industry Councils <NAPIC>, 
displayed rather more mixed feelings about the proper role 
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0£ PICa, in an interview with the editors of g!B· First, 
Knight reminded the editors that one should raaember that 
the private sector regarded eaployment training £or the 
disadvantaged as 0 primarily a government program," but it 
was willing to get involved on a substantial basis if it 
felt that the program could succeed. "Otherwise, they'll 
walk away £roa it." 
Planning authority £or training programs wasn't 
necessarily what the PICs wanted, Knight said. The 
iaportance 0£ planning authority on its own could be 
overrated. It was probably aore important that a PIC be 
allowed to run the portions 0£ the program in which it was 
particularly interested. Those sections included econoaic 
development, the designing of on-the-Job training and 
custoaized training programs, research and development, 
and serving as an intermediary between the public and 
private sectors. Only a few current PICs were interested 
in taking over administration of an entire training 
prograa. 
Further, there was not auch support among PICs for a 
strictly targeted program such as that in S. 2184. 
Businessmen felt that the benefits given to AFDC 
recipients created a strong disincentive to work, and that 
econoaically disadvantaged youth were simply hard to place 
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in the current depressed econoay. For young people, work 
experience in the public sector aight be the best answer 
Cas provided £or in the Hawkins bill>. Still, even 
reJecting rigid targeting, the aaJor £ocua of Federal 
training prograaa aust reaain on helping the 
disadvantaged. 
Knight felt there was no automatic PIC support £or 
the labor market area approach to service delivery areas, 
either. PICs servicing small areas outside of maJor urban 
centers often didn't want to be lumped together with the 
inner city. Also, since PICs functioned at the local 
level, they tended to work best with local elected 
officials, rather than states. 
Finally, stipends were the source of the aost PIC 
coaplaints about CETA. They ob3ected to the rigidity of 
the CETA systea, whereby every participant got a stipend 
and all stipends were the same <the ainiaum wage>. Some 
PIC aeabers would pref er stipends based on need, some 
would prefer to use the• to provide incentives, and soae 
would prefer their eliaination. Whatever the new foraula, 
it should be kept simple, as stipends were the chief cause 
0£ the petty scandals that could give a Federal prograa a 
bad riaae at the local level C~IB, 13:31:806-807). 
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While the coaaitteea were deliberating, aore 
iaportant in£oraation caae to light when a aaJor 
evaluation study 0£ the role 0£ PICs in CETA was released. 
The study was per£oraed by the Mershon Center 0£ Ohio 
State University, under contract with the 0££ice 0£ 
Prograa Evaluation 0£ the Eaployaent Training 
Adainiatration. 
The study warned against atteapting to improve CETA 
siaply by expanding the role of the private sector through 
the PICa. It said that giving PICs the powers currently 
enJoyed by prime sponsors would cause "considerable 
chaos 11 11 as would making PICs and priae sponsors into 
rivals by giving the PIC and the prime sponsor planning 
council concurrent planning powers. The study showed that 
private sector involvement could be effectively increased 
in three ways. First 11 the goal of placing trainees in 
private sector employaent should be made the priaary 
obJective of the eaployaent training system. Second, 
bonuses should be of£ered to sponsors that achieved a high 
private sector placeaent rate. Third" in each service 
delivery ar,ea there should be a single planning council, 
doainated by business, with the power to' disapprove 
prograas. This proposal was siailar to that in the 
Hawkins bill. 
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Alao. the report recomllended that eMployaent training 
prograas continue to be targeted on the disadvantaged. 
P'rograas should not beco1te a lllere "increment" to exieting 
private sector training prQgrams, but should retain their 
"special purpose 0£ addressing a target population 
di££arent in soae iaportant waye £roa the population 
business would reach 1£ operating on its own" <~!B, 
13:30:785-787). 
The Coaaittee for Econoaic Development, in its· own 
stataaent on employaent poiicy, was also less than 
enthusiastic about the use£ulness ~£ expanded powers £or 
PICs. The record 0£ CETA showed that PICs had "fallen 
short 0£ original hopes," and did not appear to have 
introduced aany innovations in prograa ·design or 
iapleaentation~ although this aay have been aostly the 
£ault 0£ goverriaent. It aust be remembered that while 
businesses were willing to help train the hard-to-eaploy, 
training prograas aust be designed to operate within the 
restrictions 0£ "the way business really £unctions" <~!B, 
13:44: 1186).' 
In the new legislation, .the process of selecting PIC 
•eabers should "prevent public of:ficials :froa choosing 
only those 'buainesa' representatives who will do their 
own bidding," through such means as choosing £roa a pool 
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of naaes provided by local business organizations <gIB, 
13:44:1186). It would also be "a disinct advantage for 
business to pay the salaries 0£ the core ate££" to assure 
their proper accountability <g!B, 13:44:1187). 
The Committee £or Economic Developaent's statement 
repeatedly emphasized the importance 0£ local input, and 
suggested that state action alone was not su££1cient, 
since "the essential sense of coamunity vital to 
stimulating business involvement often does not extend 
beyond the local labor market area" <~!B, 11:34:1187). 
It is surprising that the above coaaents, coming froa 
the spokesmen for those persons (mostly from the business 
sector> who had already participated i~ the work of PICs, 
had so little effect on· the Republican policy askers, who 
were supposedly representing the interests of business. 
Soae of the positions for which the· Republicans were 
fighting the hardest had little appeal to the business 
representatives, but it was apparently too late to change 
the plan of battle, now that positions had been staked out 
and hard-fought coaproaises won. On the issue of state 
~!~!Y! local control, i~ app~ars that loyalty to.the 
Adainiatration'a "new Federalis• .. agenda outweighed the 
wishes of the private sector. 
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The Senate waa £irst to co•plete action on an 
eaployaent training bill, passing S. 2036 by a vote of 
95-0. In eo doing, the Republican leadership of the 
Senate showed a considerable amount of independence £rom 
the Administration. The Administration had prepared a 
series of amendments for floor debate, but the 
Administration~s amendments were never introduced. 
Members of the Education and Labor Committee <the 
subgovernment representatives> presented a united front, 
and persuaded other Senators to accept the compromises 
•ade in committee, to consider only amend•ents o££ered by 
members of the committee, and not to introduce other 
controversial amendaents on the £loor. 
Senator Kennedy o£f ered a non-controversial amendment 
that assured funding for the National Coaaission on 
Employ•ent Polici, at two per c~nt of whatever was· 
allotted £or national prograaa. He o££ere~ and then 
withdrew two amendments that would have lessened 
restrictions on the use 0£ funds £or adainistrative 
purposes, leaving the provisions as in the committee 
report. Senator Metzenbaua successfully proposed an 
amendment requiring PICa 0£ service delivery areas within 
the saae labor market area to coordinate certain progra• 
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activities, chie£ly the assessaent 0£ labor aarket needs 
and the planning 0£ ·employer outreach activities. 
Metzenbaua withdrew an amendaent that would have exeapted 
evaluation costs £roa the 15 per cent limit on 
administrative costs. Senator Quayle dissuaded him £roa 
pushing the aaendment, adding that administrative costs 
were bound to be a "maJor issue" at the House/Senate 
con£erence, and the matter could be resolved there. 
Democratic staffers told the editors of ~!B that they had 
withdrawn controversial amendments relating the 
adainistrative and supportive service costs in order to 
insure quick passage 0£ the bill, on the assumption that 
the training bill that would pass the House would be a 
Democratic bill, and that the adainistrative cost issue 
would be raised in conference. Adainistration sources 
told the editors of gIB that they had prepared two 
strategies to be used during final'House consideration: 
first, the aaendaents they had prepared for Senate £loor 
action would be introduced there, and second, they would 
prepare a House version·o£ S. 2036, to be introduced as an 
aaendment in the fora of a substitute for H.R. 5320. 
cgrB, 13:43:1151-1152>. 
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House action was delayed until Auguat, when H.R. 5320 
was passed, by vote of 356-52. Over thirty aaendaenta 
were adopted on the floor, although aoat were of a 
technical or clarifying nature. No specific funding 
authorization was attached to the bill. An amendment 
substituted the language "such sums as aay be necessary" 
for the $5.4 billion authorization, since the House budget 
resolution had already assumed a spending level of about 
S3.0 billion £or employment training programs. 
Senate and House spending levels were now roughly 
siailar. In £act, there was some confusion about which 
was greater. The House budget resolution authorized 
S3.023 billion, but assumed that carry-over funds from 
CETA would push outlays to S3.275 billion. The Senate 
Budget Committee authorized S3.737 billion, but believed 
that post-CETA transition·activities would slow the rate 
0£ FY83 spending to S3.0 billion <sIB,· 13:41:1088). The 
Administration supported the $3.023 billion figure, an 
unusual instance 0£ siding with the House plans <g:rB, 
13:46:1223). 
Efforts on the floor of the House to strengthen the 
role of the states and PICs were defeated. The 
Adainiatration did not in fact try to substitue S. 2036 !n 
~Q~Q £or the House bill, as they had said, but they did 
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atteapt a aore liaited substitution. With Administration 
approval, John Erlenborn <R-IL>, the ranking.ainority 
·aeaber 0£ the £ull Education and Labor Coamittee, 
introduced an amendment to substitute a new Title I Cthe 
adainistrative structure> that was much closer to the 
Senate bill, giving the governors the power to designate 
priae sponsors and the right to disappprove local plans, 
and giving PICs Joint planning rights with prime sponsors. 
Representative Jeffords spoke £or the amendment, citing 
the backing of the National Alliance 0£ Business, the 
Adainistration, and the National Governors' Association; 
Jef£ords claimed that there was a crucial di£f erence 
between the Senate bill and the Erlenborn amendment "in 
that the state cannot take funds and direct them to 
£avorite prime sponsors or programs. This amendment 
carefully protects that .. by providing a forJ1ula aandating 
the distribution of funds. Thus, the Erlenborn amendment 
provided "an excellent •iddle ground" CgQ!l9.!. B!!g., 
8/4/82:H5121>. 
Despite Jeffords' efforts, the Erlenborn aaendaent 
was de£eated, 219-185 <and, after being reintroduced in 
another fora a few ainutes later, defeated again, 
219-189>. This was the crucial vote in the House, so far 
as the Administration was concerned, in which the 
Administration's political influence was'tested. The 
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aolidarity of the aubcoaaittee waa broken by a nearly pure 
party-line vote, but the Democrats had enough support to 
~in their point <Q2ng~ B!~·, 8/4/82:H5121>. 
The de£eat of the Erlenborn amendaent waa interpreted 
by the Education and Labor Committee staff aa a vote that 
would strengthen the House-a hand in conference with the 
Senate. A£ter provoking a teat of strength in which they 
failed, the Administration-a only consolation was that the 
House did ref use to tip the balance in the other 
direction, refusing Ted Weiss- <D-NY> amendaent to weaken 
the power of. PICs. 
On the key is~ue. of allowances, stipends, and 
supportive services, the House moved somewhat closer to 
the Senate. Representative:Je££ords proposed an 
amend•ent, backed by the Administration, that would have 
excluded supportiye services fro• the 70 per cent of 
prograa funds allotted to training costs. Allocating 
aupportive services to administrative costs would have 
severely liaited their-use. Jefford-a aaendaent failed, 
but a Paul Siaon <D-IL> substitute aaendaent £or the 
Jeffords amendment was accepted. It stated that at least 
70 per cent of priae sponsor funds aust be used "for the 
direct provision of employment train(ng services,•• not 
including wages, subsistence stipends and administrative 
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coata, but including aupportive aervicea. Wages and 
stipends were there£ore excluded £roa training costs, but 
~upportive services were not <the House debate appears in 
QQ~g~ B~~., 8/4/82:H5061-5180). Representative Hawkins 
later called the Siaon aaendaent "a reasonable 
co•proaise," but Assistant Secretary Angrisani told the 
editors 0£ g!B that the 70 per cent guaranteed £or 
training in the House bill was "a charade," and the House 
provi~ion was "unacceptable to the Administration, as is 
the House action on SDAs" <g!B, 13:48:1273>. 
The last •aJor hurdle £or JTPA <although it had not 
yet been given that naae> was the Joint con£erence. 
Fourteen Representatives and £ive Senatora,were appointed 
con£erees. Although there were 322 points of di~£erence 
in the two bills, only three aaJor points were at issue. 
Two of the issues were essentially distributive in 
character: £irst, the structure 0£ the delivery systea, 
with the role of the governors Y!! ~ Y!! the cities, and 
the structure 0£ Service Delivery Areas to be settled; 
second, the determination 0£ the authority and functions 
of the local elected o£f icials and the PICs. The third 
•aJor issue, whether and to what extent allowances, wages, 
or stipends would be allowed, could be called a 
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rediatributive iaaue, aince it affected the aMount of 
resources that would be £lowing to the disadvantaged. 
The £irat Joint conference aeeting combined combative 
rhetoric and practical action. The House Democrats, led 
by Representative Hawkins, insisted that they were 
unwilling to compromise further, since "we've done all the 
giving up so far," while Senator Hatch warned that "every 
coaproaise we make may Jeopardize the support of the 
Administration," which could result in a Presidential 
veto. More practically, both sides instructed their 
staffs to meet together and come up with alternative 
options on the key issues, which are summarized in the 
chart below <sIB, 13:50:1321-1322>. 
The Administration called a meeting at the White 
House, at which Senators Hatch and Quayle were told the 
basic req~irements £or any bill the President would sign~ 
The basic requirements were three: first, that no 
stipends or wages be paid; second, that no aore than 30 
per cent 0£ £unds go £or adainistration and supportive 
services; and third, that funds be distributed in the 
£or~ 0£ block grants to the states, with the governors 
distributing £unds to local SDAs cgra, 14:2:27>. 
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COMPARISON OF SENATE AND HOUSE PROVISIONS 
I. Delivery ayate• iaauea. 
1. Servic• Delivery Area. 
Senate: 
I 
--the Governor would designate 
SDAa. 
--the Governor auat designate a 
Jurisdiction with a population 0£ 
500,000 which requests 
JUriadiction as an SDA; areas 0£ 
230,000 or aore auat be 
designated i£ requested by both 




--the atatute designated SDAs by 
de£ining eligible "priae 
aponsora." · 
" ~,, ... l 
-~any.3uriadiction wit-~• 
population or 150,000 or aore 
would be eligible; consortia 0£ 
Jurisdictions totalling 150,000 
would also be eligible. 
--exiating priae aponsora would 
be "grand£athered" £or £ive 
yeara. 
2. Plan developaent; role 0£ the PIC. 
Senate: 
--the PIC would develop the plan 
and aubait it Jointly with 1 local 
elected o££icials to the 
Governor. 
·-the Governor would reaolve any 
disputes between the PIC and 
local elected o££iciala. 
--1£ the Governor diaapproved the 
Plan, appeal to the Secretary of 
Labor could be filed bnly Jointly 
by the PIC and the priae aponaor. 
House: 
---the priae sponsor and PIC would 
Jointly develop the plan, and the 
priae sponsor would aubait it to 
the Secretary of Labor. 
--if the priae sponsor.and PIC 
could not concur on the plan, the 
Secretary of Labor would aeek 
resolution; £ailing resolution, 
· the Secretary aust select an 
alternate priae aponaor for the 
area. 
--in approving the plan, the 
Secretary auat take into account 
recoaaendationa or proposed 
aodi£icationa by the Governor. 
II. Prograa Iaauea 
1. Stipends. 
Senate: 
--except £or the Suaaer Youth 
Prograa, would prohibit the 
payaent 0£ allowancea, atipenda, 
wagea, or public aervice 
eaployaant; would perait 
aupportive aervicea, including 
caah payaent to individual• i£ 




allowances, peraitted wagea £or 
work experience prograaa, 
authorized coapenaation £or 
try-out eaployaent with private or public eaployera £or youth. 
2. Training and adainiatrative coats. 
Senate: 
--required 70 per cent 0£ the 
funds to be uaed £or training, 




--required SO per cent 0£ funds 
to be expended on youth under·25. 
Houae: 
--required 70 per cent 0£ funds 
to be used £or training, 
including aupportive aervices and 
work experience. The reaaining 
30 per cent could be uaed £or 
coata 0£ wagea, allowances, and 
adainiatration. 
--required 50 per cent 0£ £unds 
to be expended on youth under 22, 
with aoaewhat aore flexibility. 
Meanwhile, the conference sta£f had prepared several 
compromise options. They prepared two options on service 
delivery that, unlike the Senate bill, were based solely 
on political Jurisdictions and did not involve PICs, and, 
unlike the House bill, involved the governor. 
Option one would let the governor designate SDAs in 
areas 0£ the state that did not automatically quali£y 
under population criteria to be designated to administer 
training programs. Option two would give the governor the 
opportunity to carve up the state into SDAs, after which 
local political Jurisdictions that met population criteria 
on their own could opt out. The issue 0£ the exact 
population criterion was not addressed. 
On the role 0£ PICs in planning, option one would 
have the PIC and local governaent Jointly develop the plan 
and split the planning grant during the first £iscal year. 
Option two would have the PIC develop the plan 'subJect to 
local governaent approval. In option three, the planning 
£unction would be split, with the PIC developing the part 
0£ the plan concerning training issues, and the local 
government developing the parts concerning client 
selection. The method 0£ resolving disputes was also left 
open £or resolution. 
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The issue of distribution 0£ £unds revolved aore 
around aonitoring responsibilities than allocation; 
should units be £unded directly by the Secretary 0£ Labor, 
only by the governor, by the governor with restrictions, 
or in soae coabination? This issue was le£t £or £uther 
deliberation <~TB, 14:2:27-28>. 
During conference deliberations, there was one last 
round 0£ public lobbying by interest groups. A coalition 
0£ the National Alliance 0£ Business, the National 
Association 0£ Counties, and the U.S. Con£erence 0£ Mayors 
issued a report giving its r~commendations £or settling 
the unresolved issues. The Joint statement did not 
e•phasize the aaJor points 0£ controversy, but largely 
con£ined itsel£ to more technical issues, generally 
recoamending options that increased the £lexibility of 
local prograa operators. 
The coalition agreed that FY1983 should be used as a 
transition year, with the CETA system reaaining in place 
while localities prepared £or JTPA. They also recoaaended 
that the youth components of the bill include those under 
the age 0£ 25, as the Senate had recommended, rather than 
those under 22, as the House recommended. 
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The coalition took no position on allowances; the 
National Association of Counties, however, separately 
proposed that the payment of allowances should be 
permitted, but that the House needs-based systea ahould be 
dropped. 
The National Governors' Association <NGA> sub•itted 
proposals 0£ its own. They remained strongly supportive 
of the Senate proposals that would give governors more 
power. They sent a lobbying letter to state governaenta 
saying that in order to gain concessions from the House on 
issues of state control, 
concessions will probably need to be made on 
issues such as the payment of wages, stipends, and 
allowances, and the consi~eration of support 
services as a training expense. These types 0£ 
concessions will be vigorously opposed by the 
Adainistration but strongly desired by the House 
<EIB, 14:2:34>. 
NGA was apparently more concerned with increasing state 
control than whether stipends would be allowed. 
NGA was worried about counting governors' 
administrative funds as part of the 30 per cent allowed 
£or ad•inistration and support services. NGA believed 
that governors' £unds were intended for "infrastructure 
support rather than client services," and should not be 
counted in the 30 per cent. NGA, like NACO, supported 
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funding training in FY83 at least at the FY82 levels; 
funding £or displaced worker programs aust be "new 
additional aoney" <~IB, 14:2:33-34). 
During conference sessions, compromise proposals were 
constantly proposed and debated, as the two sides inched 
closer together. For example, it was agreed that 70 per 
cent 0£ £unds would be earmarked £or training, with a 30 
per cent limitation on administrative and support service 
costs, but there were long debates on what costs would be 
defined as training costs or supportive service coats. 
House members were adamant that supportive services 
should be included in training costs <especially child 
care services>. Representative William Ford <D-Mich.) 
insisted that without day care provisions mothers with 
young chiidren could not enroll in training; ''they can't 
JUst park the kid and go 0££ somewhere" <g!B, 14:3:59). 
Representative Je££ords supported the House Democrats 
on the supportive services issue: "The Administration 
says it wants to make AFDC recipients a prime £ocus of the 
bill, but you'll wind up discriminating against them" by 
including supportive services in the 30 per cent cap <~TB, 
14:3:PS9>. 
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With the deadline of adJournaent <and the election 
campaign> drawing near, the breakthrough in negotiationa 
came on September 22. The conference coamittee agreed on 
the division of training ~~~!Y! administrative costs, and 
settled the size of the SDAs. The committee recessed 
while Republican members met with President Reagan, 
Presidential Assistant James Baker, and David Stockman, 
the director 0£ the Off ice of Management and Budget, and 
got their approval of the compromise. 
On the issue 0£ the service delivery system, 
governors would divide the entire state up into SDAs. 
Single political Jurisdictions with populations of at 
least 200,000 could opt out pf the governor's plan and be 
aade independent SDAs. The local government's decision to 
opt out would not require concurrence from the PIC. The 
transition to the new systea must be made by FY84, aaking 
FY83 a transition year, in which CETA would be extended 
while planning for JTPA took place. 
Local governments and PICs would remain distinct 
entities under JTPA, but they aust reach agreement on 
procedures for developing a plan, on the plan itself, and 
on the selection 0£ a grant recipient to administer the 
programs. The PIC, the local government, or some 
combination 0£ the two could perform any 0£ these roles, 
402 
thus providing for local contro~ and local diversity. 
Here, the conferees agreed not to decide, but passed the 
problea down the line to the Department of Labor, which 
would £ormulate the regulations for JTPA. PIC members 
would be appointed by the local government from 
nominations made by relevant groups Cnot Just chosen by 
the chief elected official>, and a ma3ority of the PIC 
members would have to represent private business. 
If local government and the PIC found it impossible 
to agree, the governor could merge the SDA into a larger 
one or split it into smaller ones. There would be no 
appeal to the Secretary of Labor. 
Local plans aust be approved by the governor, but he 
or she would have only what a staff member called 
"disapproval authority;" that is, a governor would be 
required to approve a plan unless it failed to meet 
criteria specified in the law; the governor would not be 
able to change elements in a plan or diapprove a plan 
because he or she did not like the program elements <~!B, 
14:4:81>. 
As the Administration had insisted, the compromise 
required that 70 per cent of funds be spent on training 
activities, but the prohibition on wages and stipends was 
dropped. Training was defined to include half the coat of 
403 
work experience prograaa <the wage elementa of work 
experience programs were excluded £rom allowable training 
costs), as well as all the cost of youth try-out 
employ•ent, with some specified restrictions. 
In the 30 per cent of funds allotted to non-training 
costs, administrative expenses could not exceed 15 per 
cent. Thus, supportive services could not exceed 15 per 
cent, including childcare and transportation expenditures. 
This provision was softened by allowing waivers on 
administrative and support service costs, if requested by 
the PIC and approved by the governor. A waiver would be 
possible only i£ one 0£ the following conditions was met: 
1. The SDA had higher than average unemployment. 
2. The SDA provided services to a disproportionately high 
number of trainees, such as the handic~pped, who 
required exceptional support services. 
3. If the costs of transportation or childcare 
con~tituted a disproportionate share 0£ all supportive 
services. 
4. If the SDA enrolled a disproportionately high nuaber 
of trainees in long-term training. 
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Funds would go:£roa the Secretary of Labor to the 
governors, who must autoaatically pass it through, 
according to a aubstate allocation formulation based on 
unemployment and income. Displaced worker program funds 
would be allocated according to a separate foraula. 
The con£erence bill provided £or a permanent 
authorization, to provide more stability in the program 
and reflect the belief that JOb training should be an 
on-going national responsibility <~!B, 14:4:82). FY83 
funding was still not settled, and would not be until the 
Congress and the President reached agreement over the 
entire budget. 
Once the compromise was approved, and despite what 
Senator Hatch, who had begun the legislative process aa 
the Adainistration's chief Congressional spokesaan, now 
called the stubborn intransigeance 0£ the Administration 
during bargaining, President Reagan enthusiastically 
endorsed the £inal coapromise on JTPA, releasing a 
stateaent on September 23 that accused Congress 0£ 
dragging their £eet in passing the bill. He said the act 
would "chart a new course £or JOb training in Aaerica, 
providing real hope by serving as a hand up, rather than a 
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hand out, to our diaadvantaged citi%ens'' <EIB, 14:4:82>. 
In a rather ironic turn of events, the rapidly rising 
uneaployaent rate <up to 10 per cent in September, 1982> 
had aade 3TPA a politically popular program; by trying to 
capture credit for the passage of 3TPA, President Reagan 
attempted to give the impression that his Administration 
was responding to increasing unemployaent, despite the 
long-standing insistence of the Adainistration that JTPA 
be purely a training bill, and not a Jobs bill. At a 
press conference two days before JTPA was scheduled for 
final Congressional passage, President Reagan accused 
Congressional Democrats 0£ stalling on passage of the act 
<Washington f2!~, 9/29/82) •. 
The President charged that during the past seven yeas 
$66 billion had been spent on "Job programs supposed to 
solve that problea Cof unemployaentl without success." 
Later, an official of the Office of Management and Budget 
indicated that the $66 billion figure included all 
employment training programs, JOb development programs, 
and JOb creation eleaents 0£ local public works and 
economic development programs. The total for CETA alone 
approximated S56 billion <EIB, 14:5:123>. Reagan asserted 
that JTPA, along with other legislation supported by the 
Adainistration, "has pulled America back from the brink of 
406 
disaster•" and that his critics were "aodern day Rip Van 
Winkles Cwhol pretend all problems began on January 21, 
1981," Reagan's £irst day in o££ice <Washington E9!~, 
9/29/82>. 
Final passage of JTPA took place in the Senate and 
House on September 30 and October 1, respectively. Both 
Democrats and Republicans who had been the principal 
sponsors 0£ the act showed irritation at President 
Reagan's last-ainute embrace 0£ the measure. Senator 
Kennedy stated 
I'• pleased to £inally have the President's 
support £or this JOb training bill. But I would 
challenge the President's claim that Congress has 
dragged its £eet on Job training. The record 
clearly shows that the Administration slowed this 
legislation down a number 0£ times by forcing 
cancellation 0£ key hearings and markups. • •• I 
can remember very well a little over a year ago 
when the Administration decided to abandon the 
whole concept 0£ youth training CQ9ng~ B~£·, 
9/30/82:S12713-4). 
Senator Kennedy was aore inclined to give credit to 
the e££orts 0£ Senator Quayle: 
This legislation would not be be£ore the Senate 1£ 
it had not been £or the e££orts and energies of 
the Senator £roa Indiana CQuaylel. The 
Administration was strongly opposed to this type 
0£ a program and resisted the e££orts that had 
been developed in the committee to move this whole 
process £orward in a ti•ely £ashion. cgg~g~ B!£·, 
9/30/82:S12713). 
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Senator Quayle hiaaelf, while not criticizing the 
President by name, also underscored the bipartisan nature 
0£ the £inal compromise. Only Senator Hatch thanked 
Administration o££icials, who he said had participated in 
developing the £our "iaportant concepts we have 
incorporated into this bill." The £our concepts Hatch 
thought important were first, setting priorities £or 
expenditures <the 70130 split 0£ training and 
administrative £unds>; second, the PIC/local governaent 
partnership; third, the establishment 0£ evaluation 
per£ormance standards; and fourth, the strengthening 0£ 
the role 0£ the states cggng~ B~£·• 9/30/82:512718>. 
Speaker of the House Thomas O'Neill CD-Mass.> took 
the unusual step 0£ inviting members 0£ the press into his 
office while he signed the JTPA bill before sending it to 
the President. Speaker O'Neill said he was concerned that 
credit £or passage 0£ JTPA go to the proper persons. He 
said the training bill was originated in the House "by 
Congressman Gus Hawkins 0£ California--a man who has 
devoted his career to promoting full e•ployment in our 
country... J'TPA passed the Senate "because of the hard 
work 0£ Senator Kennedy and because Senator Dan Quayle, a 
Republican, was willing to stand up to Administration 
obJections and write an adequate training bill" <EIB, 
14:6:137>. O'Neill emphasized that J'TPA was a training 
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bill, not a Jobs bill, and that consequently other 
aeasures were needed to attack unemployment. 
President Reagan signed JTPA on October 13, making 
the bill Public Law 97-300. Most unusually, he did not 
invite the bill's principal Congressional backers to 
attend the signing ceremony, instead surrounding hiasel£ 
with participants and graduates of current Job training 
programs. Once again, the President characterized the 
bill as a response to high unemployment, and pledged that 
"I am not going to rest until every American who wants a 
Job can £ind a JOb. 11 Yet, the President emphasized that 
those Jobs aust come £rom the private sector, and praised 
JTPA £or ending the public.service employment program; 
unlike CETA, JTPA was "not another make-work, dead-end 
bureaucratic boondoggle; ••• we are elimating the 
bureaucratic and administrative waste that has marked many 
so-called Jobs bills in the past" <~!B, 14:7:157-158). 
The Administration, which had originally opposed any 
training bill, was now pleased to take credit £or JTPA's 
development and passage, and President Reagan 
characteristically chose to sacr1£ice accuracy in £avor 0£ 




"We reached those last days when we could endure 
neither our vices nor their remedies." 
--Titus Livy, on the decline 0£ Rome. 
The end 0£ the employment training bill#a legislative 
Journey was £ar less stormy· than its beginning had been; 
JTPA passed the Senate by a vote 0£ 95 to 0 on September 
30, and the House by 339 to 12 on October 1, 1982. Before 
considering the reasons for this near-unanimity, and the 
lessons to be learned from the entire reauthorization 
process. we should review the basics of JTPA in its final 
£orm. 
JTPA was given a permanent authorization of "such 
sums as are necessary." except that S618 •illion was 
apecif ically authorized £or the Job Corps in FY83: this 
reflected both Congressi9nal parties' consensus on the 
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worth 0£ the Job Corps, in the £ace 0£ attempted cuts by 
the Administration. Although a final compromise on the 
total level 0£ funding was not reached before passage, it 
was understood that the level would be approximately the 
same as £or the preceding year 0£ CETA; this result could 
be termed a compromise, but only when measured against the 
victories already won by the Reagan Administration, which 
had cut £unding £or the last year 0£ CETA <FY82> by almost 
two-thirds. The low funding £igure, along with the 
Administration's assumptions about how many training slots 
could be provided given that £unding, virtually assured 
that 3TPA must concentrate on short-term training £or 
less-skilled Jobs, regardless 0£ the training provisions 
of the Act. The appropriation would be a Procrustean bed 
upon which the other provisions 0£ the Act Must be aade to 
£it. 
CETA was extended through FY83 to provide time £or a 
transition to JTPA. Funding would be on a one-year basis, 
despite the many requests £roa program operators £or 
two-year planning and funding cycles. The annual budget 
cycle was too entrenched as a Congressional institution to 
change for the sake 0£ better program planning. 
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Funds would be allotted to states by a £oraula, 
one-third on the basis of substantial unemployment <areas 
above 6.5 per cent>, one-third on the basis 0£ excess 
unemployment Careas above 4.5 per cent> and one-third on 
the basis 0£ the number of economically disadvantaged 
persons. Within states, funds would be allocated to 
service delivery areas on the same basis. 
The governor was given the power to designate service 
delivery areas within the state. Areas were automatically 
entitled to designation 1£ they met one of two criteria: 
1> units of local government with a population 0£ 200,000 
or more; 2> consortia of contiguous units 0£ local 
government with an aggregate population of 200,000 or 
more. 
The chief elected of£icial or officials in each 
service delivery area were given the power to select the 
aembers 0£ the Private Industry Council <PIC>. The 
maJority of the PIC must consist of representatives of 
business and industry in the area, and the Chairperson of 
the PIC must be a business representative. The PIC aust 
also have representativ~s £ram education, labor, community 
based organizations, rehabilitation agencies, economic 
development agencies, and the public employment service. 
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The PIC and local government must reach agreeement on 
how the local Job training plan would be developed, who 
would administer the program, and on grant recipient 
organizations £or local Job training £unds. The grant 
recipient and the administrative agency may by the same or 
di££erent agencies (£or example, the grantee could be a 
city, with the administrative agency a city department or 
non-pro£it agency>. The plan should be Jointly approved 
by the PIC and the local government; i£ agreement is not 
possible, the governor is empowered to merge the SDA into 
a larger one, or split it into smaller ones. 
The governor may disapprove a local Job training plan 
only 1£ it is not in compliance with a speci£ic provision 
0£ the Act, or 0£ Department 0£ Labor regulations, or with 
the state's coordination criteria. The coordination 
criteria aay not limit.local discretion in the selection 
0£ service providers or eligible participants. The 
governor's disapproval is subJect to appeal to the 
Secretary of Labor. 
Once the plan is approved and in operation, the PIC's 
oversight responsibility, defined as "review, evaluation, 
and monitoring," is not subJect to agreement with the 
local government. However, the PIC does not have the 
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right to terminate contracts or take other administrative 
actions; only the grantee aay do that. 
Governors have the responsibility to monitor local 
program compliance with the Act. The governor may issue a 
notice 0£ intent to revoke approval of part or all 0£ a 
plan if it is not in compliance; this may also be 
appealed to the Secretary 0£ Labor. 
The Secretary 0£ Labor aust establish performance 
standards £or local programs, based on increased 
employment and earnings 0£ participants and reductions in 
welfare dependency. The governors may vary the standards 
within parameters established by the Secretary. I£ a 
local program £ails to meet its per£ormance standards £or 
two years, the governor may impose a reorganization plan, 
possibly including the selection 0£ an alternate entity to 
administer the program for the service delivery area. 
A broad range of training activities was authorized, 
including two-tier training as recommended by the Jeffords 
bill. At least 40 per cent 0£ funds, adJusted according 
to the proportion 0£ youth in the eligible population, 
aust be spend on youth. A separate section authorized 
summer youth employment training programs. 
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Eligibility criteria were established such that 90 
per cent of the participants must be economically· 
disadvantaged; up to 10 per cent 0£ participants aay not 
be disadvantaged if they have other barriers to employaent 
<teenage parents, offenders, displaced homemakers, etc.>. 
Eligible youth must be aged 16-21, except that youth aged 
14 or 15 may be served in summer youth programs. 
A dislocated workers program was authorized, 
including JOb search assistance, retraining, relocation 
assistance, and supportive services. Funds under this 
program must be matched with non-federal funds, although 
the matching requirement may be ad3usted downward in 
accordance with the state's rate of unemployment relative 
to the national unemployment rate. Displaced worker 
programs were to be run by the state, but local PICa and 
governments were guaranteed the right 0£ review, and 
affected labor organizations aust be consulted. 
The Job Corps was retained from CETA, essentially 
unchanged. Siailarly, authority £or nationally-run 
programs for Native Americans and migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers was retained with minimal change. Five per 
cent of· national program funds were authorized for 
veterans programs, multi-state programs, research and 
demonstration, pilot proJects, evaluation, and labor 
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market information. The National Commission £or 
E•ployaent Policy was reconstituted as a non-governaental 
commission, £ollowing the recommendations 0£ the Hawkins 
bill. That is, as 0£ October 1, 1983, the £ive Federal 
agency heads would be replaced by public members, 
appointed by the President. 
Seventy per cent of program £unds must be spent on 
training; within the 70 per cent may be included 50 per 
cent 0£ the cost 0£ work experience and try-out employment 
£or youth. Not more than £i£teen per cent 0£ £unds can be 
spent on administration, and not more than fi£teen percent 
may be spent £or the cost 0£ supportive services, 
allowances, or wages not included in the seventy per cent 
category. 
The governor must waive the fifteen per cent 
limitation on nonadministrative costs if the PIC requests 
and JUsti£ies it, and i£ one 0£ £ive conditions is met: 
1> une•ployment is three per cent higher than the national 
average in the service delivery area; 2> the plan will 
serve a disproportionately high number 0£ participants in 
need 0£ supportive services; 3) the cost 0£ providing 
child care services will exceed one-half of the fifteen 
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per cent liait; 4> the cost 0£ providing transportation 
will ~xceed one-third 0£ the £!£teen per cent liait; 5> a 
substantial portion 0£ participants are in training 
prograas 0£ nine months duration or more <E!B, 
14:5:125-6>. 
In Chapter Two, we reviewed Davidson's (1974> 
findings on the identity, structure and operation 0£ the 
employment training subgovernment in 1969-72~ We aay now 
compare those findings with the situation in 1980-82. 
Despite the early support of the Reagan 
Administration for a radical rewriting, or.even the 
abolition, of federal employment training policy, the 
development 0£ JTPA revealed more similarities than 
contrasts with the development 0£ earlier employment 
training legislation. Davidson traced the development, 
passage, and subsequent veto 0£ the Eaployaent and 
Manpower Act 0£ 1970, CETA's precursor. There were aany 
parallels in the political processes 0£ the 1969-70 period 
and the 1981-82 period. In 1970, the employment training 
subgovernment, which had been built up during the 1960s 
and had enJoyed a high degree 0£ consensus with successive 
Democratic Administrations, was strongly challenged by two 
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£orces. First, the Nixon Administration proposed a 
radical revision in the structure 0£ employment training 
programs, replacing the Federally-managed MOTA system with 
special revenue-sharing block grants. "Categorical 
interest groups, and those who look to the Federal 
government £or support against states end cities, viewed 
such proposals with horro~" <Davidson, 1974:105). During 
a long legislative struggle, the employment training 
subgovernment managed to e££ect a compromise with the 
Administration on issues 0£ program management, through a 
process similar to that which occurred in 1981-82. 
However, the subgovernment's legislation passed the 
Congress only to be vetoed by President Nixon, and 
the £inal irritant that shattered the manpower 
coalition was the ideological struggle over public 
sector JOb creation £or the disadvantaged. Here 
was e class issue that had divided liberals and 
conservatives since the days of the New Deal and 
that evoked emotional reactions on both sides 0£ 
the £ence. The period during end Just following 
World War II was one 0£ relative quiet, but such 
class-based issues were fully revived by the 
1970-1971 recessionary period <Davidson, 
1974:104). 
The parallels are striking. In 1981, as in 1970, the 
employment training subgovernment was challenged by the 
Adainistration's desire to pass control 0£ the program 
£rom the Department 0£ Labor to the states, but through 
strenuous ef£ort the subgovernment was able to win 
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compromises that protected aome 0£ the authority of its 
constituent organizations. In 1981, as in 1970, the 
subgovernment's compromise was threatened by a more 
general, more sharply ideological issue--in the case of 
JTPA, the commitment 0£ the Administration to cut social 
spending in general. In the more conservative climate 0£ 
1981-82, public service employment could not pass the 
Congress. The result in 1982 was not a veto, but a 
funding cutback that threatened the impact 0£ the program, 
while leaving the employment training system with an 
administrative structure mismatched with the amount 0£ 
£unding it had to administer. In 1982, as in 1970, the 
Administration clashed with the subgovernment, and 
successfully used issue-expansion tactics to win some 0£ 
its goals. 
How does the identity of aubgovernment actors compare 
to those £ound by Davidson in 1969-72? The groups 
represented in the subgovernment are almost identical, 
although they are represented by di££erent individuals. 
Tracing.the identity 0£ subgovernment actors £rom the days 
of MOTA CMangua, 1968> through the development of CETA 
<Davidson, 1974; Kolberg, 1978> to the inauguration 0£ 
JTPA, subgovernment membership is characterized by 
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stability. 
The Federal Department 0£ Labor top bureaucracy, 
state, county, and local political leaders and their trade 
associations, business groups, program administrators, 
community-based organizations, labor unions, policy 
pro£essionals, the NCEP--once inside the subgovernment, 
they reaained members. While the players have remained 
the saae, however, patterns 0£ relative influence have 
shifted over tiae, as we shall review shortly. 
From his study of the 1970 legislative experience, 
Davidson drew three conclusions about the leading 
characteristics of subgovernments <1974:105-6). The first 
was that subgovernments are characterized by internal 
complexity. The employment training subgovernment 
embraces a variety of agencies and interest groups, but 
only occasionally includes potential clients. Once 
launched, programs generate very strong pressures for 
their continuation, although members of the subgovernaent 
attempt to aodify the program to suit their own interests. 
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Internal complexity has lessened somewhat. 
Successive efforts have lessened Federal control and 
distributed more power to state and local governments, 
giving local program operators much wider discretionary 
powers within outcome-oriented per£ormance standards. 
Nevertheless, the simpli£1cation process has only 
proceeded a short distance; attempts by local governments 
to grab power through "siaplif ication" were opposed by 
progra• operators, including business, community-based 
organizations, and labor, all 0£ whom wanted Federal 
statutory or regulatory protection 0£ their interests. 
Thus, in various ways employment training programs have 
continued to generate "virtually irresistible pressures 
£or their perpetuation" <Davidson, 1974:105>. 
Second, Davidson £ound that the administrative 
components 0£ the employment training subgovernment were 
vertically integrated, rather than horizontally 
coordinated. That is, authority £lowed £rom localities up 
to the Department 0£ Labor and back, with little 
cooperation among localities or within states. This 
condition was recognized as a problem and speci£ically 
addressed during the 1981-1982 debates, and the provisions 
0£ JTPA atrengthening the governor's role constituted a 
comproaise designed to increase horizontal coordination. 
It is too soon to tell whether the new provisions will be 
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e££ective, however, and a aubatantial aaount 0£ vertical 
integration waa maintained through proviaiona £or 
perf oraance standards and oversight by the Department 0£ 
Labor. 
Third, Davidson found that subgovernments are 
functionally autonomous--that is, employment training 
policy is formulated and implemented with scant attention 
£roa actors in other subsystems, from clients, or £rom the 
public at large. ''As a result 0£ their relative autonomy, 
subgovernaents are highly resistant to change" <Davidson, 
1974:106). 
Functional autonomy continued unchanged, as those 
outside the subgovernaent had very little influence over 
its operations. The impetus £or change came fro• within, 
in that the Administration members of the subgovernment 
were the main source of new influence, and their influence 
was primarily to press for less employment training in 
order to meet aore general goals. and secondarily to 
change the content 0£ employment training programs. 
S~ability 0£ subgovernment membership, as in the case 
0£ the employaent training subgovernment, implies that 
aeabership in the subgovernaent is difficult to achieve, 
and this haa in fact been the case. New members were 
admitted to the aubgovernment as a result 0£ changes in 
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the law giving new group• a piece of the action. During 
the aevelopaent 0£ JTPA, no new interest group• achieved 
aubgovernment atatua; the surprising £act is that no 
aubgovernment aembers completely lost influence, either, 
even the apparently ill-fated national contractors. The 
relative influence of groups within the subgovernaent has 
changed over tiae, however. 
We were concerned with the means by which policy 
preferences reach the foraal agenda in employaent training 
policy asking, and our finding is simple: the only way to 
place a policy preference on the formal agenda was by 
gaining access to the subgovernment. Policy preferences 
that lacked sponsorship within the subgovernaent were not 
seriously considered. The implications of this finding as 
they relate to the debate between elite and pluralist 
theorists will be considered later in this chapter. 
Cobb and Elder's ideas relating the size of the 
audience to a place on the <systemic> agenda <1983:110>, 
while not £oraulated with regard to the foraal agenda, 
proved to have an interesting application to the policy 
making process within the subgovernment. We expect 
distributive policy asking within the subgovernaent to be 
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increaental and aarked by low viaibility--that ia, without 
issue expansion to a larger audience. Whan £rustrated 
within the employment training subgovernaent, the Reagan 
Administration threatened or actually employed issue 
expansion tactics to increase its intrasubgovernaent 
influence. The Administration appealed to a wider 
audience <chiefly Congressmen outside the subgovernment> 
by rede£ining the issues to be aore ambiguous, aore 
socially significant, less technical, and in the context 
of the Administration's own most general political values; 
the process conf iras the hypotheses about issue expansion 
discussed on pages 29 and 30 above <Cobb and Elder, 
1983:112-124). 
The subgovernment used several means to liait the 
formal agenda and issue expansion. Some groups outside 
the subgovernment, whose policy preferences were not 
included in the bills that received serious consideration, 
were given the syabolic reward of the opportunity to 
testify at Congressional hearings. At the next level of 
reJection, policy preferences were introduced in bills 
that did not receive auch serious consideration <for 
example, Representative Roukema'a bill>. E££orts to 
consolidate employment training programs with the 
Employaent Service and vocational education programs had 
to be abandoned due to subgovernment competition, and 
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vague promises were •ade to include such proviaiona in: 
£ollow-up legialation. When Senator Quayle divided his 
original proposals into three bills, those interest groups 
whose policy preferences were le£t out of the £irst <and 
only co-sponsored) bill knew that actual support £or their 
proposals had been replaced by largely symbolic support. 
Employment training issues only rarely reached the 
attentive public outside the government, through newspaper 
and magazine articles in such Journals as the ~!~ Xe~~ 
!!!!!, ~!!h!ng~en ~2!~, and ~~!!n!~! ~!!~· Expansion 0£ 
the issues to the attentive public almost always had 
negative consequences for the employment training 
subgovernment, since the stories either do~umented charges 
0£ waste and £raud Cchie£ly in the case 0£ public service 
employaent) or aired the views 0£ the Administration while 
it tried to cut services. Issue-expansion to the 
attentive public was successfully employed by the 
Administration through its appeals to a •ore ambiguous set 
0£ values (budget cutting, "new Federalism">, con£iraing 
the hypothesis 0£ Cobb and Elder <1983:112-22>. 
The ability to widen the policy conflict if necessary 
can be taken as one 0£ the defining characteristics 0£ 
"clout," as it is popularly known in Washington. Like 
other types 0£ power, issue expanson clout usually need 
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not be employed, aa long as its potential use ia 
understood by other policy actors. 
The constant in the influence equation is the 
Congress. The Congressional subgovernment aembers, vested 
with formal control over program design and funding, have 
always played the role of balancing other interests; they 
have not been the captive of any one policy group. During 
the life of the employment training subgovernment, the 
relationship between Congressional subgovernment members 
and the Administration has waxed and waned; although 
Democratic adainistrations have been on the whole more 
supportive of eaployment training programs, the 
correlation is far froa perfect. After their attempt to 
limit employaent training programs and incorporate then 
into block grants failed <despite a Presidential veto>, 
the Nixon Administration and. later. the Ford 
Administration, accepted the continuation and expansion of 
employment training programs; the Carter Administration, 
after presiding over the largest expansion of employaent 
training programs, was in its final year severely split, 
with great pressure froa the fiscal policy subgovernaent 
to liait the growth in spending on employment training 
programs. Even when opposed to legislation to the point 
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of aaploying a veto, Adainistration actora·have not been 
able to dictate the apec1£ics 0£ eaployment training 
policy against the wishes of other subgovernment members. 
The influence 0£ business aeabers of the 
subgovernment has increased through the years, with 
notable advances during Republican administrations. The 
influence 0£ program client representatives, chiefly the 
community-based organizations and labor unions, was 
greater during Democratic administrations, reaching its 
height during the Carter Administration, when Ernest Green 
left his community-based organization to be the Assistant 
Secretary 0£ Labor in charge of the Employment and 
Training Administration. Community-based ~rganizations 
and organized labor suffered the greatest decline in 
subgovernment influence during the design of JTPA, when 
their political stocks were low. 
The clash between levels of governaent has been 
another perennial feature of employment training policy 
aaking. MDTA began with direct contracts between the 
Departaent 0£ Labor and program operators, usually cities 
or coaaunity-based organizations. Since then, states have 
continually attempted to get a larger piece 0£ the action, 
usually in league with Republican administrations, since a 
larger proportion of states than cities have been 
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controlled by Republicans during the last two decades. In 
1981~82, supported by the Administration, states aucceeded 
in gaining more control over the employment training 
program structure, although with many quali£ications, and 
while the powers 0£ the larger cities were protected. 
Governors also received a piece 0£ the JTPA action 
independent 0£ their authority over local programs. They 
were given the responsibility to develop a two-year plan 
for coordinating employaent training programs with other 
state programs, and given funds to provide special 
services £or specified groups. There were specific 
setasides 0£ money for workers aged 55 and older, £or 
Joint education proJects--designed to facilitate 
coordination between the employment training system and 
the educational systea--and for incentive grants to 
service delivery areas that exceeded performance 
standards, or that of£ered activities to hard-to-serve 
individuals. Money was also reserved for auditing and 
administrative expenses. 
Senate Republicans, aided by business members of the 
subgovernment, were successful in giving more planning and 
adainistrative power to the private sector, through the 
Private Industry Council CPIC>. JTPA required that a 
•aJority of the PIC be owners or chief executive officers 
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of businesses. Democrats aucce-eded in retaining 
requireaenta that other segments of the employment 
training aubgovernment, especially community-based 
organizations and labor, also be represented on the PIC. 
In terms 0£ the future structure of employment 
training programs at the local level, the relationship 
between the new Private Industry Councils <PICs> and local 
elected officials is JTPA's greatest innovation. To 
ensure business control of the PIC <and encourage its 
independence from local government>, Congress required 
that business representatives aust be nominated by general 
purpose business organizations (in practice, almost always 
the Chamber 0£ Commerce>. Although the Ch~mber.0£ 
Commerce must make noainations totalling at least 150 per 
cent 0£ the number 0£ available PIC positions, PIC members 
should "reasonably represent" the industrial and 
demographic composition 0£ the business community, and 
half the members should represent small business. These 
requireaents, designed to balance the right 0£ business to 
be represented with the right 0£ local o££icials to make 
their own appointments, are examples of how interest-group 
politics in ·washington result in the re-attaching 0£ 
strings to supposedly decentralized programs. In this 
case, it was business groups~ purportedly the champions of 
decentralization, who inserted provisions protecting their 
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intereata £rom local e1a·cted of£ icials. 
The Adminiatration was relatively ineffective in 
intrasubgovernment negotiations. The Congressional 
aembers 0£ the subgovernment prevailed over the 
Administration members in many instances, especially when 
dealing with speci£ic program details. After coming late 
into the £ield with its own recommendations, the 
Administration frequently changed its positions on issues; 
finally, the Administration~s subgovernment 
representatives, new to the policy issues of the 
employaent training establishment, had relatively little 
credibility as experts. The Administration introduced no 
new ideas into the policy process; "new Federalism" and 
block grants were retread proposals from the Nixon 
Administration, while the emphasis on the strict targeting 
of participants was begun by the Carter Labor Department. 
The nearest thing to a new employment training idea, the 
enterprize zone proposal <which had no training component 
at all>, £ailed to gain subcommittee passage during the 
first Reagan Administration. Consequently, the 
Administration £ailed to make radical changes in the 
structure of employment training policy, as it had 
promised during the Presidential campaign and in its early 
days. Even within the aubgovernment, the Administration 
gained most of its victories through the threat of issue 
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expansion. 
The Adainistration's great strength was that, unlike 
other subgovernment actors, it was con£ident of its 
ability to use issue expansion tactics. To the 
Administration, the key issues were funding, state 
control, and stipends, and it was in the Administration~s 
interest that decisions on these issues not be reached 
within the subgovern•ent. In this they were success£ul. 
On the £unding issue, the Administration was able to 
negotiate relatively low upper limits in the range 0£ 
£unding options considered within the subgovernment; then 
they were able to block resolution 0£ the issue within the 
employment training subgovernment and trans£er the issue 
to the Budget Comaittees, which were less committed to 
making employment training programs work. 
Policy pro£essionals had considerable influence, 
particularly on the aore technical provisions of JTPA. 
The National Commission £or Employment Policy, at least in 
the period before a Reagan appointees constituted a 
•aJority, continued in its role as a key member 0£ the 
employment training subgovernment, and helped the 
Congressional forces who wanted to preserve employment 
training programs. For example, the NCEP's identi£ication 
0£ the groups aost in need 0£ employment training services 
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was adopted by the Congress, although NCEP'a analysis of 
the·~ize of the needy population had little effect in the 
face of the higher political goal 0£ budget-cutting. The 
NCEP's sponsorship 0£ reports and conferences provided 
£orums for employment training pro£essionala where the 
respectful attention of Congressional policy makers was 
assured. The NCEP had little influence on issues 0£ 
prograa control and £unding during 1981 and 1982, but its 
1981 R~2Q£~ did play a key role in providing a definition 
0£ the issues in a fora that Republican supporter of 
employment training programs could adopt. 
President Reagan's appointees to the NCEP did not 
have an important influence on the development 0£ JTPA. 
Whether this was because they were appointed a£ter the 
legislative process was well under way in 1981, or because 
they were unable to formulate a policy with the 
cooperation 0£ the Administration, is impossible to say 
with certainty; probably both £actors were important, 
along with the £act that the new appointees, at least 
initially, were relatively unfamiliar with the issues and 
had few connections with other members of the employment 
training subgovernaent. 
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I~ summary, this study con£irms the hypothesis that 
the ~ore technical the issue, the more in£luential the 
policy pro£essional will be. Conversely, the more 
ambiguous, symbolic, and politically sensitive the issue, 
the less in£luential the policy pro£essional, will be. 
Also, the in£luence 0£ the policy pro£essional will be in 
inverse proportion to the size 0£ the audience; issue 
expansion is a process that works to the detriment 0£ 
technical in£luence. 
The JTPA authorization process con£irmed Cobb and 
Elder's <1983) conceptualization 0£ policy making as a set 
0£ successively narrowing boundaries, in which the range 
0£ issues and decisional alternatives is progressively 
restricted. Access to the £ormal agenda Cthe bills 
seriously considered by the subcommittees> was entirely 
con£ined to members 0£ the employment training 
subgovernment, despite a hearings process designed to give 
the impression 0£ wider participation. The 
issue-expansion tactics described by Cobb and Elder were 
also used with e££ect by the Administration during the 
JTPA process, although perhaps not in exactly the way Cobb 
and Elder envisioned. Using jts presumed electoral 
mandate to cut Federal spending, the Administration made 
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its appeal not, to the general public, but to aembera 0£ 
Congress outside the employment training subgovernment, in 
order to impose a higher-level political priority on the 
subgovernaent's work. 
The typology 0£ policies developed by Ripley and 
Franklin (1980; 1984>, although explicitly designed to 
consider intragovernmental policy struggles, prove equally 
use£ul when the conceptualization 0£ the policy making 
process is expanded to include private sector inputs--that 
is, when private sector representatives are included in 
the subgovernment. Ripley and Franklin's distinctions 
between distributional and redistributional policies, and 
the relationships between key government actors in aaking 
distributional and redistributional policies, are 
supported by this study. Distributional policies, when 
considered within the context 0£ subgovernaent operation•, 
were settled by incremental negotiation within the 
eubgovernment, as Ripley and Franklin predicted, while 
redistributional policy con£licts were rede£ined as 
distributive or settled through conflict between the 
subgovernment and the Executive. Redistributive policies 
£ailed to be enacted due to lack 0£ Executive support, 
also as Ripley and Franklin would have predicted. 
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During JTPA development, the priaary focus of policy 
making controversy was on distributive issues, and 
incremental compromise was the pattern for conflict 
resolution. The lessened influence 0£ groups representing 
prograa clients eased the process 0£ rede£ining 
redistributive issues as distributive ones--for example, 
while CETA paid stipends directly to program participants, 
JTPA encourages subsidies to businesses, in the form 0£ 
reimbursement £or wages paid under "try-out eJnployllent" 
schemes. Ironically, the same Republicans who criticized 
public service employment £or "substitution 0£ e££ort 0 
<replacing local £unda with Federal funds without 
increasing the nuJnber employed, discussed in Chapter 
Three) pushed £or try-out employment, which was 
substitution 0£ e££ort in the private sector. 
Only one redistributive issue, that 0£ stipends, 
remained unsettled until the very end 0£ negotiations, and 
it was on this issue that conservative Republicans, 
supported by the Administration, were most successful, 
virtually eliminating stipends £roa the program <one 
"insider" who read an earlier draft 0£ this study told Ile 
that Assistant Secretary Angrissni was never disabused 0£ 
his belief that all those who would be eligible £or 
employaent training services ~ere already on welfare, and 
so needed no further stipends>. Even on the stipend 
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issue, the Administration did not win a coaplete victory. 
Althdugh it was able to limit funding to a level that aade 
the provision of atipends highly unlikely, it could not 
force the adoption of language prohibiting auch payaents. 
As expected, then, the central redistributive issue 
was marked by a relatively high level 0£ visibility and 
conflict, and a hardening of ideological positions <Ripley 
and Franklin, 1984:27>. The executive branch played a 
relatively important role in resolving the conflict 
<through direct negotiations with the conference 
committee>, the conflict was resolved at a higher level 
than the subgovernaent, and there was an attempt to 
redefine the issue in distributive terms <Ripley and 
Franklin, 1984:100>. 
The stipend issue also provides a good illustration 
of the value of symbol aanipulation and issue 
redefinition. In the Carter Administration, CETA prograas 
were considered as auch eaployaent programs as training 
programs; those who were employed by the government, 
whether directly through public service employment or 
indirectly through CETA funding, aust be paid, and CETA 
required ·that participant• be paid at least the ainiaua 
wage. The Reagan Adainistration attempted to redefine 
eaployaent training programs purely as training prograas, 
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and atipends as wel£are paymenta. The position 0£ the 
Reagan Adainistration was therefore sel£-de£ined as 
pro-training and anti-wel£are. The Reagan 
Administration's redefinition 0£ the stipend issue waa 
quite e££ective, especially with larger publics not 
intimately familiar with the history 0£ employaent 
training legislation. 
Siailarly, the Reagan Administration showed 
considerable skill at symbol aanipulation <undoubtedly 
President Reagan's greatest talent>. The importance of 
symbol manipulation is directly proportional to the 
ambiguity 0£ the issues and the size 0£ the public. In 
lobbying aembers 0£ Congress outside the subgovernaent, 
and in all presentations to wider publics, the 
Adainistration stressed its guiding symbols: budget 
balancing <in the early days>, cutting social spending, 
"new Federalisa, 11 and opposing "wel£are handouts." The 
publicity caapaign against public service employaent had 
coapletely destroyed the utility 0£ employment creation as 
a positive symbol in employment training policy. 
Simila~ly, the attempt to expand the issue 0£ the plight 
0£ the displaced worker to the general public £ailed to 
strike a responsive chord in competition with 
Adainiatration ayabols. 
437 
Issue entrepreneurs played an iaportant role in the 
developaent of JTPA. When applying Eyestone's issue 
entrepreneur concept to subgovernment policy asking, our 
most iaportant discovery was that issue entrepreneurship 
was associated with holding an important structural 
position within the subgovernment. Before the formal 
agenda £or JTPA was set, the most prominent issue 
entrepreneur was William Kolberg, the president 0£ the 
National Alliance 0£ Business and chief business spokesaan 
0£ the employment training subgovernaent; his suggestions 
about privatizing employment training programs received · 
widespread and respectful attention. During legislative 
consideration 0£ JTPA, the issue entrepreneurs were the 
subcommittee chairmen and minority leaders, 
Representatives Hawkins and Jeffords and Senators Quayle 
and Kennedy. During the crucial conference committee 
negotiations, Senator Hatch, chairman of the Education and 
Labor Committee, becaae the key figure mediating the 
demands 0£ the conference committee and the 
Administration. 
Besides playing the role of issue entrepreneur within 
the subgovernaent, the eaployaent training subcommittee 
and comaittee leaders were also the spokesmen for the 
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subgovernaent to the rest of the Congress. Senate 
Reptiblicans, placed in a position of leadership by their 
newly-won aa3ority status, had to take the leaderhip role 
in developing an alternative to CETA. Their role gained 
added iaportance when the Administration delayed the 
appointaent of senior Labor Departaent officials 
experienced in e•ployaent training policy, and was slow in 
developing its own legislative recommendations. Senator 
Quayle and, later, Senator Hatch became coaaitted to 
passing JTPA, convinced their colleagues outside the 
subgovernaent to support JTPA, and shepherded its final 
shaping through negotiations between the conference 
com•ittee and the Administration. Congruent with Cobb and 
Elder~s aodel of subgovernment operations, other members 
of Congress were content to let the aubgovernment decide 
the aaJor provisions of the bill, even though there waa 
controversy over the provisions. 
In the case of JTPA, reliance on the subgovernment 
extended even past floor passage, to the work of the 
conference committee. Although aaJor features of the bill 
had to: be settled in conference, the conference coaaittee 
itself was composed of congressional members of the 
employaent training subgovernment. The pressures of time, 
the technicalities of the legislation, and the relatively 
small sums of aoney involved all made it easier for 
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Congressaen to trust the Joint con£erees to aake the £inal 
compromises. 
Kingdon's model 0£ Congressional voting behavior 
(1981>, though oriented to individual decision-making, 
proved to be £ully coapleaentary with the group process 
models of Cobb, Elder, Franklin, and Ripley. Kingdon's 
conceptualization is only strengthened by the 
identi£ication 0£ cue-givers on distributional policy 
issues with the Congressional leaders of the relevant 
subgovernment committees and subcommittees. 
One area in which Kingdon's work would be buttressed 
by a aore explicit recognition 0£ the structural 
characteristics of Congressional policy asking is in the 
identification and analysis of important votes. 3TPA was 
controversial throughout •ost of its development, but its· 
final passage was alaost unanimous. This near-unanimity 
underscores the perception of Congress that 3TPA was 
primarily distributive legislation. In distributive 
legislation, opposition tends to coalesce around votes on 
crucial amendments that would recast distributive 
provisions in the ways that the opposition favors. The 
distributive compromises are made before a vote on final 
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paasage. Once the proviaiona 0£ the bill are set, it ia 
o£ten preferable, even for Congressaen whose policy 
pre£erences lost on the £loor, to vote in £avor 0£ final 
passage, in order to reap at least a little credit with 
those to whom the bill distributes £unds. There£ore, the 
subcommittee and committee votes, along with £ull House 
£loor votes on substitution amendments, were the crucial 
votes £or JTPA. Kingdon's model would not explain why a 
Congressman would oppose a bill at one stage 0£ the 
legislative process and then support the bill on £inal 
passage, without changing his or her policy positions. To 
explain such behavior, it is necessary to understand the 
structure 0£ policy making as presented here. 
Other elements in Kingdon's aodel 0£ voting behavior 
also help explain the success 0£ JTPA. During 1982, a 
political consensus £oraed that some employment training 
program was necessary; this feeling was, i£ not caused, 
then certainly intensified by the rapidly growing 
uneaployaent in 1981-82 and the consequent need £or at 
least the appearance of a political response to that 
unemployment. In terms 0£ Kingdon's model <page 52 
above>, Congressmen decided that another policy goal had 
become involved, and the concept 0£ employaent training 
programs as employment programs resurfaced. 
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It ia aaid:o£ children that when they are given a 
haaaer, everything needs hammering. In the caae 0£ 
Congress, when they need a hammer, everything about the• 
suddenly looks hammer-like. In 1982, Congress needed a 
quick response to rapidly riaing unemployaent, and they 
grasped 3TPA as the nearest thing to an employment program 
they possessed. Once the President indicated satis£action 
with the JTPA compromise, Congressmen £elt £ree to vote 
with their policy goal. 
In addition, JTPA--like CETA--was distributive 
legislation that would deliver some bene£its to every 
Congressional district. Support £or £inal passage, even 
by those who opposed the bill earlier, established a 
record £or caJl\paign claims of "delivering the goods" to 
the Congressman's hoae district. 
Further, Democratic aembers 0£ the subgovernaent, 
especially in the House, were able to muster strong 
support among their colleagues £or an eaployment training 
program that retained aany of the £eatures and some 0£ the 
administrative structures 0£ CETA. Republicans and 
Administration strategists appear to have overestimated 
the extent of negative feelings about CETA. A substantial 
number 0£ Democrats had deserted their party leaders 
during the 1981 budget battle, earning the name "boll 
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weavila;";thia phenomenon did not reoccur during the 
developaent 0£ JTPA. 
Finally, the eventual achieveaent 0£ a compromise by 
Congressional members 0£ the employaent training 
aubgovernment from both parties had a strong e££ect on 
other Congressmen. Other Congressmen decided to £ollow 
the lead of the subgovernment. The achievement 0£ 
subgovernment-Executive compro•ise aade the legislation 
noncontroversial, and Congressmen were free to vote with 
the environment. 
To what extent did political party labels serve to 
distinguish between the policy pre£erences 0£ 
aubgovernaent actors? I£ we grouped the members 0£ the 
subgovernment according to their policy preferences and 
per£oraed an intuitive discriminant analysis, Democrats 
and Republicans would be divided into two large clusters, 
but with some overlap. In the developaent 0£ JTPA, 
Democrats were the more coherent group; they generally 
supported the continuation 0£ CETA with some 
modi£ications. Although Senator Kennedy forged a 
coaproaise proposal with Senator Quayle, his agreement was 
widely interpreted as tactical, the establishment 0£ the 
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beat possible bargaining position while keeping in mind 
the .developaent 0£ aore "purely Democratic:" legislation in 
the House. 
Republican subgovernment members overlapped the aost 
with Deaocrats in their policy views. They quickly 
realized, as the Administration did not, that their 
business constituents wanted employment training programs 
to be continued. Consequently, they were forced to assume 
the burden of policy initiation and £orge the compromises 
that formed JTPA. 
The differential in£luence 0£ various interest groups 
is clearer when we distinguish three levels 0£ spec:i£icity 
in the structure 0£ JTPA. On the aost general level, that 
0£ overall £unding, the tide 0£ Reagonomics threatened to 
sweep all be£ore it, and JTPA was almost submerged along 
with other social programs. Be£ore JTPA could be 
designed, the £irst Reagan budget reductions cut CETA in 
hal£. It took a concerted e££ort by the subgovernment to 
save as much as they did, in the £ace 0£ an Administration 
that originally claimed to oppose any employment training 
prograas. 
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The aecond level 0£ the JTPA structure concerned the 
control of program planning and adainistration. Here, 
state, local, and Federal intereata clashed, and the 
subgovernaent decided the issues through incremental 
coaproaise. States won more in£luence, but not nearly as 
much as they desired or the Administration wished them to 
have. Governors must pass £unds through to localities, 
and were given only limited influence over local programs. 
The Secretary of Labor was forced to retain an oversight 
role, so the Administration's original block grant concept 
was compromised. Most cities were protected in the right 
to be prime sponsors, and were guaranteed Joint control of 
program content with business and other private groups. 
At the same time, the private sector, especia1ly business, 
was given more input into the planning and administrative 
process. Congress aay have given business even more 
influence over planning than it wanted, to Judge by ~oae 
of the comments reported in Chapter Eight. 
The third level of prograa structure, still more 
specific and technical, concerned issues such as the 
planning and operation of training programs, criteria for 
eligibility, and the content of training. At this level, 
the influence of employment training practitioners and 
policy professionals was relatively great. Practitioners 
gained <or protected) the right to great flexibility in 
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progra• atructure. Policy professionals gained a aandate 
for broad-based, uniform performance and evaluation 
standards <although their fora was left to be determined 
through regulatory action>. 
Deciding who wins a compromise, like deciding whether 
a glass is half-empty or half-full, involves a calculus 0£ 
expectations measured against results. If we believe that 
the Adainistration sincerely wanted to cancel active 
Federal involvement in employment training prograas, as 
some of its o££icials said in 1981, then the 
Administration lost. I£ we believe that the threat of 
cancellation was merely a feint, or a bargaining chip, 
then the Administration was much more successful. The 
Administration's top priorities for an eaployment training 
bill--lower funding, no stipends, strict targeting, low 
administrative expenses--were achieved to a substantial 
degree. 
Representative Hawkins and his Democratic supporters 
were swiaaing against the political current when they 
tried to preserve an activist Federal employment training 
policy. They lost the money issues. They were 
successful, though, in retaining an administrative 
structure that, given more funding, would be able to carry 
out a considerably more activist policy. In £act, the 
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atructura that waa designed £or JTPA, in ita complexity, 
aultlplicity of administrative levels, and broad scope of 
peraissible activities, is beat suited to a much larger 
prograa; the practical question was whether it could 
function efficiently with the s•aller funding allotted to 
it. This question cannot yet be answered. 
JTPA, like CETA, was the result of many coapromises, 
within the parameters set by more general political 
considerations. The aaJority 0£ program changes were 
increaental in nature, even when neither side was pleased 
by the results. 
In the context 0£ employment training distributive 
policy making, incremental compromise was such a powerful 
aode of conflict resolution that it took precedence over 
issues 0£ program functionality. Good compromises do not 
necessarily make good programs, and the coaproaises over 
prograa control left JTPA with an unwieldy planning and 
adainistrative structure, still shot through with 
ambiguities and unresolved issues. Quite an elaborate 
plannin~, administrative, and evaluation systea was 
designed, full of checks and balances designed to protect 
the interests of subgovernment members. This elaborate 
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structure was then provided with relatively meager 
appr6priations. It appeared that service delivery areas 
would £ind themselves with extensive administrative 
requirements, small numbers 0£ training opportunities, and 
strict limits on administrative expenses. This bind is 
only now C1985) beginning to be £elt in the field. 
JTPA's mismatched policy elements were a result of 
fundamental problems in the operation of the policy making 
process. We can see that the more important the issue, 
the later in the policy process it is likely to be 
resolved, especially when, as in the case of JTPA, 
important policy initiatives challenge existing 
subgovernment operations. The Administration had more 
in£luence outside than inside the employment training 
subgovernaent, and so imposed the greatest policy changes 
in conference committee negotiations, after all other 
eleaents were in place. Proponents of employment training 
programs had to design the legislation as though they 
would win their £ights with the Administration; when they 
did not, they were forced to live with the result. 
What may we conclude about the prospects £or change 
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1. Compared to Davidson's findings for the period 
1969-72, the identity of subgovernment actors is 
essentially the same. 
2. The employment training subgovernment continues to be 
•arked by internal complexity, vertical integration, 
and functional autonomy. 
3. The situation of the employment training subgovernment 
is largely that of subgovernment dominance, although 
the Reagan Administration forced some ma)or 
adaptations. 
4. The only maJor redistributive issue during the 
development of JTPA was that of stipends; during the 
development of CETA's amendments and JTPA, the 
employment training subgovernment successfully 
redefined redistributive issues of service to clients 
es distributive issues--chiefly, the division of 
aonies among governmental units and the provision 0£ 
subsidies to business. 
5. Congressional-bureaucratic relationships over 
distributional and redistributional issues did tend to 
correspond to Ripley and Franklin's model, with the 
Executive branch wielding more influence over 
redistributive issues. 
6. Policy preferences of nonmembers of the employment 
training subgovernment £ailed to reach the formal 
agenda. 
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7. Policy con£licts were chie£ly confined to members of 
~the subgovernment. Issue expansion was used by the 
Ad•inistration, with some success. 
8. Groups receiving resources from CETA attempted to 
protect their right to receive resources under JTPA. 
9. Issue expansion was limited chiefly by the achievement 
of compromise within the subgovernment; the 
rede£inition of redistributive issues as distributive 
was one popular tactic to achieve compromise. Issue 
expansion was also limited by de£ining the issue as a 
technical one, more suitably resolved by reference to 
policy professionals or deferral to the regulatory 
process. 
10. Sy•bols were used successfully in issue expansion, 
particularly by President Reagan. Appeals were moat 
often made to more general political goals of the 
Administration, such as budget-cutting. 
11. Symbolic means were used to ease the denial of policy 
preferences, as in the case 0£ introducing bills that 
would not receive serious attention. 
12. Issue entrepreneurs were those Congressmen who held 
the leading structural positions within the 
subgovernment--subcommittee and committee chairmen and 
ainority leaders. 
13. Party labels were important but not per£ect predictors 
0£ policy preferences and voting behavior. Republican 
issue entrepreneurs within the subgovernment broke 
with the wishes 0£ the Administration to achieve 
co•promise with the Democrats. 
14. Kingdon's consensus model of Congressional voting 
behavior showed a good £it with the data in the JTPA 
policy process, when the role 0£ the subgovernment was 
taken into account. 
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in employment training policy? Within the subgovernment, . 
the pattern of distributive policy making is entrenched, 
and the forces that might move policy in a more 
redistributive direction are on the defensive. We may 
expect a maJor change only if led by the Administration. 
If the Administration remains cool or hostile to 
employment training programs, the subgovernment can at 
best hope to defend the status quo, perhaps winning small 
incremental additions to funding, rationalized by the need 
for more skill training or by high unemployment, perhaps 
absorbing more budget cuts if further reductions in social 
spending are made. 
Is there any way to break out of the straitJacket of 
incremental change? It appears that radical changes in 
policy can only be made when the overwhelming maJority of 
the subgovernment agree that it is needed Cand when they 
agree on the direction of change>, or when the President 
successfully uses issue-expansion tactics and mobilizes a 
coalition to defeat the subgovernment <as in the 
redistributive model>. 
The Reagan Administration defined employment training 
programs as handouts of remedial assistance, to be 
strictly limited to the deserving poor. It successfully 
resisted the definition of employment training policy as a 
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response to the structural problems 0£ the economy, and .. 
imposed its "blame the victim .. image on the disadvantaged 
unemployed. Together with business end government 
interests within the employment training subgovernment, 
the Administration helped strengthen the distributive 
elements of employment training policy, a thrust that drew 
attention away £rom the problems 0£ the unemployed and 
disadvantaged. 
Unemployment is a persistent structural problem of 
Western economies. Other governments, most notably in the 
Nordic countries, have used employment training programs 
as an important element in their response to unemployment 
<Rehn, 1980>. Used in conJunction with or in place of 
unemployment compensation schemes, training programs can 
mitigate the social and psychological coats of 
unemployment while. increasing the productive skills of the 
workforce and the capacity of the economy. In the 1980s, 
the United States has turned away from this opportunity, 
and this constitutes the greatest failure of employment 
training policy. 
If we resign ourselves to the inability of the 
Administration and subgovernment to pursue a fundamentally 
aore enlightened approach to employment training policy 
for the rest of this decade, it would be better for 
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prograa effectiveness not to tinker much more with the 
employment training program structure, which could 
certainly handle increased funding without maJor changes. 
Given the context of Federal policy making in the 
mid-1980s, an incremental increase in existing programs is 
the best that supporters of employment training programs 
can hope for. 
Finally, we return to the controversies between 
pluralists and power elite theorists. What can the 
experience of employment training policy making add to our 
understanding of that debate? 
Within the employment training subgovernment, the 
pluralist model more exactly describes the course of 
policy making. Most elements 0£ JTPA were the result of 
incremental compromises within the subgovernment. As we 
hypothesized, this is most strongly the case in 
distributional policy making; redistributional issues are 
aore o£ten settled outside the subgovernment. In 
distributional and in redistributional policy making, 
issue-expansion tactics may be used to involve a larger 
public within the policy process. Interest-group 
pluralism, to use Lowi's term, is a good description 0£ 
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the normal operation 0£ the employment training 
subgovernment. 
However, employment training policy making also 
illustrates the power elite theorists' contention that 
access to the policy making process is highly restricted; 
very £ew groups have the power to become pluralists inside 
the policy making arena. Thus, interest groups that 
manage-to gain access to ~ubgovernments can have a 
power£ul. effect on policy, and a source of funds such as a 
political action committee <PAC> can be a great help in 
gaining attention and credibility among Congressmen as a 
£orce to be reckoned with in a specific policy arena, 
particularly in distributive policy making, where the 
subgovernment is most important. 
Compared to other domains 0£ national policy, 
employment training is relatively young. Its 
subgovernment is rather unusual, since so many members 
represent other political units <states and cities> rather 
than private sector groups. We may assume that states and 
cities =have fewer resources to wield in the subgovernment 
arena, than corporate participants in, £or example, the 
energy or defense sector. In addition, while S3 to sa 
billion per year in funding may seem to be a considerable 
sum, it is small compared to the resources commanded by 
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the aubgovernmenta in the military-industrial complex, and 
the amount any one governmental unit could receive is 
relatively smaller still. Those elite theorists looking 
£or con£irmation 0£ the control of government policy by a 
saall group 0£ capitalists and their lackeys should 
concentrate their attention on the truly big-money 
subgovernments, rather than those that administer social 
wel£are programs. 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that indicates the 
employment training subgovernment is in any way atypical 
0£ subgovernments in general, and it has £unctioned £or 
nearly twenty years in a manner consistent with the model 
0£ subgovernment operations elaborated above. During its 
li£etime, the subgovernment has shown considerable 
stability, and subgovernment members remained potent 
actors in the design 0£ JTPA. 
From a conservative point 0£ view, subgovernments 
could be termed a stabilizing £orce; they insulate the 
policy making process £rom the in£luence 0£ the 
unorgatiized, as well as £rom the too-rapid e££ects 0£ 
shi£ts in public opinion. I£ one £ears the tyranny of the 
maJority, subgovernments have positive £unctions; but 1£ 
one opposes the domination 0£.government by a a 11 power 
elite .. 0£ capitalists, or a small group of powerful 
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interest groups, then subgovernmenta are a bastion raised 
against popular democracy. Worse still, admission to 
subgovernments seems to be growing ever more dif£icult, 
especially in terms 0£ the amount 0£ £inancial and 
organizational resources that need to be marshalled to 
participate in the subgovernment process. 
The most disturbing £inding 0£ this study is that, 
even in a relatively unimportant subgovernment, charged 
with carrying out a social welfare £unction, access to the 
£ormal agenda 0£ decision making was limited to 
well-organized and well-£inanced members 0£ the 
subgovernment, and that the interests 0£ those actually 
served by employment training programs have received 
decreasing attention. Elite theorists correctly question 
the accessibility 0£ government policy making to citizens. 
I£ individual citizens are not allowed to participate in 
setting the agenda £or policy making, i£ the context of 
policy making is de£ined by a saall number 0£ 
nonresponsive interest groups and bureaucrats, and i£ aass 
participation in democracy is limited to a voter's choice 
between candidates espousing only the most symbolic and 
ambiguous "issues," we may, with Titus Livy, £ear that 
decline is at hand. 
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The inability of the Reagan Administration to •ake 
•ore radical changes in employment training policy, 
despite its great influence during the "honeymoon" period 
of 1981, suggests that non-incremental changes in policy 
are becoming increasingly difficult to achieve in 
Congress, whatever Administration is in power. At a time 
when the pace of economic and social change is 
accelerating, the calcification of the policy making 
process is a frightening omen of future crises. Our 
responsibility as citizens, then, is to attempt to raise 
the level of public consciousness about subgovernments end 
the policy domains in which they operate; in the 
terminology of this study, to expand the issue of 
subgovernment operation until it reaches the public 
agenda. Activists must develop strategies to gain access 
to subgovernments, or perfect the techniques of 
issue-expansion in order to impose change from outside 
subgovernments. 
As students of the policy making process, we should 
realize that at best we can hope for incremental changes 
in the structure of subgovernment policy making, and that 
those who advocate change must organize to represent their 
interests. Individualism is honored as an American 
political and intellectual value, but unorganized 
individuals no longer have a voice in American political 
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life. To organize for change is difficult, but not 
impossible: the alternative ia to await calamity. 
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